How far does Stalins position as General Secretary explain his success in defeating his rivals in the years 1924-1929?
How far does Stalin’s position as General Secretary explain his success in defeating his rivals in the years 1924-1929? Following Lenin’s death in 1924, the Communist leadership of Russia was thrown into disarray. Different ideas for the future of socialism were unveiled, and out of this ideological confusion, various contenders for the party emerged. Throughout the next five years, a turbulent period of struggle in the power vacuum between these contenders ensued, and Stalin eventually emerged as the successful new leader of the USSR. Stalin’s position as General Secretary of the party, among other factors of which I shall explore, contributed to this appointment – a leader which would effectively go on to win WW2, whilst enforcing totalitarianism throughout Russia. Stalin’s position of General Secretary allowed him to use and abuse Lenin’s systems to get to the top. Stalin had the power to control what was discussed and how politburo decisions were to be carried out, and he had the significant influence of patronage. This allowed him to access every strand of the Communist party – the orgburo, politburo, and secretariat. His power of patronage allowed him to use his authority to place his most reliable supporters in key and enviable positions within the party. As a result, these people were extremely loyal to Stalin since they owed their place to him, and so therefore he could count on their support. These appointed people became known as ‘Stalinist delegates’ since at party congresses they could deliver the votes in Stalin’s favour. Stalin also had other key positions in the party, rendering his powerbase as ‘bureaucratic’ – one that allowed him to outmanoeuvre his rivals through a series of alliances. Stalin was head of the Sovnarkom which enabled him to expel party members who disagreed with his views and aims. In removing people seen as more extreme, such as soldiers and students, this eroded Trotsky’s support base (the leading contender), as head of the Red Army. His position as Commissar for Nationalities meant he could gain loyalty from the officials running non- Russian regions – effectively expanding his support base and spreading his ideas. As appointed as Commissar of peasants and workers inspectectorate, Stalin also had the power to expel those from
the government who disagreed with him. All of these important positions in the party, especially General Secretary, combined meant Stalin had a hugely powerful role within Communism, and it was the way he strategically harnessed the significance of these positions in order to control the party which contributed to his success. None of his rivals had a powerbase similar to his, and so whatever the ability of his rivals, he could always outvote and outmanoeuvre them regardless of talent. The ideological conflict of the contenders and the way in which Stalin was politically shrewd and carried out a series of ...
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the government who disagreed with him. All of these important positions in the party, especially General Secretary, combined meant Stalin had a hugely powerful role within Communism, and it was the way he strategically harnessed the significance of these positions in order to control the party which contributed to his success. None of his rivals had a powerbase similar to his, and so whatever the ability of his rivals, he could always outvote and outmanoeuvre them regardless of talent. The ideological conflict of the contenders and the way in which Stalin was politically shrewd and carried out a series of shifting alliances contributed to his appointment as leader of the Communist party. Stalin was a centrist who never chose the right or the left wings within Communism – he kept his cards open and never gave his views away. The way in which he shifted alliances with the different contenders could be compared to an analogy of playing them off against each other; he simply said nothing and let them ruin each other to a point where they were all out of the leadership struggle. To reduce Trotsky’s influence (the main contender), Stalin formed a coalition with Zinoviev and Kamenev named the ‘triumvirate’, in 1923. This opposed the left opposition’s struggle for power and highlighted key issues in the industrialisation debate and the future of revolution in Russia. The triumvirate discredited Trotsky because it capitalised on the ‘Cult of Lenin’, suggesting that Trotsky was disloyal to the former leader and his ideas. They claimed that his book showed apparent disrespect for Lenin, they questioned his ideology, and they also focused on his lack of activities since the revolution. Zinoviev described the NEP as ‘a temporary deviation, a tactical retreat’, suggesting the NEP could be used to get out of trouble from the backwardness of economic output from war communism. Stalin went on to link with Bukharin to form the ‘duumvirate’ to oppose Zinoviev and Kamenev. This suited Stalin because of his belief in the policy of ‘socialism in one country’ and because he saw the NEP as weak and unnecessary (this was his chance to rid of it). By temporarily boosting the popularity of the NEP before breaking away from Bukharin later on, it led to the eventual political demise of the left wing of the Communist party. At the 16th party congress, Zinoviev and Kamenev were substantially outvoted by ‘Stalinist delegates’ who voted in favour of Stalin. Stalin went on to accuse Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Kamenev of forming a faction with the opposing group to the ‘duumvirate’ called the ‘United Opposition’. By using this against these contenders in the leadership struggle, they all lost their positions of power. In 1928 Stalin broke his alliance with Bukharin and this was the point at which he had eliminated all credible opponents from the leadership battle. Stalin suddenly went on to blast the NEP and favour rapid industrialisation and a force for the kulaks. To Trotsky, Bukharin’s backing of the NEP suggested he was too capitalist and was neglecting the working class and undermining Communism. However, Trotsky’s theory of permanent revolution also seemed too extreme. By Stalin differing his positions on the NEP through to the mid 1920s before deciding to rapidly industrialise at the end of the 1920s, he was supported by most of the party because he responded to the mood of the times and had loyal supporters. Stalin forced Bukharin to admit his political errors by accusing him of factionalism. This attacked Bukharin and his powerbase as party theorist and communications, which stopped not only Bukharin but also his allies Rykov and Tomsky. This resulted in a political structure which was entirely dominated by Stalinist delegates who ensured votes in Stalin’s favour. Stalin’s socialism in one country appealed to the nationalism of the party because it was focused on building a self sufficient Russia. Trotsky once said, ‘the renovation of the party apparatus...must aim at replacing the mummified bureaucrats’, suggesting that the party was becoming too bureaucratic and was losing the spirit of the revolution, and that it needed more democracy and openness. However, Stalin’s political shrewdness and his strategic alliances resulted in him being the only credible person left to lead the Communist party, effectively having destroyed all other opponents. Another reason for the succession of Stalin to become Communist party leader is because he came out top when personal rivalries between the contenders occurred. Stalin tricked Trotsky into not turning up for Lenin’s funeral. This undermined Trotsky’s credibility and led to accusations of disloyalty to Lenin. This also ensured that Stalin could take on the responsibility of Leninism to transfer Lenin’s prestige to himself. Zinoviev and Kamenev were also hugely willing to attack Trotsky during the triumvirate period, because they had never forgiven Trotsky for personal attacks during the 1917 October revolution. These personal attacks led to the defeat of him at the 13th party congress in 1924. Lastly, Stalin also planted fears of ‘bonapartism’. He suggested that just like Napoleon had hijacked the revolution to become a military dictator in France, which the same could happen in Russia with Trotsky as head of the Red Army. This seriously damaged Trotsky’s integrity and created space for Stalin to claim the power Trotsky lost. Lenin’s legacy also certainly helped Stalin gain in the leadership struggle. After the civil war, Lenin had implemented the NEP. However this was seen as soft since it allowed free trade and favoured peasants rather than the working classes. This created divisions in the party because many members wanted a more socialist policy – which is exactly what Stalin delivered by differing his positions on the NEP and industrialisation. The ban on factionalism had to be accepted by all party members, which went on to help Stalin because he used it against the other contenders to contribute to knocking them out of the power struggle. Therefore, Lenin inadvertently helped Stalin because he left fragile policies which Stalin could manipulate, and combined with hard party rules, he could exploit this with his role as General Secretary to overcome his rivals. Lenin saw Stalin as ‘not being able to use power with sufficient caution’, but because he never named an heir and since the potentially damaging will was never surfaced, Stalin took this on. Lenin also did not make it clear how socialism was to be built and consolidated within the USSR, but because Stalin had a centrist role and the party had taken on a centralised nature, this made it easy for Stalin to control with his many positions within the party, eventually contributing to his emergence as leader. Stalin also had many personal qualities and characteristics which without a doubt helped him in his quest to win the power struggle. He was described as ‘comrade card-index’ because of his bureaucratic roles, but his contenders undermined this because it was actually his bureaucratic nature which helped him to form alliances which played each contender off against each other. Stalin stayed in the background and ostensibly appeared to be a moderate peace maker - nobody realised he was a serious power player until it was too late. He was perceived to be a ‘dull blur’ – again nobody realised the potential Stalin had hiding away. Stalin was tough and ruthless and was determined in his nature not to be cast out of the leadership struggle, and his political skills and cunningness of shifting alliances again, contributed to the reason why he became party leader in 1929. As a result of his bureaucratic nature, Stalin was suited to managing a party which had become centralised and bureaucratic, and he was less high minded and more down to earth – more concerned with the practicalities facing the party in comparison to the other contenders. He also had a revolutionary record and had Georgian proletarian roots, meaning he was not seen as a threat to cause splits in the party (unlike Trotsky). In conclusion, the ‘grey blur’ that was Stalin quietly defeated his major opponents and secured the leadership of the USSR until his death in 1953. He won the leadership struggle without the threat of gulags (political labour camps), imprisonment, or murder – his political prowess gained him victory among the other discussed factors. It would be ignorant to solely admire Stalin for his climb to power through his positions in the party such as General Secretary – he was helped along by luck – it was an advantageous time for Lenin to die. The weaknesses of opponents - Trotsky effectively led to his own demise. The help of early allies - Zinoviev and Kamenev were key to dismantling Trotsky. The ideological conflict - Stalin strategically shifted alliances to play off each contender with each other. The personal rivalries between contenders - Stalin’s political cunningness undermined his opponents. The legacy Lenin left - Stalin was suited to bequeath the Russia he left behind. Lastly, the personal qualities of Stalin - he wasn’t perceived as a threat until it was too late. However, his position as General Secretary was paramount to his rise despite these other factors, because it gave him the ability to appoint who he chose to the politburo and Sovnarkom. Without patronage, Stalin would have seriously struggled to gain the power of the USSR. His role as General Secretary ensured that Stalin could not be defeated politically in the struggle for power in the years 1924-1929.