The economic cost of war which resulted in social disturbances in Russia is to be considered as a reason for the revolution in 1917 rather than Lenin’s contribution. The war slumped down the economy because 15 millions of Russians were conscripted to the army so the main industrial work has been taken on by children and women. Not only industrially developed areas such as Poland were lost due to Germany defeat over Russia but also the Baltic sea which provided trade route to Europe was lost. In addition, the food supplies were sent to the troops at the expense of the civilians and the living cost rose by 300%. In such circumstances, 175,000 workers in Petrograd went on strike. Therefore, the economic and social cost of war appeared to spark revolution in 1917 rather than Lenin himself. The failure to extract Russia from war was not the only failure of the Provisional Government.
During 1917 the apparatus of the Provisional Government was so disintegrated that it was easy for Lenin to take over the rule from the insufficient Provisional Government. It acted in a self-denying manner, which has been described by Chernov as the government’s paralysis ‘by its alliance with the bourgeois nationalists’. This meant that it was torn between meeting the needs of the peasantry and the needs of the nobility. This was reflected when in 1917 the harvest was too poor to produce surplus for the landowners and to feed the peasants. Thus, the Provisional Government sent ‘the punishment brigades’ into the countryside to force requisitions. This resulted in deepened frustration and rebellions among the peasants and, in addition, the workers demanded the price controls but the government was too frightened to act against the industrialist. Consequently, the disappointments and frustrations expressed in July Days by the workers proved to be nothing more than dissatisfaction with the policies of the Provisional Government rather than Lenin’s input.
However, some may argue that Lenin’s actions after his return in April were actually crucial in the revolution of 1917. His slogans used in April Theses such as ‘all power to the Soviets’ and ‘peace, land and bread’ became largely popular. Bolshevik support by December increased by 164% and its membership rose to 200,000 by October. Lenin himself claimed that ‘history will not forgive us if we do not assume power’. On the other hand, some historians argue that Russia was heading for a socialists takeover anyway and Lenin only ensured that this takeover will be entitled to Bolsheviks. As before April 1917 Lenin was abroad, it is clear that he simply reacted to the simultaneous events. In this way, the revolution of 1917 was more an effect of the Provisional Government weaknesses than Lenin’s actions.
To conclude, Lenin was responsible for the revolution in 1917 only to the limited extent. The revolution therefore was more a direct consequence of the Provisional Government’s instability and its failure to extract Russia from the war.
