How significant was Lenin between the years 1902-1918 to the formation of the Bolshevik Government?

by thomasrobinson01hotmailcouk (student)

By “formation of the Bolshevik Government” (BG), we are referring to the October Revolution (OR) and lead up to it. Lenin’s significance throughout the timeframe, 1902-1918, to the formation of the BG has been characterised by theoretical and written works, outlining the Bolsheviks Party’s policy and methods, as well as impressive leadership in calling for, and achievement of, a socialist revolution. Yet, one must consider the influences and achievements of other individuals and factors; which undoubtedly aided the communists in their plight against the Provisional Government (PG).

The adaptation of Marxism by Lenin to suit Russian circumstances, allowed him to apply Marxist principles to a social and economic context for which they had not been intended for. In Marxist theory, before a proletariat uprising could occur, first a Bourgeois Revolution (BR) must establish parliamentary democracy and full scale industrialisation, while removing feudalism and Absolute Monarchy. Russia, on the other hand, was still an autocratic, totalitarian, state with no civic freedoms; coupled with a feudal system: no revolution could happen until a BR was achieved. The Mensheviks wanted to have an alliance with the Liberals in order to bring about said revolution.1 Lenin refuted this idea, however, at the RSD’s Second Party Congress in 19032: his position being that the Liberals would make a deal with the monarchy. He laid out his views on Marxism in What Is To Be Done in 1902 – ‘adapting’ the principle of revolution from below into revolution from above. In other words he advocated the recruiting of “professional revolutionaries”3 – who would form a “Vanguard Party”4 – reflecting the views of the workers, while at the same time excluding the “organisation of workers”5 or trade unions from the political side of the struggle (see source 1). Conversely, Marx had in 1868 asserted that “trade unions were the schools of socialism.”6 Lenin’s response was that the party should be comprised of purely professional full time activists, as they would have the experience and understanding to make it more difficult for the police to track them down; while the workers should participate in the economic struggle for higher wages. Lenin deemed this approach necessary as he was not content to wait for several decades while the BR was consolidated – partly because as the Social Revolutionaries (SR) were “uninterested in the intellectual necessities of Marxism”7, they would thus instigate an uprising when it suited them. Additionally, the proletariat were insufficiently large in number for Marx’s next stage, a communist revolution, to take place yet, so by bringing the revolution forward Lenin out manoeuvred fellow communists and the SR. The SR in particular were dangerous since their proposed land reforms gained them the support of the peasantry – numbering 97 million in 1897.8 Lenin’s trained party activists, or “professional revolutionaries”9, would therefore undertake the planning of the revolution and then, when the timing was right, prompt the proletariat into action before the other parties could act. Marx seemed to offer his support for this party policy in The Communist Manifesto published in 1848, it has been pointed out by official USSR theorists, by indicating the need for trained party activists – he stated that “the Communists...have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march”10 (see source 2). One must be careful when using Marx to justify Lenin’s actions, as the USSR theorists may have taken out of context the original meaning, in order validate their regime. Overall, Lenin’s adaptation of Marxism allowed a backward country in the midst of a BR to cut out 10 to 20 years of rapid industrialisation, and consequently the need for a large proletariat to secure a communist revolution; as under original Marxist theory. Lenin as a result achieved something thought impossible by fellow Marxists.

The writing of the April Theses in April 1917, proved to be of considerable significance in the gaining of support for the Bolshevik party (BP). Within the document, Lenin stresses there must be no cooperation with the PG (see source 3). In saying so, he had distanced himself from the SR and Mensheviks that had gone into government with the liberals, leaving his party as the only true radical one, and leaving the “socialists (in government) to become discredited in the eyes of the masses who saw them as tools of the conservative classes.”11 Lenin had a similar view, asserting that the “capitalists gleefully rubbed their hands at having found helpers against the people in the persons of the ‘leaders of the Soviets (Mensheviks)’”12 (see source 4). One can argue that Lenin had no reason to slander the Mensheviks for effect, since the source is Lenin’s own personal notes. However, the writings were translated into English during the 1960s in Moscow, at the height of the Cold War, so the motives of the interpreter, and whether they had any reason to alter them as a form of propaganda, must be considered. In addition, Lenin expressed his wish to end the war with Germany (see source 3); seen through his demand for incessant anti-war propaganda and once again isolating the Bolsheviks from the pro-war PG – a tact decision considering the unpopularity of the institution. Thus, the views put forward in the Theses reflected those of the Russian proletariat and peasantry – placing the BP at the forefront of the political scene: “membership (of the party) rocketed” from around 100,000 to really 500,000.13 Therefore, one can credit Lenin for bringing the previously small Bolsheviks party, to the forefront of the revolution; winning votes and minds.

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The Kornilov Coup of 1917 presented the Bolsheviks with an opportunity to strengthen and improve their position before the coming revolution. General Kornilov, dissatisfied with the PG over what he and other Generals saw as failure to suppress the threat from the left and the need for military discipline, was removed from the position of Commander-in-Chief by Kerensky for allegedly conspiring to carry-out an anti-revolution “right-wing coup.”14 Kornilov issued a manifesto denouncing the Bolsheviks in the Soviets and demanding continued resistance to Germany,15 and at once began an advance on Petrograd in order “to hang the German supporters and spies”16 who were manifested within the Bolsheviks.17 It was claimed at the time, by Kerensky, that Kornilov wished to set up a military dictatorship and this was just his cover. However, Kornilov maintained that it’s his “job…to save Russia (from the Bolsheviks and Germany) and rule it until the people elect their Assembly”18 (see source 6). The fact that the PG had plans abandoning Petrograd to the Germans19 adds trustworthiness to Kornilov’s desire to save Russia – yet both he and Kerensky would want to appear to be doing the right thing in public and “the truth about these events is uncertain”20 as the historian Oxley put it. Nevertheless, in order to defend the city, a council was set up by the central executive committee; including Bolshevik representatives released from prison.21 Lenin was not among them, but was watching events unfold from Finland.22 He would play no role as arms were distributed to a workers’ militia – a move by Kerensky that would prove invaluable in the preparation for the Bolsheviks’ uprising – strengthening the Red Guard. This short lived episode proved a complete failure, as Kornilov’s forces simply melted away:23 by September Kornilov himself had been taken prisoner.24 Moreover, this renegade escapade strengthened the fighting unit of the Bolsheviks – the PG effectively signing its own death warrant by increasing the firepower at the Bolsheviks disposal – while Lenin watched from the sidelines.

One can argue that the role of Trotsky was of greater significance to the formation to the BG. Despite Lenin being convinced since the beginning of September 1917 that the time was right for the Bolsheviks to seize power by force’25 the twelve member Bolshevik Central Committee thought his policy “sounded highly adventurous”26 and would not pass a resolution giving Lenin permission to do so. The main opposition came from Zinoviev and Kamenev who maintained that an insurrection “would be crushed.”27 Lenin did, however, have an ally in Trotsky, a fellow member of the board, and with his much needed help the two of them drove the rest of the members to their point of view. The following resolution document commanded “that the time for it [the revolution] is fully ripe”28 and an uprising is “inevitable”29(see source 5), possibly implying that the other Bolsheviks of the board were thinking about, if not planning a future uprising. Although true, the tide of opinion had been in favour of awaiting the results from the second All-Russian Congress of Soviets (ARCS) before acting.30 This was due to meet in the autumn – after the OR – and if judged on the first congress, which had voted 543 to 126 to support the PG,31 it was liable to elect predominately pro PG parties once again. Without Trotsky’s intervention to Lenin’s aid, an insurrection could have been delayed or worse, not carried out at all. Furthermore, it was Trotsky, as Lenin was still in self-imposed exile, in his capacity as Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, that conducted the necessary preparations for the revolution – a visit on 23rd October to the troops in the Peter-Paul fortress put a further 100,000 rifles at the Bolsheviks disposal32 – and it was Trotsky that ordered the commencing of hostilities on 25th October. Lenin himself did not appear until the second session of the ARCS the next evening.33 Hence, Lenin needed Trotsky’s assistance in sanctioning a revolution and relied on him to exercise direct control over the operation details. Thus, Trotsky’s skill and leadership was significant to the formation of the BG.

Overall, Lenin’s role in the formation of the BG from1902-1917 was of great significance. His reworking of Marxism so that it would hold relevance to the social and economic context of Russia in the early 20th century was his greatest achievement – allowing the Bolshevik Marxists of his time to attain purpose as professional revolutionaries – bringing about a communist revolution despite being in the midst of a bourgeoisie one. Lenin showed considerable political ability in appealing to the masses; his April Theses left the Bolsheviks as the only credible revolutionary party in the eyes of many – thus gaining much needed support and increased membership. However, the role of other factors and individuals throughout the time period also assisted Lenin in his quest for communist dominance. The Kornilov coup, instead of crushing the Bolsheviks, actually strengthened them – resulting in a better armed and led communist party. Additionally, Trotsky was a useful ally by Lenin’s side and certainly contributed to the formation of the BG: his help ensured the OR was brought forward and he had direct access to the planning and commencement of the hostilities. Although these other individuals and factors had a great significance on the revolution, it is imperative to remember that the original, keystone, idea of bring a communist revolution forward was Lenin’s.

Bibliography

Baggins, B., Ryan, S., Walters, D., Batur, S., Nehru, A., & Bismo, M. (2008). All-Russian Congress of the Soviet. Retrieved January 11, 2015, from The Encyclopedia of Marxism: https://www.marxists.org/glossary/events/a/arcs.htm#june-1917

Lenin, V. I. (1964). Collected Works June-September 1917 (Vol. 25). (S. Apresyan, & J. Riordan, Trans.) Moscow.

Lenin, V. I. (1902). What Is To Be Done. (J. Fineberg, & G. Hanna, Trans.)

Marx, K. (1848). The Communist Manifesto.

Oxley, P. (2001). Russia - From Tsars to Commissars 1855-1991.

Russia Today. (2011). Prominent Russians: Lavr Kornilov. Retrieved January 11, 2015, from Russiapedia: http://russiapedia.rt.com/prominent-russians/military/lavr-kornilov/

Wood, A. (2003). The Origins of the Russian Revolution 1861-1917 (3rd ed.).

Wood, A. (1986). The Russian Revolution (2nd ed.).

Woods, A. (1999). Part Six: The Year of Revolution. Retrieved January 11, 2015, from In Defense of Marxism: http://www.marxist.com/bolshevism-old/part6-2.html

Appendix

Extract from What Is To Be Done (Source 1):

Extract from The Communist Manifesto (Source 2):

Extract from the April Theses (Source 3):

1) In our attitude towards the war, which under the new [provisional] government of Lvov and Co. unquestionably remains on Russia’s part a predatory imperialist war owing to the capitalist nature of that government, not the slightest concession to “revolutionary defencism” is permissible. The class-conscious proletariat can give its consent to a revolutionary war, which would really justify revolutionary defencism, only on condition: (a) that the power pass to the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasants aligned with the proletariat; (b) that all annexations be renounced in deed and not in word; (c) that a complete break be effected in actual fact with all capitalist interests.

In view of the undoubted honesty of those broad sections of the mass believers in revolutionary defencism who accept the war only as a necessity, and not as a means of conquest, in view of the fact that they are being deceived by the bourgeoisie, it is necessary with particular thoroughness, persistence and patience to explain their error to them, to explain the inseparable connection existing between capital and the imperialist war, and to prove that without overthrowing capital it is impossible to end the war by a truly democratic peace, a peace not imposed by violence.

The most widespread campaign for this view must be organised in the army at the front.

2) The specific feature of the present situation in Russia is that the country is passing from the first stage of the revolution—which, owing to the insufficient class-consciousness and organisation of the proletariat, placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisie—to its second stage, which must place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest sections of the peasants.

This transition is characterised, on the one hand, by a maximum of legally recognised rights (Russia is now the freest of all the belligerent countries in the world); on the other, by the absence of violence towards the masses, and, finally, by their unreasoning trust in the government of capitalists, those worst enemies of peace and socialism.

This peculiar situation demands of us an ability to adapt ourselves to the special conditions of Party work among unprecedentedly large masses of proletarians who have just awakened to political life.

3) No support for the Provisional Government; the utter falsity of all its promises should be made clear, particularly of those relating to the renunciation of annexations. Exposure in place of the impermissible, illusion-breeding “demand” that this government, a government of capitalists, should cease to be an imperialist government.

Extract from Lenin’s personal letters (Source 4):

The Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks let themselves be fooled at once, and the “coalition” cabinet, joined by Chernov, Tsereteli and Co., became a fact on May 6. The simpletons of the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties were jubilant and fatuously bathed in the rays of the ministerial glory of their leaders. The capitalists gleefully rubbed their hands at having found helpers against the people in the persons of the “leaders of the Soviets” and at having secured their promise to support “offensive operations at the front”, i.e., a resumption of the imperialist predatory war, which had come to a standstill for a while. The capitalists were well aware of the puffed-up impotence of these leaders, they knew that the promises of the bourgeoisie—regarding control over production, and even the organisation of production, regarding a peace policy, and so forth—would never be fulfilled. And so it turned out. The second phase in the development of the revolution, May 6 to June 9, or June 18, fully corroborated the expectations of the capitalists as to the ease with which the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks could be fooled.

Resoltion Document (The decision for the October Revolution) (Source 5):

Quote from Kornilov (Source 6):

“I do not need any personal benefits. My job is to save Russia and rule it until the people elect their Assembly – the body that will determine the future development of the Russian state. It is the only way to save Russia from the German invasion.”

Issue

Sources

Comments

Teacher’s comments if appropriate

Teacher’s initials and date

Lenin’s adaptation of Marxism

Extract from What Is To Be Done (source 1)

A very valuable source, as a detailed exposition of Lenin’s adaptation of Marxism is provide; with key quotes. I am confident that this source is reliable since Lenin’s own thoughts on the matter are expressed.

Marx provides support for Lenin’s adaptation of Marxism

Extract from The Communist Manifesto (source 2)

I found grounding for Lenin’s adaptation of Marxism in this source, making it very useful. However, i have been careful not to take Marx’s words out of context. This is a direct source from Marx so its reliability is strong.

April Theses

Extract from the April Theses (Source 3)

This source can be seen as the turning point for the Bolsheviks, as it separated them from the other socialist parties. This is important for understanding Lenin’s contribution to the formation of the Bolsheviks Government. This source is reliable since Lenin made the Bolsheviks position public and acted out many of his assertions within it.

Lenin’s personal letter

Extract from Lenin’s personal letters (Source 4)

I used this source to provide support for the statement that the Bolsheviks were the only true radical party left. The reliability is good since the letter was not made public at the time, so Lenin would have minimal cause to lie in anyway, and the public were also of similar opinion to Lenin himself.

The decision for the October Revolution

Resoltion Document (Source 5)

This source is useful in so far that it can be used to question the significance of Trotsky, in contributing to the sanctioning of a revolution by the Bolsheviks. This source is reliable since it is produced by the Bolshevik Central Committee themselves.

Kornilov Coup

Quote from Kornilov (Source 6)

A useful source for providing evidence that Kornilov did not want to form a right-wing anti-revolutionary government. It also provides an insight into his character which is of use in evaluating him. The reliability of this source is not confirmed however, so I was careful not to place too much emphasis on it.

1 Lenin, V. I. (1902). What Is To Be Done. (J. Fineberg, & G. Hanna, Trans.) p43.

2 Lenin, V. I. (1902). What Is To Be Done. (J. Fineberg, & G. Hanna, Trans.) p43.

3 Lenin, V. I. (1902). What Is To Be Done. (J. Fineberg, & G. Hanna, Trans.) p24.

4 Lenin, V. I. (1902). What Is To Be Done. (J. Fineberg, & G. Hanna, Trans.) p24.

5 Lenin, V. I. (1902). What Is To Be Done. (J. Fineberg, & G. Hanna, Trans.) p24.

6 Lenin, V. I. (1902). What Is To Be Done. (J. Fineberg, & G. Hanna, Trans.) p41.

7 Wood, A. (1986). The Russian Revolution (2nd ed.). p12.

8 Wood, A. (1986). The Russian Revolution (2nd ed.). p1 (1897 census).

9 Marx, K. (1848). The Communist Manifesto. p24.

10 Marx, K. (1848). The Communist Manifesto. p24.

11 Wood, A. (1986). The Russian Revolution (2nd ed.). p32.

12 Lenin, V. I. (1964). Collected Works June-September 1917 (Vol. 25). (S. Apresyan, & J. Riordan, Trans.) Moscow. p237.

13 Wood, A. (2003). The Origins of the Russian Revolution 1861-1917 (3rd ed.). p52.

14 Wood, A. (1986). The Russian Revolution (2nd ed.). p35.

15 Wood, A. (1986). The Russian Revolution (2nd ed.). p35.

16 Oxley, P. (2001). Russia - From Tsars to Commissars 1855-1991. p99.

17 Russia Today. (2011). Prominent Russians: Lavr Kornilov. Retrieved January 11, 2015, from Russiapedia: http://russiapedia.rt.com/prominent-russians/military/lavr-kornilov/

18 Russia Today. (2011). Prominent Russians: Lavr Kornilov. Retrieved January 11, 2015, from Russiapedia: http://russiapedia.rt.com/prominent-russians/military/lavr-kornilov/

19 Wood, A. (1986). The Russian Revolution (2nd ed.). p39.

20 Oxley, P. (2001). Russia - From Tsars to Commissars 1855-1991. p99.

21 Wood, A. (1986). The Russian Revolution (2nd ed.). p35.

22 Oxley, P. (2001). Russia - From Tsars to Commissars 1855-1991. p99.

23 Wood, A. (1986). The Russian Revolution (2nd ed.). p35.

24 Wood, A. (1986). The Russian Revolution (2nd ed.). p35.

25 Wood, A. (1986). The Russian Revolution (2nd ed.). p38.

26 Wood, A. (1986). The Russian Revolution (2nd ed.). p38.

27 Wood, A. (1986). The Russian Revolution (2nd ed.). p38.

28 Wood, A. (1986). The Russian Revolution (2nd ed.). p83.

29 Wood, A. (1986). The Russian Revolution (2nd ed.). p83.

30 Wood, A. (1986). The Russian Revolution (2nd ed.). p83.

31 Baggins, B., Ryan, S., Walters, D., Batur, S., Nehru, A., & Bismo, M. (2008). All-Russian Congress of the Soviet. Retrieved January 11, 2015, from The Encyclopedia of Marxism: https://www.marxists.org/glossary/events/a/arcs.htm#june-1917

32 Wood, A. (1986). The Russian Revolution (2nd ed.). p39?.

33 Wood, A. (1986). The Russian Revolution (2nd ed.). p41.

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How significant was Lenin between the years 1902-1918 to the formation of the Bolshevik Government?