How Successful was Edward Carson in His Defense of Unionism During The Third Home Rule Crisis?

by shanedsweeneygmailcom (student)

Question: Unionism was Edward Carson’s “guiding star”. To what extent did Carson successfully defend Unionism during the third home rule crisis?

This piece of work will demonstrate how effective Edward Carson was in his defence of Unionism in Ireland during the third home rule crisis. It will examine events from Carson’s rise to the mantel of Unionism to how the crisis emerged and the resulting events from this and ultimately answering the question of how successful he was.

Edward Carson was born into a Dublin upper class family on the 9th February 1854. Educated at Trinity College he was there after called to the Irish bar in 1877 and began a highly lucrative and successful career. His achievements were noticed by Arthur Balfour and in recognising his talents recommended him for the position of Irish Solicitor-General in 1892. He moved his practice to London in 1893 and quickly made a name for himself with his abilities in cross examination and mastery of orating. He soon became head of the English bar and one of his most high profile cases was the trail of Oscar Wilde. At times, Carson was receiving fees in excess of £20,000 for his services, demonstrating the calibre of ruthless lawyer that his reputation afforded him. (Lyons, 1973, p. 299)

Caron had famously said that Unionism was “the guiding star of my political life” (Lyons, 1973, p. 300). This asks the question? Why did he believe in the Union and what are the religious, political and economic motives? Carson’s own politics were rather more perplexing than either his detractors or supporters could grasp. Carson had unwavering support for the Union and truly believed that any attempt to introduce home rule in Ireland was a serious threat which he would block. He also accused the Liberal government of corrupt dealings with John Redmond, the leader of the IPP in trying to push through a new home rule bill. (Rees, 1998, p. 149) What was politically alarming to Carson was that prominent members of the conservative party such as F.E. Smith were seriously considering the possibility of devolved government in Scotland, Wales and Ireland. The mere mention of this infuriated Carson. With that said, with the new form of Unionism and the establishment of the Ulster Unionist Council in 1905, Carson had found and “energetic, grass roots movement, ready to resist any attempt to impose home rule and only requiring direction” (Rees, 1998, p. 149) .To fully understand the intensity in which Irish Unionists rejected home rule, it is imperative to understand the history of the Union as a whole. This is a history that has been steeped in blood whether it is agrarian or nationalist. Whether or not nationalism took the form of constitutional nationalism or in the form of physical force republicanism, the Unionists however did not distinguish between them as they believed that they would use the introduction of home rule as a stepping stone to independent Ireland. If total separation was the intended aim, Unionists could argue that they were fighting a just cause, not just on a regional basis but for the safety of the empire as a whole. Religion would present itself as the most difficult aspect in which to measure. (Lyons, 1973, p. 289)To the ordinary Unionist and indeed across the spectrum, home rule translated into Rome rule. It can be said that the Unionist population’s fears stemmed from their numerical inferiority to Catholics. Not only were they outnumbered why considering the whole of Ireland, they had to contend with a large Catholic population in Ulster. Protestants already had seen the Catholic Church as having a major influence in nationalist politics and felt that this would be exasperated should home rule be introduced. Their concerns would be, to them, realised in reality in the renowned McCann case. In 1910 Mr McCann (a catholic) had abandoned his wife (a protestant) and had taken the children with him. The fact that any marriage not solemnised by the Catholic Church was null and void was exploited by Unionist propagandists. To them it showed that Rome could dictate their lives. To them, it perpetrated rank hypocrisy that the Catholic family was the only family was the only family. (Lee, 1990, p. 11). Economics also had a divisive role in Irish Unionist politics. For the most of the nineteenth century, the connection with England had given Ireland economic success. The Unionist landowners had received quite favourable terms under legislation introduced in 1903 and 1909 which had benefited the, greatly. More so was the industrialists of the north east who were directly reliant on the British free-trade area and the exposure to other markets. For these people, home rule was views with a great deal of contempt and suspicion. To them, home rule indicated rule under a protectionist regime offering little solace to the world outside of Ireland. (Lyons, 1973, p. 289)

The Home Rule crisis came about from a very British constitutional problem. Years of bitter disappointment for Redmond and the Home Rulers ended in 1909 when Lloyd George proposed a budget that would send shockwaves through the House of Lords who could not ignore it. There had been tensions between the upper and lower houses ever since the rejection of the second Home Rule Bill in 1893 which now dominated the relationship between the two. This was a situation that Redmond and nationalists would be quick to exploit. With the House of Lords rejecting the budget a general election was called in January 1910 which produced a hung parliament. After a series of elections, Asquith had the majority in parliament that he needed, he was able to press ahead with the Parliament Act which was introduced on the 21 February 1911. The bill contained three main clauses. It stated that the Lords should not be able to reject or amend any money bill: that if any other type of bill was to be rejected by the Lords that it would become law in 2 years and the maximum term a government could sit at one time was to be reduced from seven to five years. The conservatives were determined to fight this but were met with a problem when Lord Lansdowne had been told that the King was prepared to create the necessary liberal peers. (Rees, 1998, p. 147) This then created a spilt in the conservatives, the “hedgers” who would not vote against legislation as to avoid the large creation of liberal peers and the “ditchers” who were prepared to fight the bill all the way. The conservative party was already deeply divided over the issue of tariffs, but the issue of the Parliament Bill was to cause major divisional problems for them. When the vote finally took place on the 10th August 1911, the bill was passed 131 to 114 with the hedgers abstaining and over 30 conservatives voted with the government. The Parliament Act was now on the statue book and home rule seemed to be certain. In the end the conservatives were left reeling from a third consecutive election defeat and a divided party, the liberals on the other hand were confident and had succeeded in putting their plan in to action with military efficiency. (Rees, 1998, p. 148)

This is a preview of the whole essay

To say Unionist reacted negatively to the Parliament Act is an understatement. Their mood was palpable. The introduction of the Parliament act in August 1911 galvanised Unionists and gave great importance to a campaign of resistance to home rule. Even before the Home Rule Bill had entered the House of Commons, the Ulster Unionist Council had begun to organise it’s response by rolling out the propaganda machine and with a deepening of relations with the conservative party. In order to organise the best possible support, Carson turned to Ulster, after all it was this part of Ireland that had the highest concentration of support for the Union. Carson, whom it must be noted was not familiar with Ulster, by his own admission he had been only but a few times and needed someone on the ground to help mobilise a movement. For this he turned to James Craig, a Unionist politician for East Down. Craig was ideal for Carson’s plan. He had great organisational skills and was methodical in his planning in previous struggles against the attempted implementation of Home Rule. Craig had initially wrote to Carson asking for him to come to Ulster, Carson replied to Craig on the 29th July 1911 by saying; “What I am very anxious about is that people over there really mean to resist. I am not for a mere game of bluff, and unless men are prepared to male great sacrifices which they clearly understand, the talk of resistance is no use. We will… be confronted by many weaklings in our own camp who talk very loud and mean nothing and will be the first to criticise us when the moment of action comes” (Stewart, 1997, p. 47) Craig’s main concern now was to convince Carson that the Ulster people were resolute in their determination to stop any attempt of imposing Home Rule and would follow him without question. With this in mind he began to organise a monster meeting. On the 23rd September 1911 50,000 men attended from Orange Lodges and Unionist clubs across the province. At this meeting, Carson gave a passionate speech in which he states a programme which would defeat the governments “nefarious conspiracy” and that “We must be prepared….the morning Home Rule passes, ourselves to become responsible for the government of the Protestant people of Ulster” (Rees, 1998, p. 151) The Craigavon demonstration determined the policy and direction that would be followed for the next three years. The following Monday, a “Commission of Five” (Stewart, 1997, p. 48) was appointed to draft the constitution for the provisional government of Ulster, “having due regard to the interests of loyalists in other parts of Ireland”. (Stewart, 1997, p. 48) The people that worked with Carson on the Commission were Captain Craig, Colonel Sharman Crawford, Colonel R.H. Wallace, Thomas Sinclair and Edward Sclater (Stewart, 1997, p. 48).

On the 3rd of October, Winston Churchill addressed a meeting in Dundee. At this meeting he states that the government will introduce a Home Rule “and press it forward with all their strength.” “We must not attach too much importance to these frothing’s of Sir Edward Carson” he told the audience “I daresay when the worst comes to the worst we shall find that civil war evaporates in uncivil words…” (Stewart, 1997, p. 49) Churchill was quick to point out that Carson and been “elected Commander in Chief” of only half of Ulster, a connotation that delighted Carson’s detractors. It can be said that it would not be have been completely wrong for Liberal observers to allow themselves to think that Carson was engaging them in an elaborate game of bluff. Demographically, three counties in Ulster, Monanagh, Cavan and Donegal had large Nationalist majorities whilst Fermanagh and Tyrone had Catholic majorities by a much smaller margin. The four counties in which Unionists did hold a Unionist majority were Derry, Antrim, Down and Armagh. When it came to political representation, Unionists held a majority of one, but this was reversed when a by-election took place and a Home Rule candidate took the seat. Faced with the obvious findings that not only were Protestants the majority in only four of the nine counties of Ulster and the political reality of Unionist politicians being in a minority, the Liberal government considered the request for special treatment for the whole of Ulster as unfeasible. History would show that this was a serious misunderstanding of the depth of Carson’s intentions. Protestant Ulster would stop at nothing to remain within the Union and remain British. Evidence suggests that Carson was ready to use Ulster as a “wrecking device” to destroy Home Rule. With this said, as early as the autumn of 1911, from correspondence between Carson and Bonar-Law shortly after the Craigavon demonstration, Carson conceded that there may have to be some form of separation of Ireland and that this would clearly agitate southern Unionists. (Lewis, 2006, p. 81) It must be stressed at this point that the evidence shows us, that even though Unionists were in a minority in Ireland, and indeed within the nine counties of Ulster, Carson still manages to negotiate the possibility of concession on Home Rule. This can be seen as a element of success in his defence of Unionism.

In 1911, Balfour resigned as leader of the conservative party. During his stewardship of the party they had witness bitter division about that Parliament Act and finally breaking point reached when the infighting had begun over tariff reform, not to mention three successive general election defeats. After Balfour’s resignation on the 8th of November Andrew Bonar-Law became leader after the leadership contest. There was a stark difference between the two leaders, Balfour was an aristocratic, sharp debater, Bonar-Law was a successful businessman with little experience in the field of politics nor did he match Balfour on intellectual level. What he did have was a great deal of passion and conviction for what he was doing, something that it seemed his predecessor was lacking in. Bonar-Law inherited a deeply divided party. In order for him to pull the party back together, he decided to play what is now known as the “orange card”. He knew that by doing so, he would have an issue that would unite the party and project the required united front. Bonar-Law cared greatly for Ulster, his father worked as a minister in Coleraine, before emigrating to Canada where he was born. He then moved to Scotland when he was twelve. Bonar-Law was keen to demonstrate his commitment to Ulster and he did so at the Royal Agricultural Society’s show ground at Balmoral where after Craig’s planning he addressed a crowd of 100,000 on the 9th of April 1912. This event was a carefully choreographed event which in its designed aimed to demonstrate to the Liberal government the bond that existed between Unionists and Conservatives. This was galvanised in the handshake in full view of the crowd. It was made clear that from that point, not only would they face a resolute political opposition; it was to take on an extra-parliamentary dimension.

Two days after the demonstrations that took place in Balmoral, Asquith introduced the third Home Rule Bill. In keeping with previous bills, it would be based on an all-Ireland basis. In the bill, Ulster was not to be given special status as four fifths of Irish MP’s wanted Home Rule and only an “irreconcilable minority” in Ulster opposed the demand. (Rees, 1998, p. 155) The basis on which the Home Rule bill would be discussed would be that of the economic ties with Ireland, not that of Ulster. Throughout 1911, little consideration was paid to Ulster, even when concerns were raised by the then Chief Secretary for Ireland, Augustine Birrell. His voice was however did not sway any members of the cabinet. It was not until 1912 when two senior members of the Liberal party, Churchill and Lloyd-George who were the most vocal in cabinet debates presented the idea of some form of Ulster exclusion, provoking strong reaction from cabinet colleagues. Asquith had changed his mind several times before finally rejecting any form of Ulster exclusion from the bill. In the end the bill was voted in favour by the cabinet. With this said, it must also be stated that Asquith added a proviso, that if “fresh evidence or facts or pressure of British opinion” dictated otherwise it maybe necessary to have some form of provision for Ulster. From this, we can see that the government did not rule out a specific clause for a form of exclusion for Ulster, but rather it was a case of Asquith’s “wait and see” policy in the hope that Carson’s rhetoric was nothing more than empty words.

When an amendment was tabled by a Liberal backbencher, Thomas Agar-Roberts, it caught both sides by surprise. During the bill’s second reading which had been passed by over 100 votes, Agar-Roberts had called for the four north east counties to be excluded from the Home Rule settlement. The amendment deeply embarrassed the government because it demonstrated to the public that not all Liberal party members supported the idea of Home Rule on an all-Ireland basis. In the end the amendment was defeated by 69 votes. Asquith had good reason to not support it; he was of the view that even if he did, Unionists would still be opposed to the bill and that Nationalists like Redmond would be disaffected. The opposition had more reason to be worried, if they supported it they would be accused of deserting southern unionists, given that the party line was to reject Home Rule in its entirety, it would prove hard to sell. It was at this point that Carson stepped in and convinced them to support the amendment, believing that Redmond would not accept the partition of Ireland, and thus using the exclusion as a “wrecking device” (Rees, 1998, p. 157) for Home Rule all together.

On the 27th July 1912, Bonar-Law committed his party to an extreme course. It was at Blenheim Palace where he said that the government was “a revolutionary committee which has seized upon despotic power by fraud” (Stewart, 1997, p. 57), he further says that Ulstermen “would be justified in resisting by all means in their power, including force…. If the attempt be made under present conditions I can imagine no length of resistance to which Ulster can go in which I should not be prepared to support them” (Rees, 1998, p. 158) In these speeches Bonar-Law seem to have little regard for attacking the foundations on which British parliamentary democracy stood. He declared that if Home Rule were to be passed; that it would not be binding on the British people and if Ulster were to resist that it would have the whole support of the conservative party. Language such as this had not been heard since the days of the Long Parliament which caught Asquith and Redmond by surprise. Although this may can been seen as a risky tactic by the conservatives, Bonar-Law views the move as serving two fronts; that parliamentary democracy was dependant on the fundamental respect for the desires of the minorities and secondly that the destruction of the House of Lords veto had deprived them of the method in which to compel the government to hold a general election. It was Bonar-Law’s view that the liberals had made a bargain with the nationalists to destroy the Lords, and had hid this fact from the electorate. Conservatives firmly believed that if there were an election called on the issue of Home Rule, they would win. (Stewart, 1997, p. 57)

It can be said that the words that Bonar-Law used would have fanned sectarian tensions in Ulster. Carson would have been furious with this as the violence that irrupted from July 1912 was intense. Carson needed to portray a disciplined, united front. Anything else would have left him open to criticisms from liberals and would weaken his case. Events such as the forcing out of 2,000 Catholics from Harland and Wolfe shipyards after the perceived attacking of a group of schoolchildren by a return Ancient Order of Hibernians were examples of how out of control the situation was spiralling. Carson needed to address the problem and focus the passions of his followers in a way that could demonstrate unity and discipline. Craig came up with and devised the Ulster Solemn League and Covenant and requested that all Ulster Unionists sign it. It was based on the older Scottish Covenant of 1580 and had a distinct biblical element to it. In essence, the document states the signatories to proclaim loyalty to the King, but to warn government that the people of Ulster would use “all means which may be found necessary to defeat the present conspiracy to set up a Home Rule parliament in Ireland” (Rees, 1998, p. 159) It was Craig again who took on the responsibility of organising the event. On the 28th September 1912 Ulster Day was born and Carson and other Unionist leaders were to sign the Covenant in City Hall. The signing was the culmination of a weeklong of events that took place throughout the province starting off in Enniskillen. Through the monster demonstrations and lofty speeches that Carson delivered with magnificent orating skills, the religious, peaceful element to the signing at City Hall, Carson won a huge propaganda victory. He could show the world that theirs was a just cause and that they were “Gods People” (Rees, 1998, p. 160) More than 218,000 men signed the Covenant, 228,000 women signed the signed the corresponding Declaration and 20,000 people who were from Ulster but living in England signed the total was 471,414. By all accounts, it was a massive demonstration to the liberal government that Unionists were deadly serious and they would not be silenced.

In December 1912/January 1913 Carson was to seek out his own, more elaborate partition scheme. In this, he sought to seek out the exclusion of the whole of Ulster from the Home Rule Bill. Carson knew that this was a tactical move as he wanted to undermine the Home Rule and still be open to negotiation. Carson’s minimum terms for settlement. The total exclusion of Ulster was preferable but he would settle on basis of six. Anything less would be un-acceptable. During this time Carson had several meetings with Lloyd-George and with Churchill were they discussed possible outcomes and resolutions to the crisis which included an opt out scheme for counties that did not want Home Rule and for the whole of Ulster was to spared, but to join Home Rule in six years. Carson stated in response that “we do not want a sentence of death with a stay of execution for six years” (Jackson, n.d., p. 33) In the end, Asquith agreed to six county exclusion but not to the removal of the time frame. It was at this point that the crisis started to deepen even further.

With the government rejecting exclusion, Unionist decided to demonstrate that they were more than capable to resist the introduction of Home Rule. On the 31st of January 1913, the Ulster Unionist Council had announced that a new group would be formed. The Ulster Volunteer Force represented, by the end of 1913 90,000 men whose membership required a man to be a signatory on the Covenant. It had a small but dedicated full time staff of ex-British Army officers who were based in Belfast’s Old Town Hall. It was organised into regiments, battalions and sections, just like a regular army. In order to train this vast expanse of man power, they enlisted the help of Lord Roberts of Kandahar. Through him, the UVF began the training of 50,000 men. In a short space of time they had developed a medic corps and even a Motor Car Corps, all in order to give the impression of a serious army. Although the UVF were taking this seriously, they were lacking in one particular element, weapons. It would not be long before Carson was to bring the gun back into Irish politics.The formation of a paramilitary force in Ulster had not gone un-noticed in the south. Eoin MacNeill decided that the time was right to form the Irish Volunteers. This group had no clear policy. It most certainly was not set up to fight against the UVF but to fight for the introduction of Home Rule.

The rejection of the Home Rule Bill by the House of Lords in July 1913 galvanised the minds of all concerned, in particular, the King. The King feared that if a solution was not found that he would be dragged into the debacle thus removing his impartiality. Bonar-Law believed that by continually asking the King in public to dissolve parliament and call election would prove most effective. Over the coming months, the King was bombarded with requests from the conservatives, amongst their suggestions was to withhold Royal Ascent and to dissolve Parliament before Home Rule could be passed. With all this information converging on the King, it was imperative that Asquith gave a succinct response. On the 11th of August, the King handed Asquith a 400 word memorandum had had complied after reading Bonar-Law-Lansdowne document. Asquith’s response could not have been more blunt when he made it clear beyond all reasonable doubt that the King should “not depart from constitutional precedent and should not, therefore, contemplate any intervention in the Home Rule crisis. It was by this point that Asquith realised that when Home Rule was to be introduced that there would be a strong reaction to it but alarmist talk of civil war was unnecessary. Asquith states that all though he believes that an all party conference is doomed to failure if conservatives cannot accept the principle of Irish Home Rule but still leaves himself open to negotiating when he mentions the possibility of a compromise on Ulster if the terms are favourable. It can be said that Asquith’s handling of the Irish Question can be criticised but what cannot was the way in which he firmly dealt with any attempted interjection by the monarch. King George was left in no doubt that it was the Prime Minister in charge.

Throughout 1913, there was considerable political jostling, each party for its own ends and always ending in deadlock. Ulster was on the brink. By chance, Bonar-Law and Churchill were both at Balmoral Castle when their arrangements had over-lapped. In was at this time that the two men had a lengthy conversation about the political crisis. Churchill was surprised by the different tone that Bonar-Law took in private compared to the unwavering Unionist that was so clearly demonstrated in public. Bonar-Law had said that he was uneasy about the prospect of Carson establishing the provisional government and that if Home Rule was enacted that some form of Ulster exclusion would be acceptable and the rest of Ireland could have Home Rule. With this new found possibility of a resolution, Bonar-Law writes to Carson to express the desire of Churchill to reach a compromise. Carson not only endorsed what Bonar-Law says but in particular, agrees his position on some form of Ulster exclusion, the whole of Ulster being preferable but the minimum being six. With this said, the next form of opposition that they had to clear was from southern unionists, namely Lansdowne, Curzon and Long. They would view the new course a deep betrayal and an abandonment of them. It was at this point that Carson had a meeting with them to address the issue where he managed to persuade them not to vote against the form of Ulster exclusion. Whilst Carson was romanticised by the notion of keeping the whole of Ireland free from Home Rule, he was also pragmatic in the sense that it was better to save what he could than save nothing at all. Whilst Unionists and Liberals are becoming somewhat more tolerant of each other, it is Redmond who begins to grow frustrated with the apparent rescinding on the Home Rule by Asquith’s government. He famously said “Irish Nationalists can never be assenting parties to the mutation of the Irish nation, Ireland is a unit…The two nation theory to us an abomination and a blasphemy” (Rees, 1998, p. 167) Over the next period of months, Asquith, Redmond, Bonar-Law and Churchill would continue to play a political game of chase with each other in a desperate attempt to find a resolution to the crisis. Still, by 1914 there was no end in sight after a range of compromises such as Home Rule within Home Rule were offered but flatly rejected. In the end, though the talks collapse without resolution. Carson would not except as he called it “a stay of execution” when it came to Ulster eventually having to go under a Dublin Parliament after 6 years. It was quite clear that in order for Asquith to impose Home Rule in Ulster, it would have to be the army that did so.

The government became increasingly concerned with the formation of a second army in Ireland, and in a tactical move, banned the importation of munitions and weapons to Ireland. This particularly irked the Irish Volunteers who had witness the UVF import weapons with what it seen was with impunity. The most prominent gun runner for the UVF was Fred Crawford. Crawford had some experience in the military and an impressive knowledge of guns which helped him become director of ordinance of the UVF. He used this position to urge the Unionist leadership to allow him to order large quantities of guns, all of which was being paid for by the donations received by the Belfast business community and various other sympathy groups such as the British League for the Support of Ulster and donors such as Rudyard Kipling sent £30,000. (Rees, 1998, p. 171)

Carson rejected any notion of a county opt out scheme, which led to Churchill raising the pressure on Carson when he described the provisional government on the 14th of March as a “self-elected body….engaged in a treasonable conspiracy” (Rees, 1998, p. 172) in this, Churchill implied that the army would be deployed should Unionists reject the final offer of compromise. On the same day, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Paget received orders to tighten security at certain barracks across Ulster as it was suspected the UVF were planning to conduct and arms raid. Churchill proposed that the army match the UVF with a show of military strength. Paget was already suspect of the misgivings that his soldiers would have when it came to dealing with the UVF as the military in Ireland had strong connections with it, some had homes there. Paget was told that if any officers were to refuse to carry out their duties then they were to be dismissed. When Paget returned to the Curragh, the main British Army base in Ireland, his aptitude in conveying the message led to a mutinous situation. He had told them that any officers domiciled in Ulster would be exempt and any others would be dismissed. The bad handling of this led to General Gough refusing to march north. They were summoned to London were he sought assurances that the army would not be used in anyway against the people of Ulster. The Curragh incident had greatly embarrassed the government as it now and made a promise not to use the army to enforce home rule, greatly restricting its ability to enforce it when it would be passed. Asquith tried to regain control of the situation by taking over the War Office position by himself along with his Prime Ministerial duties, much too heavy criticism from conservatives. Nothing he could seem to do would change the held opinion of conservatives and unionists that he was using the army to plot against them. (Rees, 1998, p. 173)

Not long after the Curragh incident, on the night of the 24th-25th April, the UVF managed to secure large arms shipment of arms and munitions. Crawford had travelled to Germany where he had purchased weapons which were then transferred by boat and dropped off in Bangor, Donaghadee and the port of Larne. With the UVF sealing of the town there was little risk of interference from the RIC. With the ever rising shipment of arms that the UVF were getting through, members of the Irish Volunteers became increasingly alarmed at how easy it was for them to import weapons or indeed how they were acting without fear of prosecution. The sudden growth in Irish Volunteers reflected this and so began the process of their own armouring, namely helped along by Sir Roger Casement. They would use Erskine Childers yachts, The Asgard sailed to Hamburg were they bought 1,500 rifles and 45,000 rounds of ammunition. When they arrive back into Howth, the Dublin police tried to intervene in but were outnumbered. A small detachment of troops arrived and the crowd became more rowdy, stones and bottles were thrown. In the end, three civilians were killed and a number wounded. It was clear to nationalist that the difference between what was happening in Larne, or not as the case maybe, and what was happening in Dublin showed them that they were being treated differently to their Unionist counterparts. (Rees, 1998, p. 174)

Asquith finally agreed to all party conference after persist requests from the King. It was at this meeting that Carson and Redmond found a respect for each other. But neither could agree on a solution to how to address problem. Redmond refused to have the whole of Ulster excluded and Carson insisted that six counties was the absolute minimum to which he would go. Although Fermanagh and Tyrone had nationalist majorities, Carson could not forget the loyalty that had been showed to him by unionists from there. Even with interjections from Churchill and Lloyd-George there could still be no compromise to be made. Churchill summed it up with his famous line, ground to a halt along “the muddy byways of Fermanagh and Tyrone” (Rees, 1998, p. 178) With the outbreak of war in August 1914, Asquith decided to abandon his Amending Bill, and instead and passed the Suspensory Act. The Suspensory Act ensured that Home Rule would be postponed for the duration of the conflict and would not come into operation until the end of the war. Unionist seen this as a manoeuvre by Asquith was a breach however, with the Home Rule Bill effectively put into limbo and the arguments surrounding it still capable of being resurrected before home rule was actually to come into operation, Unionist politicians soon left the issue aside in the face of more pressing concerns. (Rees, 1998, p. 178)

To answer the question; how successful was Edward Carson in his defence of Unionism? Like all matters in history will depend on how you choose to view it. It can be said that Carson’s attitude towards the Union changed and evolved as time passed. As a pragmatist, he eventually realises that he may not, and indeed did not get all he wanted. After all, the demographics of Ireland showed us that Unionists did not deserve what they got. They were tiny minority in an over whelming Catholic country. This demonstrates the determination and the passion that Carson had for what he believed in and the lengths that he was prepared to go to ensure the stability of the Union. Through sheer determination as vision, with what were to seem unsurpassable odds, Edward Carson was able to ensure some form of exclusion for the six northern counties and to stop the Irish Parliamentary Party from realising a thirty-two county devolved government under the crown. To southern Unionists, it can be said that they would have felt that Carson had sold them out. To the northern Unionists, he was saviour. It is with a great deal of irony that when Ireland was portioned some time later he had warned Ulster Unionists not to alienate the Catholic minority by saying "We used to say that we could not trust an Irish parliament in Dublin to do justice to the Protestant minority. Let us take care that that reproach can no longer be made against your parliament, and from the outset let them see that the Catholic minority have nothing to fear from a Protestant majority." History will show us this largely went ignored.

Shane SweeneyPage