The original socialist state vision that Stalin wanted to achieve could only be created if the overwhelming majority of the population were workers, but in 1928, only 20% were workers. Industrialisation in the USSR went hand in hand with agricultures fate. In order to industrialise a country, money was needed to be spent on factories, machinery and equipment to produce goods, this is called capital investment, and although Russia had various goods to export, they were not enough to cover the sums of money needed. Also, the USSR was not in a position to borrow money from abroad, so ultimately the only source which could generate this wealth was agriculture. Surplus grain could be sold for export, and other grain supplies were needed to feed the growing workforce, these 2 needs had to be satisfied for the push toward industrialization to be successful.
Before December 1927, the main body that organised and administrated the economy was the NEP, but in December 1927 at the fifteenth Party Congress, the announcement of the first five year plan marked the end of the NEP. This plan demanded rapid industrialisation, with high targets needed to be achieved. Importantly also, it called for agricultural collectivisation, around 15% of peasant households were to be collectivised, The goal of this policy was to consolidate individual land and labour into huge, more modern, Collective farms. The Soviet leadership was confident that the replacement of individual peasant farms would immediately increase the food supply for urban populations, the supply of raw materials for processing industry, and agricultural exports. Collectivization was thus regarded as the solution to the crisis of agricultural distribution (mainly in grain deliveries) that had developed since 1927. This problem became more acute as the Soviet Union pressed ahead with its ambitious industrialization program.
The implementation of the first five year plan, or The Great Turn as it is often known, was hugely significant as it marked the major shift in were the USSR was headed, it took a huge step towards industrialisation and mobilisation, but some historians also mark this as the point where the Soviet Union took a step towards totalitarianism, tyranny and inhumanity.
In mid-1929, less than 5% of peasants were on collective or state farms, but in January 1930, Stalin announced that around 25% of the grain-producing areas were to be collectivised with the coming year. This news was greeted with some surprise; many thought that this would have been a voluntarily process, taking place at a much slower rate. Collectivisation was thought to stabilise agriculture because they believed that large units of land could be farmed more efficiently through the use of combined mechanisation, which would in turn require fewer peasants to work the land, releasing them into the labour industry. It would make grain exportation and collection easier and quicker. And possibly most importantly, collectivisation was the socialist solution to their problem, before collectivisation much of the population were private landholders who sold their produce on the market, but this new plan would create social solidarity were the people would co-operate and live communally.
Force, terror and propaganda were used to carry out collectivisation, the idea of the common class enemy of the Kulak – better off peasants, was used to scare lower class peasants into submission. Stalin enlisted an army of 25000 urban party activists to root out kulaks and persuade middle and poor peasants to sign a register demanding to be collectivised. The land, animals etc taken from the kulaks would be used as the basis for the new collective farm. The activists were given a number of kulaks to find, and they were found whether they existed or not. They were either shot, deported, or demoted to worse land. It is estimated the up to 10 million people had been deported to Siberia or labour camps by the end of the collectivisation process.
In industrial terms, the first five year plan was hugely optimistic from the start, but just as it was beginning the targets were revised upwards. Examples of these seemingly unattainable targets were the hope coal to be increased for 35 million to 75 million tonnes, and iron ore from 6 million to 19 million tonnes. The increased need for mass production caused wealthy businessmen to start pulling strings so that their particular project did not suffer, this resulted in certain industries overproducing, and others under producing. But managers and officers were too afraid to admit anything was wrong as they didn’t want to be accused as being an enemy of the plan. In conclusion, although some sectors showed marked improvement, because much investment had to be contributed to the collectivisation programme, many targets were not met, the first five year plan although not meeting its targets, proved to kick start the Soviet economy.
The second five year plan changed the emphasis slightly, the over optimistic targets were scaled back and more detail was put into each section of the industry, so that the increases in production could be consolidated. This organisation through emphasis on consumer goods and improvements to the railways and the increase in training programmes resulted in 1934-36 being known economically as ‘good years’. The third five year plan continued were the last left off, heavy industry continued to grow and the emphasis on armaments increased rapidly, although the plan only lasted 3 and a half years as the second world war intervened.
