the West could come to terms and agree among ourselves on rational principles of peaceful
co-existence’ .The people of Eastern Europe hoped and truly believed that Khrushchev
words were the first stage in a relaxation of the communist regime, and that the era of
extreme repression would soon be drawing to a close. Hence, the direct result of
Khrushchev’s speech was that relations with the US and the West were eased. On the
other hand, it also led to the events in Poland and Hungary in October 1956, both of which
resulted in heightened tension between East and West.
However, the death of Stalin and ensuing rise to power of Khrushchev was the
fundamental factor in the development of a partial thaw of Cold War tensions. For
Khrushchev, it was no longer a viable option to threaten the US with force, since the
destructive capabilities of the hydrogen bomb rendered it basically unusable. In addition to
this, the USSR appeared to be enjoying a period of economic and military strength. Heavy
industrial production was massive, and the USSR was the world leader in new technology,
as was displayed by the deployment of Sputnik in 1957 and the first human flight in space,
by Yuri Gagarin in 1961. Although these facts mask the true nature of the Soviet economy,
which was extremely unbalanced and ultimately very vulnerable, as consumer industries
were totally neglected, Khrushchev believed that these successes demonstrated that planned
economies were fundamentally better than those of capitalist countries, and that as a result
the USSR did not need to use force in order for Communism to spread throughout the
world. Meanwhile, the Western powers were becoming increasingly conscious of apparent
Soviet successes, particularly in terms of their technological advances and military strength.
Kennedy was particularly aware that under Khrushchev communism appeared to be
delivering, and was anxious that the missile gap which had opened up as a result of
American complacence should be closed as rapidly as possible. Khrushchev did not want
conflict with the West, nor view it as necessary whilst the US feared conflict with the
apparently superior strength of the USSR, and as a result of this relations were better
between 1953 and 1962. The other side of this is that the Soviet Union became more
confident, and it was this confidence which could be said to have caused the Cuban Missile
crisis, which almost sparked a full-scale nuclear conflict between the two countries.
During the period 1953 to 1962 there were several other indications that something
of a thaw was occurring. The first of these was the conclusion of the war in Indo-China
with the Geneva peace accords of 1954 and relative success of the summit in the summer of
1955, also held in Geneva. The Soviet delegation at the summit was headed by Bulganin,
although Molotov and Khrushchev also attended. Khrushchev himself claimed that the
Soviet aim at Geneva was to ‘sign a peace treaty that would recognise the existence of two
German states and would guarantee that each state would be allowed to develop as its own
people saw fit’, whilst he also thought that the goal of the Western powers would be ‘the
reunification of Germany’ and the ‘liquidation of Socialism in the German Democratic
Republic’. Although these perceived aims were obviously not compatible, the very fact that
the Soviet leadership was meeting with Eisenhower and other Western leaders signalled a
sharp reversal of Stalinist foreign policy, and it is important not to underestimate the value of
communication, even if little is actually agreed. The conference also did much to boost
Soviet conference, as Khrushchev considered Eisenhower a ‘mediocre military leader and a
weak president’ and recognised that there was ‘something soft about his character’.
Khrushchev summed up the conversations with the US delegation as ‘generally constructive
and useful for both parties, although neither side changed its position’, and stated that ‘We
returned to Moscow knowing that we hadn’t achieved any concrete results, but were
encouraged, realising now that our enemies probably feared us as much as we feared them’.
It was this mutual fear and development of some form of mutual respect which meant that
relations between Khrushchev and Eisenhower were never very strained.
The Austrian state treaty of May 1955 was a more significant agreement and an
indication of increased co-operation between East and West. As with Germany, Austria
had been divided up into four zones following World War Two, but had been allowed her
own government and was viewed as a liberated state as a opposed to a defeated enemy.
Problems developed as the Russians seemed to be trying to drain the Soviet sector of
resources whilst the three Western powers were trying to rebuild their zones of occupation.
However, the Austrian state treaty of May 1955 meant that Austria did not become a
divided nation. It is likely that the Russians chose to co-operate with the West as they
feared that a strong Western Austria would merge with West Germany to create a strong an
economically powerful state. The state treaty resulted in the withdrawal of all Soviet troops
and independence for Austria which was granted its 1937 frontiers. The USSR was also
satisfied, as union with Germany was once again forbidden, and the Austrians pledged to
remain neutral in any conflicts between East and West. This meant that they could not join
with NATO, nor be included in the Warsaw Pact which was set up shortly afterwards.
In addition to this, there were other signs that a relaxation of the Cold War was
occuring. In 1955, the Russians agreed to give up all of their military bases in Finland and
Cominform was abandoned in April 1956. There were also shifts in American foreign
policy. Eisenhower replaced Truman in 1952, and for his eight-year term the US returned
to a state which was similar to its isolation under Roosevelt. During Truman’s presidency,
fear of Communism had been the most important factor in determining foreign policy, and
this had a knock-on effect on domestic policy. Following Stalin’s death and Eisenhower’s
election, American priorities changed slightly, as the USSR no longer appeared to be
expanding further and as the nations of Western Europe gradually gained in strength and
economic independence.
It would be extremely simplistic to conclude that as a result of the factors mentioned
above, the period 1953-1962 saw a relaxation of the Cold War. There were several events
and decisions which led to increased tensions which could have escalated to the level of the
Cuban missile crisis, and Khrushchev’s foreign policy remained at best confusing and at
worst schizophrenic. Problems emerged in 1955, at the same time as the ‘Spirit of Geneva’
had led to increased optimism about future relations, when West Germany was granted
entrance to NATO.
NATO had been set up 1949 as a treaty of collective security, involving nations
such as the US, Great Britain, Belgium and Holland. Although its members would not
openly admit it, it was clearly an anti-Soviet alliance. Western aid had been pouring into
West Germany since its formal split, and by 1955 it had grown into a powerful nation once
again. To the West, it was inconceivable that such a strong and prosperous capitalist nation
should be denied entry into NATO due to its history, and in 1955 entry was granted. The
main result of this was that West Germany was allowed to re-arm. The USSR was
extremely unhappy about this, but also used it as a pretext to set up the Warsaw Pact in
1955. The Russians claimed that the Warsaw pact had been set up to resist future German
aggression, and to protect Poland from German revanchism, arguing that they would wish to
retake their territory up to the Oder Neisse Line. Ostensibly, this was the motivation behind
the formulation of the Warsaw pact, although the USSR had been waiting for a legitimate
opportunity to set up an organisation of Eastern European nations to give some security
against NATO. The formation of the Warsaw pact heightened tensions, and was a clear
indication that Cold War sentiments and fears were far from forgotten.
Germany and in particular Berlin remained a constant source of tension between the
USSR and the USA. In 1948, Stalin had blockaded the city in an attempt to drive out the
Western powers, and ten years later the island of capitalism, freedom and prosperity was
once again under threat. In 1955, a treaty between the USSR and the DDR granted East
Germany the right to conduct its foreign affairs as it saw fit. At the same time, Khrushchev
wrote to the USA that the USSR would continue to have control of rights of movement
between West Berlin and West Germany, which would mean that the West would not have
to deal with East Germany. The note meant that if the USA refused to recognise the DDR,
the USSR would no longer control rights of movement, forcing the USA to have direct
relations with the DDR. This would obviously render the Western policy of refusing to view
the DDR as a sovereign power impractical. By 1958 however, the Western stance on
Eastern Germany had not changed, and in response Khrushchev delivered an ultimatum in
which he claimed that West Berlin had become ‘a springboard for espionage and anti-Soviet
acts’ and demanded that if the West did not act positively to alleviate the problem within 6
months, the USSR would grant the DDR full sovereign status, which would effectively give it
the right to claim all of the land in its capital, Berlin. Although Khrushchev had not stated
this directly, he was demanding that the West recognise the DDR or lose access to the city.
For the West, the second option was simply not a possibility, as Berlin was such an
important symbol of hope, though they were equally unkeen to yield to Soviet demands.
The final result was that the US reasserted the absolute right of free access to Berlin for the
Western powers. Khrushchev, faced with the prospect of World War Three, backed down
at a summit in 1959 signalling the end of this period of heightened tension.
Berlin continued to be an issue and a problem, particularly for Khrushchev. Whilst
West Berlin was a flourishing, open city, the Eastern side was drab, communist, and inferior.
This, coupled with the proximity of the two sides, and the relative ease with which the
border could be crossed, meant that between 1949 and 1957 more than two million
refugees had fled across to West Berlin in search of employment or to escape the Soviet
regime. When Khrushchev met Kennedy in June 1961 and repeated the warning that the
Western powers must be prepared to leave Berlin within six months, the number of
defectees increased to almost 1000 a day, many of whom were young, skilled intelligent
workers, which had an effect on the economy of the city as well as being a cause of
embarrassment for Khrushchev. In August 1961, a wall was erected to prevent people
from fleeing from East to West, which in some ways was a success for Khrushchev, as it
stopped the loss of essential manpower. On the other hand, it did not please the Western
powers, and meant that for the next 28 years Berlin remained a source of tension between
the US and USSR.
Elsewhere in Europe, the de-Stalinisation speech and the apparent softening of the
regime under Khrushchev led to problems. The first signs of this came in Poland, where, in
October 1956, there were huge demonstrations in which the people demanded that
Gomulka be made the new leader of the party. Gomulka had consistently stood for Polish
rights against Stalin, and was hugely popular among the Polish people. In the end,
Khrushchev yielded and granted the Polish people their wish, although the decision had not
been easy. In Hungary, people saw the events of Poland, and hoped that something similar
could occur in their country. The result was a huge demonstration on 20th of October 1956
in favour of Imre Nagy, who, like Gomulka was a popular figure who had never been
executed. At a mass riot at the Radio Station in Budapest there were amazing scenes as
many members of the police and army refused to fire on the protesters and instead joined
them, demanding both freedom from repression and Nagy. The situation was rapidly
spirally out of control, and Khrushchev, following the advice of Zhou Enlai and Mao
decided that Hungary could not be allowed to leave the Warsaw pact, as such a move
would almost certainly lead to a collapse of the Soviet empire. On Sunday November 4th,
tanks were sent into Hungary to crush the uprising. After 1 week of street fighting, the
Russians had regained control of Budapest at the cost of thousands of Hungarian lives. In
the wake of the crushing of the uprising there were mass resignations from the communist
parties of other countries, as people were shocked at the force used by the USSR to
destroy an independence movement. The West did nothing, as they did not believe the issue
worth going to war over, and had seen that Khrushchev was prepared to defend his empire
with force. Such a demonstration meant that there could never be a full relaxation of cold
war fears and tensions.
It was not only Europe which saw the effects of continuing cold war tensions. In the
Far East there were several instances where relations between China, the other huge
communist power, and the US became extremely strained, particularly as a result of the
Chinese threat to Taiwan, which was recognised as the legitimate government of China by
the US. In addition to this the Chinese alleged that the CIA had been training Tibeten rebels
who were fighting for independence following the ‘reunification of Tibet’. This too meant
that there was not a serious reduction in tension following the Korean War until towards the
end of the Cultural Revolution in the early 70s. More important, perhaps, were events in
Cuba.
In the 40s and 50s, Cuba had been ruled a total dictator, Batista. Much of Cuba
was run by American businessmen or by the Mafia, and Batista had the support of the
Americans who saw no reason why his regime should be challenged. In the late 1950s,
however, his regime began to become increasingly corrupt and harsh, and he became
something of an embarrassment to the US. Simultaneously, a guerrilla movement was
gaining strength in the mountains of Cuba under the leadership of Fidel Castro and Che
Guevara. At this time, they were seen by the US as freedom fighters, not communists, and
so the Americans began to relax their support for Batista. When he was overthrown on new
years eve 1958, the Americans welcomed the new leaders as champions of freedom and
liberty, yet relations rapidly deteriorated. During 1959 and 1960, Castro nationalised and
took over American holdings on Cuba, seizing them in the name of the people and giving the
land back to the people. A trade embargo was placed on Cuba by the US, so Khrushchev
stepped in and began to trade with Cuba, as well as supplying aid and equipment. By 1960,
Cuba was communist.
Kennedy was not happy to see a communist regime emerge so close to US land in
Florida, and gave the go ahead for the Bay of Pigs invasion of spring 1961 which had been
orchestrated by the CIA, despite his misgivings about the operation. The invasion was
undertaken by Cuban exiles, who had fled to the US after the establishment of Castro’s
communist regime. It was a complete disaster, there was no popular uprising in Cuba and
100s of the invaders were captured and imprisoned. For Kennedy, this was a serious
source of embarrassment, and he was still left with the problem of a communist nation
almost within sight of American soil.
The proximity of Cuba and its good relations with the USSR led to further problems
in 1962. Despite the fact that the USSR had put a man in space in 1961, they were not
ahead of the US in the arms race, possessing only five or six missiles capable of reaching
American cities. The balance was dramatically changed, when in October 1962, the US
discovered through photographs taken by a U2 spy plane, that Soviet missiles were being
installed on Cuba. This left Kennedy with a major dilemma, since an invasion of Cuba to
destroy the missiles, or a bombing campaign to render them useless could prompt a violent
response from the US, whilst to do nothing would leave the missiles in place and expose
American weaknesses. In the end, following the advice of his executive committee
(EXCOM), which included people such as MacNamara and Acheson, he set up a blockade
around Cuba to prevent the arrival of further missiles on convoys from the USSR. As the
Soviet ships headed towards the blockade, many Americans feared the consequences if
they refused to stop, and there was a real possibility that the situation could have escalated
into a nuclear war. Clearly, October 1962 does not represent a relaxation of the Cold War,
although it is interesting to note that both leaders handled the situation excellently, and it was
resolved once the US promised to remove their missiles from Turkey in exchange for a
Soviet withdrawal from Cuba. The resolution of the crisis meant that neither leader felt
humiliated, and nuclear war was prevented. Although this was arguably the closest the
world came to nuclear conflict, the relaxation of tension and events of the preceding years
undoubtedly meant that the effects were not as disastrous as they could have been, since
communication between the USSR and the USA was clear and concise, and both sides
were aware of the capabilities of their opposition.
Hence it is correct to say that the period between 1953 and 1962 saw a relaxation
of the Cold War. During this time, East/West relations improved dramatically as a result of
the rise to power of Khrushchev, who was far more prepared to co-operate and co-exist
with the West. There were several occasions where the two nations could be seen to be
reaching some form of agreement, such as at Geneva in 1955, and ironically, over the issue
of Cuba in 1962, and despite the fact that there were several occasions where relations
were extremely strained, such as in Berlin in 1958 and relating to the take-over of Cuba in
1961, the tension never erupted into a full-scale conflict.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
Khrushchev (Translated by Strobe Talbot) – Khrushchev remembers
Lowe, Norman – Mastering Modern World History
Mooney, Peter – The Soviet Superpower
Lynch – Stalin and Khrushchev
It is interesting that in ‘Khrushchev Rememebers’ the Soviet leader plays down his own role and did
not appear to consider himself as absolute leader until 1957, whilst Lynch seems to believe that
Khrushchev had complete power as early as 1955.
Arguably, if the Hungarian people had stuck to their original demand of the installation of Nagy as
leader of the Party this may have been granted.
