Naturally, some influential figures were more interested in how much they could gain from supporting either Joanna or Isabella than in helping the development of the region. Pedro Gonzalez de Mendoza was from a very wealthy and influential clan that owned vast tracts of land and controlled thousands of troops. He had made it clear that he wished to be made Cardinal. As the Pope was pro-Aragonese, Pedro switched to supporting Ferdinand and was duly awarded his position. Convinced of Ferdinand’s influence in helping him, by the end of 1472 the entire Mendoza family switched their support to Isabella. To have such an influential family as a key supporter was important in Isabella’s eventual triumph.
Once Queen, in order to consolidate her position, she had to improve her relationship with the Castilian grandees. Thus, Cardinal Mendoza was promised a chancellorship and his brother became the Duke of Infantado. Nobles who supported Queen Isabella was rewarded and those who had only luke-warm feelings would have been impressed by her promise to maintain all grants of nobility (hidalgos) issued by Henry IV.
Isabella did not have the support of every influential figure. A sizeable proportion maintained their allegiance with Joanna and her claim. Nonetheless, Isabella’s shrewd political playing of the grandees was remarkable. In gaining the support of the majority, Isabella developed diplomatic skills and political sharpness that were to assist her greatly in the years to come. A lesser mind would have lost the support of the grandees and would never have recovered. It is a testimony to Isabella’s attributes of determination, perception, intelligence and ‘spin’ that she succeeded.
Such submission by the grandees can be considered as valid a reason for her success as Ferdinand’s influence and military help – perhaps more so. Grandees, like Ferdinand, could raise vast armies and like Ferdinand, they could halt rebellions and uprisings in towns. Those who supported Isabella could also help withstand the Portuguese menace and Joanna’s claim. Unlike Ferdinand, these grandees were already Castilian and thus had vested interests in the outcomes of political, social and military situations. What was happening was directly affecting them and their inheritance. As a result, their support was assured.
Whilst the support of the grandees was deemed important to Isabella, it was just as imperative that she build up a body of support in the towns and cities. With war against Portugal and France imminent in 1475, and support for Joanna growing as a result of her marriage to Alfonso of Portugal, Isabella had to turn to a reliable power-base. To do this she needed Castile’s major towns and cities. However, many areas were riddled with banditry and the political situation was distinctly unstable. Each town appeared to hold a different view on Isabella and thus she had many requests to consider and accept before they officially supported her. Examples of this include the town of Burgos whose people requested royal protection from nobles seeking more land and money. Toledo was offered royal privileges by Isabella if they agreed to support her, whereas, conversely, Seville was threatened with commercial and financial punishments if they failed to support.
Perhaps most important, nonetheless, was Isabella’s determination to travel her realm and maintain a real sense of a royal presence over affairs. She travelled to dangerous regions like Extremadura and Andalucia in 1477 promising not to issue special taxes. In doing this, she calmed the people and helped build a peaceful relationship between the towns and cities of such areas and the crown.
Vassals on land owned by enemies of the Queen were subjected to royal propaganda informing people of Isabella’s right to the thrown. Those who agreed to rise up in rebellion against their owners and at the same time support Isabella were rewarded with privileges and royal protection, offering them peace of mind they had not previously lived with. Finally, if towns still showed no intention of supporting Isabella, a more direct approach to getting them onside was developed – force. This fitted well with Ferdinand’s influence and his steady supply of troops.
So, slowly but surely, Isabella built up her support from the roots of her land – the towns and cities. It took until about 1480 before she could relax a little, safe in the knowledge that she had majority support. That said, once a town or city had established an allegiance with her crown, royal presence was deemed necessary, if only to remind citizens of the unwritten deal they had made with Isabella. Hence, civil governors (corregidores) were placed in areas to uphold royal interests. The idea of corregidores upholding Isabella’s influence over an area is actually not as accurate as it appears, and not as significant in helping Isabella secure the throne as some historians claim. Ultimately, only some towns had corregidores, others refused them altogether and, although Isabella in an ideal situation would have wanted them, she could not risk disturbing the peace she had. Therefore, corregidores can be considered a success in the cities that had them, but not an overall triumph, as some towns refused them. Their importance should not be over-exaggerated - Isabella did not insist of them in places that did not want them. What was more noteworthy was the gradual establishment of respect for Isabella in towns and cities. This, and not the corregidores, was the major success story of Isabella’s fight for the settlements of Castile and had more bearing on her overall conquest.
The support of towns and cities was always paramount in Isabella’s aspiration, but her change of policy to deal mainly with winning them over was accelerated by the threat of war with Portugal and France. Naturally, any full-scale war causes major problems, but especially so if your throne is not secure. Isabella had neither the money nor support nor troops to seriously quell an invasion. This is why support from towns and cities was so important.
The possibility of war links well with the general threat from Joanna who also claimed the Castilian throne. The start of 1475 saw a very real military danger – King Alfonso of Portugal threatening both to invade Castile and marry Joanna. France’s Louis XI was also threatening action in Castile’s northern provinces and this made the problem worse. It is here that the support she established from the grandees came to the fore, as she was able to borrow money from them. Her marriage to Ferdinand was also significant, as she was able to claim troops and raise some from her allegiance with grandees as well. Fortunately for Isabella, only one real battle took place - in Toro in March 1476. Portuguese forces would claim the outcome was uncertain, a stalemate. Isabella regarded it as a victory as it halted Alfonso’s advance, forcing him to return to Portugal with Joanna. On his return to Lisbon, he was greeted with both good and bad news. The good news was that he had received Papal dispensation to marry Joanna but the bad news was that he learnt of an agreement between France and Castile that saw the French agree to halt their campaign, allowing Isabella’s forces to concentrate totally on the Portuguese menace.
1478 was the principal year for Isabella. It was in 1478 that she really began to see the fruits of her labour, when her hard work began to pay off. A major reason for this was the birth of a son, providing security and, most importantly for many of Castile’s citizens, the promise of a stable and peaceful succession when Isabella died. Alfonso attempted a second invasion during 1478, but the increased support from grandees and towns, mainly due to the birth of a son and an agreement with France, helped Isabella to emerge victorious. Now she had jumped many of the hurdles in her way and was entering the closing straight of her campaign. Certainly, the momentum was lifted further in January 1479 when Ferdinand finally became King of Aragon. Alfonso was no fool – and should be credited for his response to these events. He officially recognised Isabella as rightful Queen and drew Joanna out of the equation by making her become a nun! Furthermore, Portugal as a whole agreed, as France had done, to halt all claims on Castile and the Canaries. Castile, in return, agreed to allow Portugal to preserve her cartel of African trade. As a result, Portugal ceased to be a threat.
At first sight, these events appear to be overtly responsible for helping Isabella succeed, but it is necessary to put them in their proper place. While it is true to say that they were a great help, they were not the catalysts for success – they, in fact, were the results of previous triggers. For example, Isabella could not have staved off the Portuguese at Toro without money and troops, and money and troops could not have been provided without support from towns and cities and, especially in terms of troops, the grandees. Therefore, the events of 1478 were not fundamental reasons for Isabella’s success, but can be seen more to be the results of her previous hard work.
1480 was also a key year for Isabella, and a consolidation of her change in fortunes. Maintenance of support and control prior to this date was often carried out by ‘hermandads’ – essentially Castilian brotherhood militias. Originally, many towns had their own hermandad that kept civil law and order, put down rebellions and protected citizens. However, once towns began to fall into line and switch their allegiance towards Isabella, it was deemed necessary to merge all the hermandads into one larger movement – the Santa Hermandad. This group had several roles. They could raise thousands of men to fight the Portuguese or put down rebellions across the countryside. Furthermore, they were seen as an income stream. Isabella needed plenty of money to help secure her crown. She could not afford to defend Castile against invasions without substantial funds in reserve in order to stop the state running at a deficit. Although direct and indirect taxes were implemented, using the Hermandad as a source of revenue was clever as, despite being out of favour with some grandees, it was loyal to the crown and supported Isabella.
In many ways, however, the Queen was able to make the Santa Hermandad work by basically forcing compliance – ‘any person or corporation who refused to contribute to it would be prosecuted’. Therefore, the Hermandad was able to raise armies of up to 3000 men and raise money relatively freely. Indeed, when many grandees believed the time had arrived to close the Santa Hermandad down, Isabella stressed the Hermandads importance further. She secured its existence for an extra three years with a sizeable grant, despite most viewing the Santa Hermandad as a temporary measure designed to work in emergency situations only. What is significant here, and helped Isabella, is the effective control that the crown had over rural brotherhoods, turning them into useful and valuable fighting forces – mercenaries. This allowed her to discipline towns and cities that had fallen into the hands of revolt and banditry, where civil order was replaced by civil strife, and to regulate the countryside, an area previously overlooked in the search for support for Isabella.
There is an interesting postscript to the evaluation of the Hermandad. Early historians often agreed that the creation of the Santa Hermandad could be seen as a fundamental reason for Isabella’s eventual triumph. This, however, is now no longer a popular view. Indeed, many modern historians argue, quite rightly, that in fact the Hermandad was nothing more than a publicity stunt that primarily did little to help Isabella, especially when compared to other reasons. This technically contrasts heavily with 15th century chroniclers like Palencia and Pulgar who believed the Queen would never have controlled the aristocracy without the Hermandad. Essentially, this is not so. First of all, the Queen herself originally saw the Hermandad as a temporary measure. In addition, grandees could raise thousands more men than the Hermandads could, thus pushing the Santa Hermandad back into the realms of irrelevancy. Thirdly, the Santa Hermandad was only a basic peace-keeping force. It only really became important later on when it ceased being a militia and more a source of revenue. Nobility could raise similar sums of money, and indirect tax policies were not abolished. Therefore, it seems ludicrous to associate the formation of brotherhoods with sure-fire, definite reasons for the Crown’s success. We know that they were of some benefit, but were no more a reason than the eventual backing of grandees and towns and cities, and the allegiance with the Aragonese through Ferdinand. In fact, it can be considered less of a reason and this is why modern historians tend not to dwell too much on the brilliance of the Hermandads as reasons for Isabella’s victory.
When discussing how Isabella secured her throne between 1469 and 1479, various points are put forward. While some of these can be linked together and follow on naturally as consequences of previous catalysts, one major explanation can be found within all – namely, the personal character of the Queen. Many overlook this as an irrelevant justification for her success but the simple facts remain. Isabella was a shrewd politician, cunningly playing rivals off against each other, building up strong relationships with those she could trust, rewarding followers with high positions that bought their continued support. As well as this, the Queen was a determined, resolute, unwavering figure who clung to her self-beliefs and felt a strong moral sense of duty to do right. Her determination is portrayed no better than through the accounts of her heroic expedition through Andalucia and Extremadura and her three-night trek from Valladolid to Cuenca in order to influence the Order of Santiago to appoint her husband as its next master. Such shows of mental and physical toughness won her many admirers from the various social groupings that she sought to rule. Isabella’s dream to preside over a glorious Castile, a safe Castile, an affluent Castile was, indeed, a noble one, but her excellent policies made such a dream become far more likely than any could have expected. A righteous commitment to right the wrongs of her predecessor saw towns given the power they yearned for and nobles the privileges they so desired.
The idea of the Queen’s character being the main cause of her success is not so romantic a notion. If we consider the primary reasons for her success – the marriage to Ferdinand, the support of towns, the failure of Portugal, the backing of grandees and the hermandads – her strength of integrity and disposition is paramount in all. Had Isabella been a selfish, unintelligent and unpatriotic lady, few of the issues that eventually fell in her favour would have done so. Her attempts to secure the throne would have foundered had she not the insight to make the correct decisions and rule with a moral and decent heart and head. In marrying Ferdinand she had the perception to see the long-term benefits that such a move would give her, like troops, money and political support. To get the support of towns, she combined diplomatic skill with previously unrecognised physical endurance and grit. Stopping the Portuguese advance took good tactical insight and perfected political judgement to combine the support she already had from Ferdinand, the grandees and towns to work together in her favour. Indeed, to gain the backing of grandees and ruin the case of Joanna, her chief rival, Isabella had be shrewd, wise, crafty and, at times, ruthless. The fact that she was successful epitomises her deep intellect. Her wise use of the Hermandads and creation of the Santa Hermandad and then, against the odds, to maintain it for an extra three years than originally agreed demonstrates a certain degree of skill and deception. Had she been unsuccessful in achieving any of the things listed above her eventual consolidation of power would have been far more traumatic than it actually proved to be.
There is a theme running through the examples listed in the paragraph above – they all include illustrations of Isabella’s strong character and this, above anything else, can be considered the paramount and fundamental reason for her rise to unrivalled power as Castile’s undisputed monarch. Six suggestions as to why Isabella succeeded have been put forward that, on their own amount to little, but together perpetuate a strong case. For the most part, the reasons are inter-linked, often arising as a direct result of previous clauses. The failure of the Portuguese invasion was important to Isabella, naturally so, but one can argue that without the influence of Ferdinand of Aragon, such a victory may not have occurred and, perhaps, the rivalry with Joanna may never have ended so well in Isabella’s favour. Likewise, Isabella’s formation of the Santa Hermandad would never have worked out if she didn’t have the towns and cities on her side, and it can be argued that the towns and cities would never have acquiesced if there had been no backing from the Castilian grandees that Isabella so delicately and perfectly won the support of through the giving of privileges and offers of high powered positions.
Amidst all this interrelation is the optimum reason for success as Castile was blessed with a monarch so dutiful, no trouble was spared in the bid to satisfy the people. So clever that those who fundamentally wanted not to support her found themselves giving in. So desperate for justice and peace that she would go to, literally, any lengths to establish her rule, to carry out her dream of a developed, economically, socially and politically sound Castile. Chroniclers of the time perhaps do the other contributions, like that of Ferdinand, little justice, spending much time also on devaluing most of the previous monarch’s work. They may well be contributing to royalist propaganda but, ultimately, despite being appointed by the Queen to record her history in a favourable light, Isabella was a good Queen. While she alone did not secure her succession to the thrown, her positive and admirable attributes as a person and leader can be seen to be the best possible reason, above any others, for her accomplishment.
“It was certainly a marvellous thing that what many men and great lords could not agree to effect in many years, one lone woman carried out in a little time.”
‘Decadas’, Alonso de Palencia, 1485.
