The Vietnam War was based on assumptions by the U.S.A. The initial and most cited reason America was concerned with the region of South East Asia was the inherent fear of communism in public opinion. For a country which prided itself on democracy and was built as a capitalist nation, the ideas of Marxism were seen as alien and evil and so bred paranoia. International events also caused pressure on the American government to stop the spread of communism. From the viewpoint of the U.S.A, in the years post World War 2, the U.S.S.R was extending her sphere of influence throughout Eastern Europe, there was a war in Korea, China had become communist and North Vietnam was winning its fight against the French. The balance of power appeared to be shifting and thus the Truman Doctrine of containment was followed; it was seen as America’s duty, after failing to support the French at Diem Bien Phu, and not recognising the North Vietnamese government, to aid South Vietnam in what they saw as a cold war conflict. America also had an international reputation to protect, after seeing the consequences of appeasement in Europe, and later facing the embarrassment of the outcome of the ‘loss of China’ combined with the embarrassment of the Korean stalemate, it was essential to their international prestige. Truman did not want to appear ‘soft’ on communism. And so the original reason for entering the conflict was the polarised ideologies and a matter of geopolitics combined with fear, paranoia and the need to not look weak on the world diplomatic stage.
Yet to an extent the intervention in Vietnam was economically motivated as Kolko believed; Eisenhower himself stated in 1954 that South East Asia should not be lost due to the wealth of natural resources there such as tungsten and rubber If the nation became communist America could then not trade with them, and so would not have access to these resources. Japan was also of key importance as an area of trade; coined ‘the rice bowl of Asia’ the island had an American base and would be a large blow to America if it became communist. America had also poured millions of dollars worth of money into the Vietnamese and South East Asian economy in a bid to stop the conditions which they believed cause communism. In 1950 alone Truman authorised $20 million of aid to help France in the region, thus committing his country to the conflict. The money given to France was also significant as the U.S were wary of upsetting France, due to wanting her to take part in the newly set up N.A.T.O. If France failed to agree to join N.A.T.O this would cost America economically in the long run. Later presidents also gave money to South Vietnam in huge quantities; Eisenhower gave Diem’s government in the south over $100 billion. To view it in a cynical way, American presidents had invested billions and billions of dollars in Vietnam, perhaps fuelling economic motivation, as losing the war meant a waste of public money. It could also be argued that support of the French proves that America were not fighting for ideological reasons at all; they were an anti-imperialist nation, Woodrow Wilson famously included the need for ‘self determination’ in his 14 points in 1919, and yet America were helping to fund France’s claim to Vietnam as a colony, thus denying the people of Vietnam right to determine and govern their own country.
It could be argued however that as the war progressed America was protecting neither their ideological interests nor their economic ones. The nature of the war had changed; it had become a battle ground for national pride on which no body wanted to face humiliation of defeat. This began as early as the 1950s; after deciding not to support the decisions made at Geneva and splitting Vietnam literally down the 17th parallel, America were committed to upholding and maintaining the situation they had helped create, withdrawing aid and advisement would make the nation look weak and unfair, as Westmoreland later stated they had become ‘Morally locked into Vietnam’. This idea of being morally accountable progressed the further in America got, the more troops that were sent, the more damage, the more lives lost and the worse America would seem internationally. No president wanted to be seen as the one who ‘lost Vietnam’ and so the quagmire theory has been propounded by many historians; each president was obligated by the actions of those before him and this graduated commitment made it harder to get out of the ‘quagmire’. Prestige and credibility played a huge role, not only international but within their own country.
Domestic pressure
International pressure
Fear of embarrassment
Situation by 1964
conclusion
