In World War II, belligerent countries faced similar basic problems
of economic mobilization as in the first one; tremendous military requirements, inadequate industrial capacity and significant shortages of necessary raw materials. They faced the same problem of speeding up the translation of industry to war production; problem of determining adjusting requirements and capacity; problem of upward spiralling prices and of economic stabilization by price control and associated measures and of setting up huge emergency agencies to handle the various mobilization functions. Only this time the extent of the mobilization effort was immensely larger than in the first one. The countries fought in theatres all over the world, instead of mainly in Europe as in World War I. The variation in scale can be summed up in an account of cost; the cost of World War II was roughly 10 times that of World War I.
The pre war level of economic development significantly influenced the capability of economies to mobilize their resources during the war period. The war-making capability of a country depends upon the ability of its economic system to make available the forces, the equipment, and the supplies essential for the carry out of military operations. It depends above all on the ability of the nation's economic system to produce a surplus of materials and commodities over and above the essential requirements of the civilian population and of the war-supporting industries which produce the needs of the military. The greater is this surplus, the larger the armed forces and the greater the level of military operations that can be supported. When it comes to mobilizing men, geography (specifically transoceanic distances) did matter significantly in World War I but in World War II, the effect of these was almost negligible. However the most significant factor upon which the mobilization capacity of an economy depends is its level of economic development.
During times of war, most of the resources from agriculture were reallocated to the military. This led to an obvious decline in agricultural production. To counter this decline in production, richer countries like Britain and America offered higher prices to its farmers. In response to these incentives, there was an increase in the output and supply of food. As a result of this increased production in agriculture, the rich countries were able to feed the army as well as the civilians even though a lot of resources were mobilized from the agricultural sector for the war. In these rich countries, government was also able to raise funds for war by methods such as tax collection and war bonds for e.g. in the United States, taxes provided about $136.8 billion of the war's total cost of $304 billion (Kennedy, 625). To cover the other $167.2 billion, the Treasury Department also expanded its bond program, creating the famous "war bonds".
The American economy expanded at an unprecedented rate between 1941 and 1945. The gross national product of the U.S., as measured in constant dollars, grew from $88.6 billion in 1939 to $135 billion in 1944. War-related production skyrocketed from just 2 percent of GNP to 40 percent in 1943 (Milward, 63).
Table shows, output in many American manufacturing sectors increased enormously from 1939 to 1944, and the height of war production in many industries.
Indices of American Manufacturing Output (1939 = 100)
Source: Milward
On the other hand countries with a low pre war level of output struggled to mobilize a high proportion of their economic resources for the war. Most of the poor countries had a large amount of their resources locked up in low productive subsistence agriculture. During war times, mobilization began to take resources away from agriculture particularly manpower. This also meant increased requirement of food for the increases in the size of the military. As a result the government in these countries diverted a significant proportion of the food supplies from rural households to itself. Mobilization also meant reduced supply of manufactures to the countryside. As a result there was no motivation for farmers to produce food and sell it in the market (offered low prices) and they retreated into subsistence activities resulting in tremendous decrease in urban food supply, rocketing prices and ultimately famines. A common feature of poor economies was their dependence on peasant agriculture which was highly resistant to mobilizing. Countries like Germany, Italy, and Austria-Hungary had all had large peasant population which made it impossible for the government to mobilize significant amount of resources for the war. Underdeveloped transportation and communication systems and lack of technical know how further hindered the much needed acceleration in food production. The inability of the government to raise funds through tools such as tax collection and war bonds was a further reflection of the economics underdevelopment of such countries. As a collective result of all the above factors, the poor countries struggled to mobilize majority of their resources for the purpose of war which meant that they fielded army and military equipment which wasn’t comparable to that of the rich countries which ultimately led to their downfall.
Like in the previous world war, in World War II there existed a positive correlation between pre war development of a country and the percentage of resources it is able to mobilize for the purpose of war. Only this time the relation was less strong than before. This might be attributed to the fact that although developed and rich countries such as USA, Britain, France etc. were able to mobilize a very high percentage of their economical resources for the purpose of war, the then underdeveloped and poor Soviet economy was also able to devote a very high proportion of its economical resources for the war. In fact the soviet economy was able to provide manpower and equipment for its military with the same strength as that of the other rich countries with a per capita GDP almost double that of the Soviet.
USSR had huge population and massive land area, but its per capita GDP was very low. This may be attributed to the fact that most of the working population of USSR was engaged in low productivity subsistence farming, international trade was almost absent and the large territorial area of the country was mostly unexploited due to underdeveloped transport systems and lack of suitable technical know how. Inefficient government and lack of financial planning put further barriers in development and growth of USSR. But During the 1920’s, the Soviet Union under the leadership of Stalin went under a massive programme of industrialization. Wherever possible, skilled labour was replaced by machines which helped in standardization and simplification of the production process. Mass production, developed in the 1930s to increase the development of the soviet, was the key to the wartime production. This industrialization was based on the concept of collective farms that crushed the power of peasants to withdraw from the market during the time of the war. This helped the government get control over the food supplies to feed and maintain a large army at times in which USSR was actively involved in war. This ability of the Soviet to control allocation of food supplies helped it to mobilize a high proportion of its resources for the war.
But the real heroes who helped the economy pull through the war period were the people themselves. The war made exceptional demands on the civilians. Most of the labour was mobilized for the purposes of war. As a result majority of the industrial and agricultural workforce consisted of children, women and old men. Soviet workers were made to work for long hours and any holidays or leave for the workers were cancelled indefinitely. The gruelling regime of work imposed on the soviet people was unprecedented in history. The greatest source of hardship was the food supply. No other population was asked to make this level of sacrifice. The story of the soviet people is that of epic endurance which ultimately helped the economy pull through the burden put on it by war.
Allied powers supplied the greatest quantity of military resources to the theatres of war. It is no surprise that they ended up on the victorious side. The ability to so field massive amount of troops and military equipment was based on the fact that the allied powers level of economic development was far greater than that of their opponents. Pre 1914, economic factors were not as important as during the period of the great wars due to the inability of the government to mobilize the resources from industry and agriculture because too many people were required to work in the fields and workshops just to produce enough to feed the population, and it was economically unfeasible for the government officials to count, tax, and channel them into war. II
The period between the great wars was unique. The dependence of military performance upon and pre economic development specifically holds true for this era in history. After World War II, the economic factors might have lost their significance again. This may be best summed up by the following.
‘Since 1945 the economic factors in warfare may have lost significance
again. This is because after the advent of nuclear weapons any rich country
however small or any large country however poor could acquire devastating
military force for a few billion dollars. Hence the marshalling of economic
resources may have played a much more vital role in the outcome of the two world wars than was likely in any period before or since.’
Source: Harrison, Mark. 2004. "Why the Rich Won: Economic Mobilization and
Economic Development in Two World Wars."
Bibliography
- Harrison, Mark. 1998. “The Economics of World War II: An Overview.” In
The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International
Comparison, 1-42. Edited by Mark Harrison, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
- Harrison, Mark. 2004. "Why the Rich Won: Economic Mobilization and
Economic Development in Two World Wars." University of Warwick,
Department of Economics. Paper to the conference on “La mobilisation de
la Nation à l’ère de la guerre totale, 1914-1945: Armer, produire, innover,
gérer,” organized by the Département d’Histoire de l’Armement of the
French Ministry of Defence, Paris, 26 to 28 October.
-
Overy, Richard J. 1995. Why the Allies Won. London: Pimlico.
-
Milward, Alan S. 1977. War, Economy and Society, 1939-45. London: Unwin.
- http://www.eh.net/encyclopedia/article/tassava.WWII
in World War II the patterns of mobilization in market economies were broken
by an exceptional Soviet performance based on the command economy.
When we introduce the evidence from World War I we find the first four
of these patterns present in full force. When subjected to superior force, poor
economies eventually crumbled. Against this historical background the Soviet
achievement in World War II appears even more remarkable.
suggest that the power of these simple ideas about the relationship
between economic and military performance is confined to a relatively short
historical period. The era of “total war” from 1914 to 1945 seems to have been
unique. In both world wars the main combatants were able to devote more
than half of their national income to the war effort.
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