Apart from a prolonged German problem which the victors failed to handed, the staggering international crisis and the failure of the victors in alleviating the tension stemmed from the international crisis generated fear among various nations. After German and Italian unification, a new phrase of European era was formed. It was suggested that startling imperialism of the Western powers and the nationalism in this new era were the driving force behind international conflicts toward 19th century and also 20th century. In 1875, nationalism in Eastern Europe caused by Bulgarian Crisis stroke “Eastern Question” and it entirely destroyed the relation between Austrian Empire and Russian Empire. The Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism made German Empire and Russian Empire apart from each another. After World War 1, the aggressions of Hitler, which was supposed to be a kind of Greater-German movement, discredited German from being trusted by Chamberlain, British prime minister from 1937 to 1940. After1870, imperialism became prevalence among European power with the outcome of an incoherent striving for national status, which brought to various conflicts among power. For example, Anglo-French rivalry in Egypt (1890), Anglo-German rivalry in South Africa (1896), Franco-Italian rivalry in Tripoli and Tunisia (1882), Franco-German rivalry in Morocco (1905&1911) etc. The imperialism continued after World War 1, in 1923, Mussolini bombarded Corfu, Southern part of Greece and in 1938; he conquered Abyssinia which worsened the relationship with Britain. In 1938, Hitler annexed whole of Czech, which cast a deep shadow all over Europe. As a whole, international crisis creating tension or rivalry among powers, this eventually generated fear among powers. Moreover, the thesis of Charles Tilly, which entitled “a standard war provoking logic”stating that powers trend to expand with a little buffer zone, so that more conflicts would be mounted. Actually, every power did not want war to come, but out of fear, they envisaged that the war would soon or later happen. The victors, however, did nothing to alleviate the tension from international crisis. Britain and America, far from stopping these crisis, uphold a policy of “splendid isolation”, a policy of remaining neutral in every European affair, thought out 19th century and even after World War 1.Britain concentrated on her oversea trade and only took action when her trade route was affected, for example, Crimean War in 1858 and Mediterranean agreement with Italy and Austria in 1920s. America only cared about the continent of America. Furthermore, Britain did not devote herself as peace-keeper, for example, she actually did not support League of Nation in dealing with the aggression of Mussolini, despite the fact that she was a foundation member of it. France, on the other hand, actively joined into the international crisis instead of averting them before World War one, while after it; she was so weak that she had to follow the policy of Britain. Also, both Britain and France appeased to Hitler aggression in the hope of satisfying him to prevent war, ironically turn out to raise the indulgence of Hitler creating more tension. Hence, it was palpable that the victors failed to alleviate the tension brought by international crisis, which made war drawing nearer.
The fault of victors in the prolonged German problems and the staggering international tension could not give us with the whole picture vividly, since these problems along were not sound enough to explain the outcome of Second World War. Had German problem gave us the entire picture, Hitler would have got power in 1921, when he was leading a Putsch, then would Second World War started earlier? Despite the fact that international crisis did create fear up to a point that war seemed to be the only way to deal with such fear, but fear did not hundred percent equivalent to having a war. Fear had existed in 19th to 20th century among power for a long time, but within such period, only a handful of war could be witnessed. Hence, there must be some problems which was either not a fault of victors in World War one, or a problem after World War 1 that, on the same time, causing World War 2.
It was suggested that economic impact was a vital cause of Second World War. World War one caused a hazardous destruction of every power, since they employed all their recourses in supporting the war. After the war, there was a prominent improvement in the economic of every power, but David Thomson argued that every power had their own way of recovery, and no matter which way they followed, it had potential loopholes. During the Locarno Honeymoon period (1924-1929), relationship between great powers was fine, which provided a favorable environment for powers to recovery their economic, employment, thus reduced for every power. Yet, their recovery suffered from several handicap. There was a rapid depletion of the export of British economy. France was greatly restricted by a shortage of labor and a too protective trading policy which hindered her export. German’s recovery was precarious, since she depended too much on international or American’s borrowing. Their economy severely collapsed after the Great Depression (1929). Super-inflation was elsewhere over Europe and America followed by unemployment booming up. In Germany, people were frustrated and they turned their support to Hitler, an only person who promised to tackle the entire socio-economic problem. “As Germany plunged deeper into the Depression, growing numbers of middle-class citizens began to see in the youthful dynamism of the Nazi Party a possible way out of the situation” In 1932, the election gave Nazi party 11.74 million of vote with 196 seats as compared to 0.81 million of vote with 12 seats in 1928. Hence, economic impact was rather an essential factor for the rise of Hitler. On the other hand, after the Great Depression, British government under Chamberlain was not eager to restrict Hitler and Mussolini, since he intended to correct the socio-economic in British. He then appeased Mussolini in Hoare-Laval Pact in 1935, which enabled him to conquer Abyssinia and Hitler in Munich conference in 1938, which gave the most strategic place of Czech to him. All these paved the way for their further aggression and confrontation with Britain and France, especially when Hitler invaded Poland that caused Second World War.
Apart from the impact of economic, the impact of Paris Peace settlement linked, intricately, to the outbreak of Second World War. Such thesis can be interpreted in term of the fault of victor after World War One. For one thing, it angered German race. For another, it had changed the balance of power and created a national minority. A major fault of Paris Peace settlement was to assert that German should solely be responsible for the coming of First War World. “The Versailles Treaty was deliberately punitive. This was to be a misleading and unfortunate conjunction, for the harshest term actually arose not from any presumption of moral guilt but from the French wish.” As a result, a very harsh term was imposed on Germany. She had to pay a huge indemnity to the victors and her territories were being ceded to victors and the newly established nations. All these generated a revenge sentiment over German, which spread seeds for the rise of Hitler and Second World War. Moreover, the settlement had damaged the balance of power in Europe. Richard J. Evans described the situation as “Collapse of the established order in Germany as elsewhere under the cataclysmic impact of First World War”.After World War one, four big empires, namely Austria-Hungary, German, Russian and Ottoman Empire, were vanished in the map of Europe. Their vast territories were replaced by various nations like Finland, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia etc., which were too weak, in both military and economic, in upholding the balance of power. They were, thus, incapable of defending themselves against aggression. Also many German were controlled by Czechoslovakia near Sudetenland and Poland in Polish Corridor, which provided Hitler with an excuse to expand. Hence, the outbreak of Second World War could be traced back to the impact of Paris Peace settlement, which could be regarded as a fault of victors after the outbreak of World War One.
On top of the impact of Paris Peace settlement, failure in collective security further made the war become possible. David Thomson described the origin of collective security as “The provisions made in the Covenant of the League of Nation for joint action against aggression, all presupposed that government and people interested in preserving the peace and in maintaining the settlement of 1919 would be able and willing to act together.” However, this origin was not so robust. When socio-economic problems began to crop up after 1929, they failed to have a joint action against aggression. Italy was given Abyssinia in 1935, despite the fact that it was obviously an aggression. Germany was given Sudetenland, which was strategically important to Czechoslovakia, despite the fact that France had a little alliance with Czechoslovakia and she promised to support Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, Soviet Union was absent in collective security, so that it was only a “power-less”security system and could not guaranteed any peace. Soviet Union was being isolated due to the fact that she was a communism country. Yet, during the period of economic recovery, the relationship between the Western power and Soviet Union was improved by various agreements. With the rise of Hitler, Soviet Union even proposed to join with the West in collective security. However, the West did not trust Soviet Union. Soviet Union was not invited in Munich conference. John Keegan argued that “Western democracies preference for gambling on Hitler’s reluctance to cross the brink rather than accept Soviet help to ensure that he did not”. Stalin, being totally frustrated with the West, collaborated with Hitler even Hitler was anti-Slavic. Hence, the failure of collective security also facilitated aggression of Hitler and the signing of Nazi-Soviet non aggression Pact (1939) gave Hitler confidence in invading Poland, which marked the opening of Second World War.
All in all, the outbreak of Second World War can be interpreted as a failure of victors in dealing with the problem in Europe starting in 19th century. However, those problems were not sound enough to give us full picture; there were some new problem after World War One leading to the outbreak of Second World War.
Bibliography
Anderson, M.S. “The Ascendancy of Europe” ( London, 2003) pp.277-280
Evans. J.R. “The Coming of the Third Reich” (New York, 2004), pp7-9
Ibid., p246
Ibid., p464
Meinecke, F. “The German Catastrophe: Reflections and Recollection” (Cambridge, 1950), pp. 89-107
Keegan, J. “The Second World War”, (New York, 2005), p11
Perry, K. “Modern European History Made Simple” (London, 1983), p. 27
Roberts, J.M. “The penguin history of Europe” (London, 1997), p521
Thomson, D. “Europe since Napoleon” (London, 1957) pp.616-620
Ibid., pp690-694
Tilly, C. “Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990” (Cambridge, 1990) pp.70-76
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J.M. Roberts, “The penguin history of Europe” (London, 1997), p521
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John Keegan, “The Second World War”, (New York, 2005), p11