In What Ways Were Britain's Imperial Policies Before 1952 Influenced By The Development Of The Cold War?

Authors Avatar

Skandar Zaman

Sarah Stockwell

26/01/06

In What Ways Were Britain’s Imperial Policies Before 1952 Influenced By The Development Of The Cold War?

There has been much historiography concerning the development of the Cold War and its impact on British imperial policy. The Second World War had drained the nation’s wealth tremendously and a led to a geopolitical transformation where instead of Germany challenging the British Empire; the Soviet Union was now challenging America for global dominance. However, Britain refused to accept the permanent nature of this post-war shift in the global balance of power and John Kent argues that ‘policy makers were fully aware of the decline in British power produced by the war, but believed that such a decline could be reversed’. In order to achieve this objective, British imperial policy was centred on cooperation with America and non-compromise with the Soviet Union.  Although the idea of a ‘third force’ emerged where Britain would lead a united Western Europe, and use the vast resources of Africa in order to bridge the dollar gap and become independent of American dominance, this idea was unrealistic and discarded in favour of cooperation with America. Despite the economic threat that the superpower posed and the anti-colonial views held, Britain regarded America as a friendly power which was essential to her recovery and to the maintenance of the Empire. The Soviet Union on the other hand was considered as much more dangerous and the problem of containing Soviet influence in the post-war years was of prime importance. In March 1946 at Fulton Prime Minister Churchill stated ‘they will not be removed by closing our eyes to them…by mere waiting to see what happens nor will they be removed by a policy of appeasement’. In areas of vital interest to Britain such as the East Mediterranean and the Middle East Britain was intent on maintaining exclusive influence and refused to succumb to Soviet demands. Deighton states that Britain wanted the best of both worlds with her own sphere of vital influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East Eastern without accepting an exclusive Soviet sphere in Eastern Europe. This was due to the geographical proximity of counties such as Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to Greece, Turkey and the Aegean and Black Seas and the fear of an extension of Soviet influence which could reorganise the whole of Europe into a Soviet-led bloc. The development of the Cold War certainly influenced British imperial policy with increased importance placed on Anglo-American solidarity and a hard line against growing Soviet and Communist influence. Although Prime Minister Richard Attlee feared aggravating the Russians through non-compromise, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin declined to appease the Soviets. Bevin believed that a domino effect would ensue where compromise would simply encourage further demands. The Cold War threatened to cast a shadow Britain’s global influence and prestige. The imperial policies pursued in the years up to 1952 were intended to prevent further erosion of her great power status and reverse the nation’s decline.

The Middle East and East Mediterranean were areas of vital British interest due to Soviet power being much closer and Soviet influence more likely to grow as a result of the advance of the Soviet armies. In the years after the war Britain held a severely non-compromising position in this region due to a combination of political, economic and strategic reasons. The Middle East was an important source of oil, an export market and a replacement for food supplies after Indian independence was granted in 1947. In strategic terms Indian independence also enhanced the importance of the Middle East due to Egypt replacing India as the main garrison between herself and Singapore.  Moreover many of the Soviet Union’s vital centres were out of range from the United Kingdom, making the Middle East bases essential so that effective air action could be taken against the Soviet Union’s important industrial and oil producing areas of Southern Russia and Caucasus.  The importance of the Suez Canal was evident through Britain’s refusal to renew the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty. After the humiliating evacuation of Abadan Britain was determined to hold on to the Suez and prevent it from becoming an allied base subject to international control. Although there was initial acceptance of withdrawal from Egypt in 1946, this was reversed in March 1947 and made withdrawal from the troubled Palestinian mandate more acceptable. As well as the free passage of Soviet warships and joint Russian-Turkish bases in the Straights, the Potsdam conference also revealed that the Soviets were seeking a position in Libya though the acquisition of trusteeship over Tripolitania. Britain wanted to obtain responsibility of Cyrenaica in the east as the region was deemed necessary for the protection of British air routes and air bases. Furthermore, if the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty could not be revised, then it would become a very useful facility for stationing troops. Britain held reservations because Tripolitania would give Russians control of an area from which they could cut Mediterranean communications and it would strengthen the case for Soviet bases in the Straits. Britain was successful in its policy of excluding Russia from the ex-Italian colony as until 1951 Tripolitania and Cyrenaica were held under  administration.

Join now!

The crisis in Iran in 1946 also helped strengthen Britain’s Middle-Eastern position. The crisis centred on the continued Soviet occupation of the Iranian province of Azerbaijan and the refusal to withdraw troops, prompting America to urge the Iranians to renew their complaint to the Security Council. America took the lead in opposition to Soviet imperialism by promising limited military credits to Iran and renewing several important wartime advisory missions. This helped to bring about Russian evacuation and prevented the Soviets from attempting to carve out its own sphere of influence in the Middle East. Therefore to an extent the ...

This is a preview of the whole essay