Large dams, and the irrigation that they provided, did make a great contribution to the increase in agricultural output of India, and thus to the decrease in poverty. In 1951, the food grain production was 52 million tonnes. In 1990, a record harvest of 170 million tonnes was achieved (Iyer, 1989, p. 66). While the availability of good quality seeds, of high-yielding crops and of fertilizer, as provided by the Green Revolution, are all important, the ‘average increase in crop production, due to irrigation ... is a phenomenal 183 percent’ (Singh, 1997, p. 64). This clearly demonstrates that irrigation can greatly be credited with boosting agricultural production. Of this irrigation, an increasingly high proportion of the water came from large dams, 47% in 1990 (Shah, 1990, p. 105). Thus, dams can be attributed with directly contributing to a 90% rise in agricultural output. Furthermore, irrigation is recognised as having directly raised millions out of poverty, by increasing landowners’ incomes and by providing employment to others. In 1982, as calculated by Shah, irrigation augmented farm-owners’ income by, on average, Rs4000/ha/annum and man-power used was three times higher on irrigated land than on un-irrigated, because of the lower risk in crop cultivation (1990, p. 112). This contributed to the consistent decrease in the percentage of those in India living below the poverty line (Khilnani, 2004, p. 101). However, Farmer warns that one must be careful in reacting so enthusiastically to such improvements, as they were generally confined to wheat - rice, for example, only increased its output by 16% (1986, p. 176).
As Nehru had hoped, dams eventually lessened the effects of droughts, managing ‘to break India’s dependency on food imports’ (Khilnani, 2004, p. 93). The benefits were not immediate, as during the 1950s and 1960s there were regular food shortages, with the nation becoming heavily dependent on American nutritional aid (Khilnani, 2004, p. 79). However, with ever increasing irrigation and the start of the Green Revolution, the UNDP Human Development Report was able to state in 1993: ‘India’s dependency on food imports has shrunk to such an extent that today it imports less than two per cent of the food it eats’ (p. 161). This is particularly impressive given that India’s population doubled from 1951 to 1990. The progress made was even more significant than Nehru could possibly have foreseen. As the East-West conflict heightened, America and the Soviet Union were ever more in search of satellite states. India’s economic independence prevented it from getting embroiled in an unnecessary dispute. This was largely due to dams allowing for high crop yields even during periods of low rain. In the drought of 1987-88 ‘major and medium irrigation was the mainstay of food production’ (Shah, 1990, p. 111). Of areas usually fed by large dams, 79% remained irrigated whereas only 3.5% of minor irrigation units were still cultivated, because they had dried up (Shah, 1990, p. 110). Agricultural output only dropped to 138 million tonnes in that year from the previous peak of 155 million tonnes in 1983-84 (Shah, 1990, p. 111).
Urban and industrial water supply was the second economic objective of Nehru in building large dams. The water requirements in metropolitan areas in India have always been critical. With booming populations, Indian cities were expected by the government to be unable to rely purely on the rivers flowing through them. The experience of other industrializing nations had shown that any lack of water in an urban area would be a considerable limiting factor to a city’s growth. It was envisaged that large dams in the vicinity of cities would account for an increasingly significant amount of urban water supply.
Large dams did meet the water demands, with many predominant Indian cities becoming dependent on them. Baijal and Singh suggest that, because groundwater was often saline and water from minor irrigation projects would evaporate with the advent of summer, India became reliant on large dams (2000, p. 1659). Bombay’s entire water supply came from a set of dams of Vaitarana, Tansa and Bhatsa. Delhi, which is on the banks of the Yamuna, only obtained 25% of its needs from the river. Instead, the balance was met by releases from the Bhakra Dam to the West and the Ram-ganga dam to the East (Shah, 1990, p. 103). The situation was similar for other large Indian cities. Although water requirements for industry constituted only a fraction of total consumption of water, they could not be fulfilled without large dams. For example, the Bokaro Steel Plant, one of the largest steel plants in the country, had to have a large dam built at Tenughat to supply its water (Shah, 1990, p. 104). Hence, in terms of water demands for the growing population of India, dams were a success.
Nehru recognised the significant impact that the supply of electricity had had on the development of Western economies, making hydropower his third objective in dam building. The generation of electricity, due to the prevailing trend of diverting energy to urban areas and industry, must be considered in the wider development aim of modernisation (Thukral, 1992, p. 8). With improving technology, it was hoped that hydropower would provide a substantial and renewable energy source that would drive India’s industrialisation.
The electricity requirements of India were largely met by dams. Hydropower output increased significantly, from 575MW in 1951 to 19370MW in 1991; naturally, an increased availability of power was necessary for the undeniable growth of Indian industry (Singh, 1997, p. 62). However, this does ignore the declining importance of hydropower in relation to thermal energy in India. Although it had increased in terms of output from 1953-1990, hydropower declined from 50 percent of total energy consumption in 1962 to just 27.2 percent by 1990 (Baijal & Singh, 2000, p. 1660). However, Singh argues that hydropower was always of importance because it was renewable, did not pollute and could be turned on and off at ease (1997, p. 164). Yet he failed to account for the fact that thousands of tonnes of carbon dioxide and methane were released both in dam building itself (through the production of concrete) and in the decomposition of organic matter (from the submerged vegetation). Thus, despite its increased output, hydropower had a decreasing impact on Indian industrialisation, possibly polluting in the process.
Dams only partially met Nehru’s economic aims, as they rarely fulfilled expectations and were much more expensive that predicted. Ashok Mitra stated in 1989 that it ‘is very well known that the returns from investment on big irrigation works is abysmally low, project after project’ (p. 1791) giving dams questionable financial viability. This emphasis on finance is seen in the financial productivity analysis adopted in 1951 that calculated a Cost-Benefit ratio; this could not be less that 1:1.5 if the project was to be considered viable (Amin, Kothari, & Singh, 1992, p. 169). Herein lay a major deficiency of dams in India, a schism between claims and performance: the Indian national average for output on irrigated land was 1.7 tonnes of grain per ha while it had been predicted to be 4.5 tonnes. With hydroelectricity, Singh argues that, despite the fact that there is no clear data, there ‘is a shortfall in this sector too’ (1990, p. 564) due to poor maintenance, inefficiency, the breakdown of turbines and the reduction in the life of a dam caused by unexpectedly large siltation. This is exemplified by the Hirakud Dam. By 1987, over forty years since its construction began, it only operated at 48 percent of its envisaged capacity (Viegas, 1992, p. 31). As well as the lower than expected benefits, construction costs were surprisingly high, with average expenditure being 254% greater than anticipated (Singh, 1990, p. 563). This may even be an optimistic figure, with the Public Accounts Committee finding 32 major projects in the Fifth and Sixth Plans alone that had run over budget by more than 500% (Singh, 1990, p. 563). In terms of Cost-Benefit, such discordance had fundamentally undermined the financial aims of dam-building with the 1:1.5 ratios rarely being met. Theses shortfalls of dams meant that the Indian population grew to hold them in less regard and, because they often failed to meet their targets, they can only be considered to have partially succeeded in fulfilling their economic promise.
Dams also had a number of unforeseen consequences, one of which was to compound inequality, contrary to the aim of Nehru’s wider development strategy. Economic equity, though ideologically part of Nehru’s plan of Indian development, was rarely a pervading practical aim of dam-construction. The pre-1964 Cost-Benefit analysis, which did not consider social costs, exemplifies this. This analysis was largely proposed by rich landowners and politicians in order to make criteria easier for dam development so that investment could occur without convoluted and stringent financial productivity investigations (Singh, 1997, p. 75). In this way, the interest of the politician-landowner nexus fundamentally influenced dam projects. This was not an economically fair society where costs accrued to the rich and benefits to the poor. Instead, what is seen is a commoditisation of dam building in itself, as it became a political rather than a social enterprise. The politician-landowner nexus meant that distribution of water from state irrigation was selectively provided to landlords with political clout (Singh, 1997, p. 172). The extensive politicisation of this basic commodity organically grew an irrigation policy that was beneficial to a privileged class close to this nexus. It thus exacerbated the inequitable distribution of gains and losses between rich and poor. Even after the agricultural boom of the 1970s, the bottom 40 percent of society had just 1.2 percent of total landholdings (Singh, 1997, p. 77). Essentially, unlike what many Indians had hoped, dams had fused with capitalist philosophy to form an unfair society.
Dams also caused the displacement of significant rural populations, again of concern to the rural poor. In building a dam, large swathes of land were flooded, causing the widespread upheaval of villages and towns. It is estimated that over 30 million Indians were displaced by large dams since 1951 (Roy, 1999, pp. 6-11). Moreover, the 1984 Land Acquisition Act meant that the government was only legally bound to supply cash compensation, which was often below the market value of the land. Furthermore, few of the uprooted were adequately resettled (Bandyopadhyay, Mallik, Mandal, & Perveen, 2002, p. 4108). These people, who had to rely on a market economy, lacked capital and skills and so were disadvantaged from the outset. This does not demonstrate any gain from the irrigation projects by the displaced population. Suresh Sharma questions whether this model of development was truly in the ‘national interest’, as Nehru claimed, or merely there to benefit the state, industry and rich peasantry (1992, p. 78).
Dams had widespread negative environmental ramifications. Overuse of irrigation caused waterlogging. This afflicted 8.51million hectares of land, wasting water as well as providing a central concern for environmentalists (Baijal & Singh, 2000, p. 1662). Baijal and Singh attempt to rationalise this waterlogging issue by suggesting that it represents only 10 percent of total land irrigated and that therefore the benefits far outweigh the costs (2000, p. 1662). However, in the conservationist context, this argument ‘for the greater good’ remains unconvincing as any such destruction of the environment unjustifiably damages the sustainability of Planet Earth. More significantly, dams accounted for the destruction of large expanses of forest. This land often had rare species of flora and fauna which had formed a ‘naturally well balanced organic whole (and hence not replicable by human effort)’ (Shroff, 1990, p. 151). Dhawan attempts to justify the deforestation caused by submergence by highlighting that it accounts for just 5 percent of total forest cover lost since independence (1989, p. 1096). Nonetheless, in his argument he fails to consider that dams were an integral part of a development process that was responsible for the other 95 percent of deforestation - in the deforestation necessitated by resettlement, for example (Pant & Dharmadhikary, 1989, p. 2035). The shortfalls and the three side-effects of dams, the worsening of inequality, the displacement of locals, and the environmental destruction, had a significant effect on Nehru’s second objective in dam building.
Nehru’s second objective was that large dams should become the symbol of modernity, the ‘Temples of Modern India’. For religious people a temple represented the ‘physical replica of God’s abode’, a place elevated above an earthly stage – something inspiring (Martin, 1977, p. 1). Similarly, dams were intended to be the towering structures which the population respected and, to a degree, worshipped. They were the flagship of Nehru’s ‘promise of a future of plenty to be shared by all’ (Baviskar, 2004, p. 32) in which the Indian people had grown to believe. Sunil Khilnani goes so far as to propose that ‘these dams ... embodied the vision of modernity to which India had committed itself’ (2004, p. 62). Amita Baviskar agrees, arguing that there was a strong belief in the large dams’ ability to convey a powerful image of development (2004, p. 27). This is proven by the Indian Government’s investment of the greater part of its total irrigation outlay on medium and major irrigation projects, despite the estimate that minor works would provide water at a quarter of the price per hectare. Baviskar elaborates, saying that this was because ‘the state preferred to believe that showy, expensive projects are better investments than more modest, decentralised ones’ (2004, p. 27) due to their symbolic resonance. The idea that the dams were supposed to be the leading lights of the process of industrialisation is epitomized by Zachariah’s statement that, in 1951, they became ‘truly national’ (2004, p. 193) projects of great ideological importance.
As a result of the economic shortfalls, social problems and environmental destruction associated with dams, it is generally accepted that Nehru’s vision of dams being ‘symbols of national development and prosperity’ failed (Das Gupta, Raina, Jauhari, & Jauhari, 1993, p. 152). Khilnani argues that ‘Nothing ages worse than images of the future, and half a century later that image, many agree, seems to have been mistaken: grandiose, irrelevant and even destructive’ (2004, p. 62). He goes on to say that ‘The great dams ... came to be seen as the emanations of a developmental fantasy insensitive to ecological limits and careless of turning its citizens into refugees in their own land’ (2004, p. 63). Opposition to dams had steadily grown since the inception of the modernisation model under Nehru. In 1953, ideological sceptics, who were predominantly followers of Gandhi’s village-model of development, found their voices quashed amidst the nationalist clamour and the charisma of mega-projects. The resistance against earlier projects was sporadic, localised and disorganised. However, in the 1970s and 1980s such resistance, when combined with support from scientists, environmentalists and tribal activists, became sustained and organised. This resulted in powerful alliances which managed to alter the image of dams on a national stage to one of destruction and desolation (htt4).
While no accurate data exists as to how large dams are perceived by the Indian people, newspapers generally reflect a population’s views, demonstrating the lessening regard for large dams. On 1 July 1953, at the opening of the Tunghabahadra dam, when people were optimistic about irrigation prospects, The Times of India was calling for ‘more and more rivers to be harnessed’ in a similar way (Anonymous, 1953). In February 1970, at the inauguration of Rana Pratap Sagar, dams were still in relative favour with The Times of India, which referred to the project as being ‘a work of pride for both Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh’ and a ‘stupendous accomplishment’. However, this positive reaction must be considered with caution, as the same newspaper also wrote that ‘the dam, like others in India, has caused widespread displacement’ (Anonymous, 1970). Later, on 22 April 1988, the day of the Gosikhurd Dam opening ceremony, The Times of India stated that ‘the history of large irrigation projects ... has shown that the benefits promised never seem to materialize’ and that ‘projects which have a dubious return value should not be encouraged’ (Anonymous, 1988). Similarly, The Hindustan, at the completion of the Bargi dam in 1990, claimed that ‘dams are the scourge of the Indian people’ (Anonymous, 1990). The growing discontent between 1953 and 1990 concerning dams is evident. While Nehru’s plan, that dams be seen as harbingers of progress, was at first successful, dams gradually became the symbol of the shortfalls of industrialization.
This analysis of the economic and ideological contributions of large dams must carefully be regarded. There were important stakeholders in all the dam projects. It was often only individuals, with political affiliations or who stood to gain from a dam’s construction, who argued in favour of it. As Shripad Dharmadhikary described it, dams were only being ‘aggressively promoted by those who stood to gain most’ (htt5). Regarding the evaluation of the image of dams there is very little literature on the topic and so making an impartial judgement based on a wide range of sources is impossible. The investigation of newspapers is risky as they are frequently politically biased and their opinions may vary greatly. The Times of India, established in 1838 by colonial rulers, has always held conservative and bourgeois views, placing it more in favour than against the construction of large dams (htt6). Conversely, The Hindustan, first published in 1924, with roots in the independence movement, has remained a left-wing newspaper, thereby causing it to be more opposed to large dams (htt7).
Despite the uncertainty regarding the assessment of dams, the benefits they brought to India were substantial. Dams were major contributors to an irrigation effort that helped triple agricultural output from 1951 to 1990. They were essential in mitigating the effect of droughts, with the consequence that India, in the latter part of the 20th century, was rarely dependent on foreign food aid. Indian cities would not have been able to survive without the water that dams provided for domestic and industrial use. While their relative importance declined, dams continued to be a significant source of electricity, which promoted industrialisation. Nevertheless, even with the advantages that dams brought, they unquestionably underperformed. Costs were higher than predicted, building time was longer than projected and the benefits were lower than promoted. They also floundered in trying to reduce inequality, instead only compounding it. In addition, to a degree unforeseen, dams had the consequences of causing both the displacement of tens of millions of people and an ecological disaster (htt8). Indian dams were not as successful as their American counterparts, on which they were modelled. Dams in the US met their financial targets more regularly and had a considerably smaller displacement problem. Therefore, dams only partially fulfilled Nehru’s economic objective.
In the long term, dams failed to fulfil Nehru’s second objective of becoming the ‘Temples of Modern India’. At first, dams were popular and were heralded as India’s future. However, under increasing pressure from social and environmental groups in the 1970s and 1980s, they grew to be portrayed in a more negative light. As Stephanie Joyce concludes, ‘Once a sign of modernization and growth, dams are often seen ... as symbols of environmental and social devastation’ (1997, p. 1050).
Word Count: 4359 (with references)
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htt1 - http://www.educationforallinindia.com/fiveyearplans.html
htt2 - www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp923.pdf
htt3 - http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rpande/papers/dams_OUP_Nov30.pdf
htt4 - http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/articles/ncsxna/art_dam.pdf
htt5 - http://www.panossouthasia.org/pdf/OntheBrink05.pdf
htt6 - http://www.itopc.org/travel-requisite/newspapers/times-of-india.html
htt7 -
htt8 – Email correspondence between Ashok Khosla, President of the Club of Rome, and me dated 11 October 2011
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It was actually Mokshagundam Visvesvaraya, another notable Indian politician, who first adopted the motto ‘Industrialize - or perish’, but it came to represent the half of Indian politics, Nehru’s half, that was in favour of modernisation.
P.C. Mahalanobis was a key advisor to Nehru and the architect of the Second Five Year Plan.
It was on the TVA model that the Damodar Valley Corporation was formed in 1948.
The Green Revolution was a period from around 1963-1985 when the expansion of infrastructure, implementation of of cereal grains, modernization of farming techniques, and distribution of synthetic , hybridized seeds, and to farmers, occurred in many developing countries
The impact of large dams is such that there is also an argument that they were one of the principal causes for the social and environmental movements that swept around the world in the 1970s and 80s.