Indian History. To what extent did large dams built before 1990 fulfil Nehru's ambitions?

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Nicholas de Haes        Candidate no. 0031        Centre no. 58295

To what extent did large dams built before 1990 fulfil Nehru’s ambitions?

After gaining independence from the British Empire in 1947, India had two opposite development alternatives: the village economy model of Ghandi and the modernization scheme of Nehru. Nehru prevailed, running for office with the slogan ‘Industrialize – or perish!’ (Visvanathan, 2007, p. 5). In 1951 introduced the concept of Five Year Plans - developmental plans for a period of five years formulated by the newly established Planning Commission (htt1). Described as the ‘architect of Indian planning’ (Khan, 1989, p. 4), Nehru was the principal driver of economic change in independent India. He instituted policies based on the idea that India had to emulate the West in its development and follow a path to modernity. In 1954, Nehru even stated: ‘We are trying to catch up, as far as we can, with the Industrial Revolution that occurred long ago in Western Countries’ (Nehru, 1954, p. 93). He emphasized the need for ‘mother’ or ‘key’ projects: large-scale productions such as steel factories, power plants, agriculture and, most significant, dams (Khilnani, 2004, p. 72). These were essential because of their contribution to the development of other economic sectors. This concept of planning the basic industries with market forces taking care of the rest, summarised in the famous Nehru-Mahalanobis model, became so prominent that Medha Kudaisya argues that it was the raison d’être of the new postcolonial state (2009, p. 942). The objectives of this economic policy included making India largely self-sufficient (an imperative in maintaining India’s new found national sovereignty – particularly at risk in the cold war power games), increasing the wealth of the country and improving social justice and equality (Rao, 1952, pp. 6-20).

Nehru had two ambitions in dam building: firstly, the economic objective of providing irrigation, urban and industrial water, and electricity; secondly, the objective that they would become, in Nehru’s own words, the ‘Temples of Modern India’ (Nehru, 1958, p. 3). As Arun Nayak explains, this second objective was that ‘their symbol of development ... would contribute greatly to the growth of a nation’ (2010, p. 69). Daniel Klingensmith argues that these targets were pursued so enthusiastically among Indian planners because of the ‘perceived successes of the great New Deal water projects in the United States, particularly that of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)’ (2003, p. 123). With this in mind, starting from the First Five Year Plan, India embarked on the extensive construction of large dams - dams over 10m high (Shah & Kumar, 2008, p. 117). By 1990, the end of the Seventh Five Year Plan, India had built 3500 new dams (Central Water Commission, 2009, p. 1), placing it third in the world in dam construction, behind the US and China (htt2).         

In order to assess whether these dams fulfilled Nehru’s ambitions, this essay will first examine each of Nehru’s economic objectives – irrigation, urban and industrial water supply, electricity – and the degree to which they were met (Iyer, 2001). The dams did bring many benefits to the Indian population. They contributed to a considerable increase in agricultural output from 1951 to 1991 and reduced the impact of droughts, thereby decreasing India’s dependence on foreign food aid. Their supply of water facilitated the urbanisation and industrialization of India. Through hydropower, dams provided a substantial source of energy. However, despite these substantial benefits, dams hugely underperformed, rarely meeting their targets.

This study will then examine the problems associated with large dams and how they affected Nehru’s second objective, of dams becoming an impressive symbol of development. Large dam construction had a number of unforeseen consequences, which also affected irrigation in many other developing countries, particularly China: they exacerbated inequality, created a social displacement dilemma and caused widespread environmental destruction (Biswas & Tortajada, 2001, p. 11). Consequently, dams were somewhat detrimental to India and, more significantly, came to be viewed negatively by the Indian people. This lessening regard for large dams meant that, as is now consensually agreed, they failed to fulfil Nehru’s second aim (Mehta, 2001, p. 1): instead of being resonant symbols of development, dams became ‘symbols of controversy’ (Saleth, 1992, p. 1607).

It is not the purpose of this paper to suggest alternative development strategies and thus involve itself in ideological discourse concerning which of them would have been best. Nor, will it deal with extensive comparisons to other countries and time periods. Instead, it will investigate the extent to which large dams fulfilled Nehru’s objectives in India during the period 1947-1990. Neither will it reflect the slanted discourse of the 1980s and 1990s that was characterised by dam opposition and the uncritical acceptance and popularisation of those views (Dhawan, 1989, p. 1096). Rather, some impartial analysis will be attempted, based on benefits and costs, which pertains to a more recent trend in dam historiography, as displayed by writers such as Ramaswamy Iyer.

Irrigation was Nehru’s principal economic objective of large dam building. It must be explored in terms of increasing food production to improve India’s ‘huge agrarian economy that was one of the most impoverished in the world’ (Khilnani, 2004, p. 64). In the absence of other significant technology, until the Green Revolution, irrigation was supposed be the predominant benefactor of agriculture. It was predicted by planners that with just 5cm of irrigation a year crop yields would increase by 80%  (Dhawan, 1990, p. 6). Irrigation would bring benefits to a large majority of the rural poor (80% of the population subsists), thus reducing inequality. Large dams were particularly key in the irrigation effort, considered ‘the main form of investment in irrigation undertaken by the Indian government’ (htt3). As well as increasing overall agricultural output, dams were expected to reduce the impact of droughts, thereby decreasing the political manipulation of India that had come with American food aid  (Dhawan, 1990, p. 6). With an average of 75% of rain falling in the monsoon season and just 5% in January and February  (Thomas, 1990, p. 175), there had always been a ‘vulnerable dependence of Indian agriculture on the vagaries of the monsoons’ (Iyer, 1989, p. A108). Dams, acting as storage, would prevent floods during the monsoon and provide irrigation in the dry season.

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Large dams, and the irrigation that they provided, did make a great contribution to the increase in agricultural output of India, and thus to the decrease in poverty. In 1951, the food grain production was 52 million tonnes. In 1990, a record harvest of 170 million tonnes was achieved (Iyer, 1989, p. 66). While the availability of good quality seeds, of high-yielding crops and of fertilizer, as provided by the Green Revolution, are all important, the ‘average increase in crop production, due to irrigation ... is a phenomenal 183 percent’ (Singh, 1997, p. 64). This clearly demonstrates that irrigation can ...

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