Links between the two regimes of Lenin and Stalin.

Authors Avatar

        “They’re the same”, my father once exclaimed. For if we believe the dominant ‘traditional’ intentionalist argument, put forward by cold- war era historians, then there indeed exists a direct link between Stalinism and Leninism, and that the socio- economic and political base provided by Lenin resulted in the excesses of Stalinism. Unlike Stalin’s personal soviet viewpoint, which advocates that he was the Lenin of the day shedding a positive light on his own policies, which he said were the rightful extensions and correct fulfilments of Lenin’s basic principles, the totalitarian argument shows us that the Stalinist experiment became “a nation’s tragedy”. While of course, Trotskyites, the first line of opposition to this case, believe that Stalinism broke with Leninism. They strongly favour the fact that Stalin perverted the basically democratic progressive nature of Leninism into a personal dictatorship. It is was a “Thermidorian negation…[and] betrayal” of the basic Bolshevik beliefs. Deutscher, took up this view, and proved that the only way Stalin stayed revolutionary was “not in the sense that he remained true to all the original ideas of the revolution, but because he put into practice a fundamentally new principle” of socio- economic and political organisation. This ‘clear break’ theory between the two regimes, was taken up most famously by Khrushchev who, while trying to justify the existence of his Marxist- Leninist regime, denied that Stalinism was rightful Leninism, and through a policy of de- Stalinisation spoke of the excesses which inhabited Stalinism. Also while there was an attempt to explain both regimes in a balanced viewpoint, the revisionists pointed out that there were both continuities and discontinuities, but that Stalinism had other influences as well from Russian history. The prevailing argument is now a balance of the ‘straight line’ intentionalist theory that Bolshevik Marxism “determined the character of post revolutionary Leninism as well as the main traits of what we call Stalinism”, and the revisionist research that has shown the difference of extremity between the two regimes. While Leninism began to grope its way towards political totalitarianism, economic liberalisation did not mean inevitable Stalinist authoritarianism. The fall of the Communist regime has sparked a resurgence in Sovietology, and it has also solidified the fact that the distinction of the “good” Lenin and the “bad” Stalin “is becoming less and less sustainable”. While it is not certain that “out of the totalitarian embryo would come totalitarianism full blown”, it is definite that Lenin played a part in producing Stalin, but Stalin took the economy, politic and terror one step further.

        Many agree that there indeed occurred a ‘great change’ when Stalin initiated his economic reforms based on the policy of collectivisation the effectively abolishing private property, concentrating the remaining peasantry into ‘collective’ farms and rapidly industrialising, through the introduction of the ‘Five Year Plans’. He himself stated that it was a ‘Great Leap Forward’. Alec Nove concludes that the introduction of Stalinist economic policy was “a great turning point in Russian history”, in which Stalin stood Marxist theory on its head for determined the character of the economic arrangement through the political system. Essentially the policy of collectivisation was a turnabout to the semi- capitalist policies of trading under the NEP. And while ‘that wonderful Georgian’, in changing the structure of the USSR, tried to show us that wholesale collectivisation and industrialisation did not only represent the continuation of the Bolshevik blueprints set about by Lenin, but that it was a “the path of socialism”, men like Trotsky whole heartedly disagree. Trotsky showed that in the process of bringing about a “sharp turn or zigzag” of policy, Stalin broke away from Bolshevik ideology and that “opportunism… turned into its opposite… adventurism”. Stalin’s argument of collectivisation as an extension of Leninist ideas, associated with grain requisitioning tactics and kulak ‘liquidation’ during the Civil War, does not hold much water. Although he tried to justify his actions by using the words of Lenin, who once said that collectivisation is an eventual socialist goal, and that the kulaks are “bloodsuckers, vampires, robbers of the people”, Stalin’s theory that his policy would lead “to the destruction of the last roots of capitalism in the country, to the final victory of socialism in agriculture, and to the complete consolidation of Soviet power in the countryside”  is fantastical. Not only is the reliability of his evidence dubious, dismissing some of Lenin’s writings (by placing them under lock and key in the archives) but also is his pick-and-choose manner towards economic argument. The justification of his argument is only based on words to strengthen his viewpoint and to further his own ambitions, for he fails to include Lenin’s wise warnings towards collectivisation: - that “coercion towards the middle peasant is a supremely harmful thing… to act here by means of coercion is to ruin the whole cause”, and that collectivisation should be on the grounds of “not… pressure but…example and persuasion”.

In western historical analysis of Stalin’s economical policies, it was first Deutscher, who challenged the Soviet idea, by saying that there had occurred a break in policy of the communists and said there had appeared a “great change”. He wrote that “Soviet Russia embarked upon her second revolution, which was directed solely and exclusively by Stalin… [and which]… was even more sweeping and radical than the first”. The fact that he distinguished it as a second revolution appears to signify the major difference that he thought existed between the two revolutions. He called collectivisation a “military operation… a cruel civil war”. The experiment to place 150 million peasants into 200, 000 kolkhozy was a “piece of prodigious insanity, in which all rules of logic and principles of economics were turned upside down” and he clearly stipulated that “Stalin undertook to drive barbarism out of Russia by barbarous means”. Although Deutscher understood the cost of such means, it is unclear whether he had all the facts, for writing in 1949, his opportunity to look at first hand material was limited, and so this is why, although he states that Stalin “having borrowed so much from Marxist thinkers and economists, that he might well be charged with outright plagiarism” he concludes on Stalin with a positive note. Being a socialist in his political inclinations, thus compassionate with communist ideology, he talks of the rewards of such policies, describing Stalin’s economy as the “first truly gigantic experiment in planned economy, the first instance in which a government undertook a plan to regulate the whole economic life of its country, and to direct its industrial resources towards a uniquely rapid multiplication of the nation’s wealth”. He states that the plans enabled Russia to modernise and transform society, and for the first time ever, an abstract idea was made practical. For him the break in policy was not as disastrous as later historians would see it. But he does believe that behind Stalin “were tramping the myriads of weary bleeding Russian feet.”

Join now!

To Deutscher’s optimistic conclusion the intentionalists replied that collectivisation was not useful and only damaged Russia. They class the period of Stalinism as “a struggle on the same scale”as the First World War; “a war against the nation”. Ulam considers collectivisation as a war against the peasantry- he asks, “Was the Civil War ever concluded?” For the totalitarian school of thought both Lenin and Stalin saw peasants as scum, malleable to any needs of the party. Ulam even believes that had Lenin lived on then he would have ended the NEP earlier than Stalin did. To them both, the revolution was hi- ...

This is a preview of the whole essay