Parties
The Mensheviks and Bolsheviks evolved from the split of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party in 1902, Bolsheviks being the majority after the split. The Bolsheviks lead by V. I. Lenin and the Mensheviks under Martov had markedly different ideas although both followed the ideas of Marx for example recognising the need for tight central control and ideological beliefs. Both believed that the Provisional Government was a necessary ‘bourgeois evil’ on the road to revolutionary socialism that would be passed over relatively quickly; however they had differing “respective doctrines of revolution” and the similarities end here.
The Bolsheviks believed that the proletariat (working classes) and peasants were the key to a socialist revolution and would be lead by a tightly knit group (i.e. themselves) whereas the Mensheviks believed that it was the bourgeoisie who filled this role and that the proletariat should play no part. This to me was the key weakness of the Mensheviks. Marxism had predicted revolution in more economically advanced nations where the bourgeoisie formed a larger proportion of the population. In Russia, being relatively undeveloped, there was not sufficient strength of numbers of bourgeoisie to support revolution and their faith in an underdeveloped class could be seen as their downfall. Another weakness is that in Russia the bourgeoisie were too dependant on the government to “constitute a centre of resistance” so would be less inclined to revolt.
Both parties recognised any revolution would firstly be a bourgeois not socialist revolution as conditions did not exist in Russia to facilitate the latter “given the semi-feudal and retarded nature of Russian society”.
The Bolsheviks and Mensheviks had a further difference of opinion over the expected revolution should take place. Bolsheviks believed that the revolution should effectively be incited by development of the proletariat as a class “in itself, then for itself”, under guidance from the Bolsheviks. This contrasted with the Mensheviks who believed as Marx did that once the time is right the revolution will occur spontaneously i.e. the bourgeoisie will reach a stage of political awareness and discontent that they will revolt on their own.
The third party was the Kadets, or Constitutional democrats. They had developed out of the Liberalist movement of the 1860s and formed the majority of the Provisional Government in the early months of 1917. They represented intelligentsia, and zemstvos gentry; the more educated part of Russian society. They wanted Russia to modernise and become more liberal based on the model of England, where economic development would sustain a democratic government; so were markedly different from Marxist theory and the Bolsheviks. In addition they demanded a constitutional government, which I believe preoccupied them and delayed them making key policy decisions over re-establishing food supplies to Petrograd for example.
The Socialist Revolutionary Party was founded in 1900 under Victor Chernov. They were resolutely anti Marxist, instead basing their ideas on the populist movement extolling redistribution of land to the peasants, it may be argued to gain a popularity base, and a program of terrorism and mass agitation to fight for political freedom. It can be viewed as having backfired for their forebears because particularly after the murder of Tsar Alexander II in 1881, there were new waves of repression.
The populists and SRs influenced the marxists in two ways, firstly in Collectivism, working together for a greater good, and secondly by having a small group of revolutionaries to lead the uneducated masses. It could be argued that this was reinforced by the attempted revolution in 1905 that showed to the SRs but also to the Bolsheviks under Lenin that this was indeed possible – “a conscious minority who would remould the world”.
Why the Bolsheviks?
I believe the Bolsheviks came to power in October 1917 because of a complex relationship of reasons that are all interrelated.
The first major reason lies in Policies and political ambition of the Bolsheviks. I feel they had very clear ideas. Primarily it was the Bolsheviks’ attitude to the provisional government and to the Soviets, particularly those of Petrograd and Moscow that allowed them the means to take power. They believed in “no support to the Provisional Government” and that all power should be transferred to the soviets, (despite their domination by the SRs and Mensheviks), characterised in their Revolutionary slogan ‘All power to the soviets’. By seizing power of the Soviets from the Mensheviks and SRs they would possess an easy route to power as the Petrograd soviet by this stage controlled the armed forces of Petrograd allowing armed revolution against the Provisional Government. The opposite view was held by the SRs and especially the Mensheviks who I think, supported by the arguments of Kochan (1972) underrated the potential power that the soviets could possess. They failed to recognise that the Bolsheviks would use the soviets to their own ends and that the Bolshevik slogan of ‘All power to the soviets’ was in fact a means to gain support (away from the provisional government) for the soviets as a means to that end.
I consider that the second major reason was the position of the Provisional Government, political parties and the Bolsheviks over the pressing issues of the day and the amount of support each group garnered as a result. The Provisional government and therefore the Kadets could be described as weak, and acting with indifference, even contrary to, popular demand. Sakwa (1998) describes this well: “On a range of issues the provisional government found itself not flowing with the current of popular demands and social pressures but attempting to obstruct, divert, or suppress them”.
I think one of the key issues was the First World War. By October 1917 it is estimated that the war had caused between 8 – 10 million casualties and resulted in the crippling of Russian industry and the economy. The Provisional government, by continuing the “predatory imperialist war” mainly, it could be argued, in response to pressure from the Western Allies, went against popular opinion clearly demonstrated by the mass mutinies by the army and protests at home. By contrast the Bolshevik’s policy, which was completely against that of the Provisional Government said that the war was an imperialist one and called for an immediate end. This would only be possible, Lenin argued, if the government were removed and replaced by the soviets thus removing the ‘imperialist’ from the ‘war’.
The position of the Bolsheviks responding to the issues of the day, summed - up as ‘Peace, Bread and Land’ was I feel a major reason for the support or at least indifference of the Russian population to the Bolshevik take over. It meant they had support from all major areas of society – the soldiers (who were largely tired of the war; demonstrated by mass desertion), the urban population (no matter the class – any attempt to restore food supplies to the towns would have been welcomed) and the peasantry (who welcomed any measures to give them more land from landlords)
Sakwa sums up the reason for the increase of Bolshevik support well: “the Bolsheviks appeared to be the only party offering a viable economic and social alternative to economic catastrophe and bourgeois dominance”.
Also I think here was a crucial mistake by the Provisional Government and the Socialist Revolutionary majority – they wanted to wait until a Constituent Assembly approved their policies for land redistribution – but the events of the time, fuelled by the Bolshevik slogans, overtook them as the peasants merely claimed the land for themselves and reduced further their support base.
A third reason why the Bolsheviks came to power can be offered. While skilful planning and policy made possible the Bolsheviks’ rise to power, it was equally the events going on around them and Bolshevik opportunism that contributed. Several key examples can be cited to support both arguments.
An example illustrating opportunism is the events around the gradual loss of face of Kerensky’s Provisional Government during the ‘July days’, incited by the Bolsheviks, and due to the attempted Coup by General Kornilov in August. The link between Kornilov (who, Sakwa (1998) believes was instructed to move on Petrograd by Kerensky) and Kerensky and the humiliating failure of the coup to restore order in Petrograd meant that Kerensky’s position and that of the Provisional Government was severely weakened, especially when “its popular support was…weak” anyway. This almost certainly allowed Bolsheviks to gain power in the elections in the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets of September and which leads me to my second example.
An illustration of planning and policies becoming successful, the gradual increase in power of the soviets relative to the Provisional Government between March and October was mirrored by an increase of Bolshevik dominance within them. The elections of September put the Bolsheviks at a 51% share of members of the Moscow Soviet and this was reflected in the Petrograd Soviet too. The Bolsheviks also gained ground in the Trade unions and in support from factories. This I feel was another reason why the revolution of October was successful as the Bolsheviks had support of the Proletariat in the factories, and the power of the soviets over the armed forces meant they also turned a blind eye to the revolution.
Once their power in the soviets had been established and a support/ indifferent base created I think the Bolsheviks possessed the prerequisites for revolution.
The tactical brilliance of Lenin and the Bolsheviks is illustrated by the forming of the Military Revolutionary Council (in response to the Kornilov debacle under the guise of resisting perceived right wing coups) and the fact that the MRC were able to take Petrograd relatively painlessly. This was I think because all the other ‘elements’ discussed earlier in this section that would have provided an obstacle to the revolution had been dealt with by, or were made indifferent to, the Bolsheviks. In alliance with the SRs, the Bolsheviks moved the MRC on Petrograd on 24 October and seized key installations in Petrograd.
I think a fourth lesser factor was the element of chance. Effectively all the reasons/prerequisites discussed earlier for revolution came together in October 1917. In March 1917 Lenin himself didn’t believe he would “…see the revolution is [his] lifetime…”, while Sakwa (1998) states that “…a few days earlier [the revolution] might have failed, a few days later and it would have been crushed”.
Another example is the walk-out by the SRs and Mensheviks from the Congress of Soviets on 25 October 1917 effectively handing power completely to the Bolsheviks.
Conclusion
It has been demonstrated that the major political powers and parties of 1917 had many differing policies and ideologies. It can be argued that the relative strengths and weaknesses of these against the conditions of the time, for example the Mensheviks’ lack of confidence in the strength of the soviets, or the Kadets’ desire to establish constitutional government over dealing with more urgent issues (such as food shortages) lead to the Bolsheviks having an advantage over the other parties.
In addition their clearly defined policies such as transferring power to the soviets appeared to “offer the prospect of a break with old patterns of authority” thus their support, it can be argued, was based on the fact they were offering something new to the political arena which coincided perfectly with the aims of the social movements and the needs of the people – summed up as ‘Peace Bread and Land’.
The Bolsheviks were also in the right place at the right time – their skill in using events such as the Kornilov attempted coup to gain support for their party was instrumental in gaining support for, or indifference to, their takeover.
Thirdly Lenin’s skill as a leader and tactician with forward thinking, particularly in the use of the soviets to gain power, was decisive. He advocated ‘All power to the soviets’ at a time when the Mensheviks and SRs dominated them, but safe in the knowledge that the Bolsheviks could gain a majority in the soviets in the long term. Also the formation of the Military Revolutionary Council under the guise of resisting right wing coups but then using them as an utterly loyal means to take power was in my opinion an extremely clever move.
Finally, the following quote summarises my argument that it was a combination of factors that allowed the Bolsheviks to take power:
“October was accomplished…by the actions of a definite party but it was…prepared by all the unfolding events hitherto…”
Bibliography
Kochan, L, 1972, Russia in Revolution, Paladin Grafton Books, London, 334 pp.
Lenin V I, 1917, The April Theses
McCauley, M, 1998, The Longman Companion to Russia since 1914, Longman, New York, 367 pp.
Sakwa, R, 1998, Soviet Politics in Perspective, Second Edition, Routledge, London, 355 pp.
References