Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) is the monitoring of signals generated by communications between targeted actors. This also included monitoring the flow of communications even when the precise meanings of the message cannot be obtained. This means of intelligence acquisition was employed by the United States as evidenced by the the Americans and British driving a tunnel deep into the Soviet sector in Berlin.
According to the documentary, Intelligence was used by the United States [as well as the Soviet Union] during the Cold War for one main reason: to know whether their enemy state intends to fight them. And the documentary concludes that the answer lay hidden not in a satellite photo, or an agent report, but in the minds of their opponents.
The second documentary, “Korea,” on the other hand, focused on the Military Capability as an instrument of foreign policy. Military capability is aimed not to forge an agreement but to generate compliance from targeted state through the destruction of its human or non-human assets. It is described as a purposive and functional instrument—one of the many instruments in the orchetra of power—states use at an appropriate moment in the pursuit of their respective national interests.
One of the uses of the Military Capability is the use of brute force. It is the actual application of organized violence to destroy a state’s military capabilities or the state itself. Examples of this would be: (a) Nazi Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 to conquer territory and seize reources; (b) the 2003 U.S. Invasion of Iraq, and in the case of the documentary shown; (c) the mission in Korea to contain communism in that state.
Another use of the Military Capability is the reliance on the threat of future military force to influence an adversary’s decision-making but may also involve the limited application of force, this is called Coercion. The limited use of actual force may form a key component of coercion strategy if its purpose is to enhance credibility or demonstrate the type of price that continued to enhance credibility or demonstrate the type of price that continued defiance will bring. Examples of which would be: (a) the NATO intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, and in the case of the documentary shown; (b) the initial supposed show of force by the United States in order to set the communist forces aback, but it proved to be insufficient, so they eventually applied brute force.
The main limitation regarding the use of Military Capability as a foreign policy instrument is that it simply costs too much. Whether it be just a simple show of force (you need to be able to project large amounts of resources) or in the actual use of force, a vast amount of resource would be eaten up. Another limitation would be that once a country engages in this type of instrument, it would be extremely hard to go back, and repercussions are always expansive.
In summary, both instruments, based on the documentaries shown, were not as effective as the United States had hoped for them to be. With the fist one, they ultimately failed to answer the question as to whether the Soviet Union really intends to fight them or not (and vice versa). The Cold War ended, costing the lives of many CIA agents in the cold-blooded hands of the KGB. Same as with the second documantary, where although there was a minor victory when Pyongyang fell (It was the only communist capital ever to fall to the West during the Cold War) it was eventually recaptured by the Chinese. In North Korea alone, it is said that 2 million civilians were killed. 54,000 Americans didn't go home and the war claimed the lives of 3,000 men from the armies of 15 other nations. And although the west held the line and communism was contained there was no victory. Moreover, 40 years later, at the end of the Cold War, Korea was still divided by the same line.
It is undoubtable that the United States has the ability to influence any country, in whatever way, whether cultural, social, or political. But in these cases I don’t think the instruments were effective in advancing American values abroad. The United States has no apparent positive influence on the former Soviet Union nor Korea (at least North Korea) with regards to the American values resulting from these incidents concerning espionage and the use of force. These events have, in fact, been regarded by the states involved as a stigma, considering the number of casualties and the trauma that it has caused not only the citizens of the receiving state, but also the families of those who fought for the United States. In the case of intelligence, the casualties were mostly in the hands of the KGB, so the United States really wasn’t at fault there—just taking into consideration the deaths and the trauma it caused the families, not the situation as a whole. I really don’t think there was really any other way to undertake those things that had happened, but I think that before employing any of these instruments, due thought and precise calculations should be done in order to avoid disasters, such as the Korean War.