It is strikingly obvious that there are a myriad of incentives for Britain to adhere to abolition, most notably because for the appalling devastation nuclear weapons can potentially create. Probabilistic conception of causality is that inevitably nuclear war will occur in the future, thus global abolition would significantly reduce this probability to virtually zero. Jonathan Schell’s book ‘The Abolition’ gives a first class diagnosis of the nuclear predicament. Many theorists, such as Quinlan, fear global disarmament because of the potential crisis occurrence of a dangerous and volatile re-armament race. Schell counters this by making the mutual threat of re-armament fundamental to his argument for a NWF (nuclear weapons free world), (Wheeler and Booth, 1992, pg32). He labels it a ‘deterred state’ or a condition of ‘weaponless deterrence’, a situation which occurred between India and Pakistan prior to further proliferation. States thus realize that any attempt to re-arm will only create the same dangers experienced in a world of uncompromising nuclear terror. Thus states can enjoy the stabilizing benefits of the weapons without physically possessing the weapons themselves.
Further abolition proposals hold rational clout in the political arena. Strategic defence systems could be built to counter the predicament of cheaters. Even if states did cheat the damage from war would be slight. Re-armament parity would allow states to re-arm at the same pace negating the problem of unstable arms build-ups with ineffable effects. Scott Sagan’s direct reference to the disturbing probability of the risk of accidents would also not feature anymore (Sagan, 2002, pg47). Consequently, the existence of long-lead times would buy time enabling resolutions to be reached during potentially catastrophic political disputes. MccGwire consolidates this by pointing out that we no longer live in a bi-polar system. Thus the existence of a multi-polar system with one or two more players would sharply increase the future probability of inadvertent or accidental war (MccGwire, 1994, pg225).
If Britain relinquished its nuclear arsenal it would be setting an exemplary example to the rest of the world. By promoting non-proliferation and moving away from negative peace based on deterrence to positive peace based on community norms and values, a psychological spillover effect may occur (Wheeler, 1992, pg279). Undoubtedly by retaining nukes one does encourage proliferation, likewise by setting an example others may follow. Furthermore, if other states follow suit with abolition the possible savings could accrue to “a huge ‘peace dividend’ of capital…, released from military budgets to the benefit of the entire world economy” (Häckel, 1992, pg75).
Undisputedly there are many positive aspects to abolition globally and for Britain. Minimum deterrence as strategists advocate does work in a US-Russian context but uncertainties resonate when applying deterrence rationality in the politically volatile Third World. Waltz and strategic theorists believe states co-exist in a condition of anarchy with a very real security dilemma existing (Waltz, 2002, pg4). The concept of deterrence, as history shows, has prevented a general war between major powers since 1945. This is why many heavily criticise the case for nuclear disarmament and instead champion the concept of minimum deterrence. Minimum deterrence is a practical policy of reducing arsenals low enough without jeopardizing a countries security. Advantages include reducing damage, making forces easier to control and setting a good example to potential proliferators.
Charles Glaser claims that total disarmament could make war more likely thus adopts the strategy of minimum deterrence. He attests that the pre-requisite for disarmament is excellent robust political relations. However if relations are this good the probability of nuclear war would be just as low in a nuclear armed world (Glaser, 1998, pg113). In his article ‘The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament’ he illustrates the problems of designing arrangements to provide states with the confidence that they would be secure in a disarmed world. Furthermore he describes the dangers of abolition, most notably the increased probability of accidents if re-armament ensued, by reason of the lack of priority to the inclusion of safety mechanisms.
Technical considerations regarding verification and enforcement for abolition also need to be evaluated. Häkel asserts this aspect is often overlooked by arms control experts. Nuclear disarmament can result in a significant reduction and limitation of conventional military capabilities bound up in dual-capable hardware. Disarmament would also entail demobilisation of the elaborate array of delivery systems and support structures, which would be undeniably expensive for Britain (Häckel, 1992, pg74). Thus the case for abolition is by no means foolproof and conjures up further more additional risks and problems. These include states cheating, blackmail and the fact that conventional war becomes a possible eventuality. It would also be myopic to exclude rouge leaders from the nuclear equation. In a new age of abolition, the possibility of ‘crazy’ leaders capitalising on a situation of security based on co-operation and trust is extremely likely. Therefore by disarming, Britain would put itself in a very vulnerable position relying on extended deterrence and conventional forces. Consequently, abolition could equate to fear and uncertainty, mistrust and rumour (Wheeler and Booth, 1992 pg37).
Finally many reject abolition and side with deterrence because essentially it is an apolitical argument. It ignores the subtleties of politics associated with disarmament, including problems of transitions, alliances and issuing wider supranational constraints on state behaviour. Not surprisingly minimum deterrence also comes with its risk and is subject to criticism. Wheeler identifies that small arsenals are vulnerable to first- strike and pre-emption attacks in times of crisis. Additionally in a situation of only a few hundred weapons there would be great reluctance in expending them against so called ‘soft’ military targets (Wheeler, 1992, pg252-5).
In conclusion one must contend that the USA has played a central role in the creation of the contemporary global prohibition regime. Ever since attempts were first made to deal with the problem of illicit drugs on a multi-lateral international level, the U.S. has exercised its hegemonic powers, thus, ‘U.S. drug policy has become internationalized as a result of U.S. pressure subtle and blatant alike’ (Gerber and Jensen, 2001, pg 12). The pivotal position and powerful influence the USA wields in the United Nations has been a decisive factor in enabling them to perpetuate their style of drug war. This is achieved through the main instruments of drug control, such as conventions, international law, monitoring and sponsoring, developed over the last century. The U.S. contention that its control efforts are morally correct and just is legitimized by the United Nations and consequently, ‘the UN plays a major role in sustaining and implement the global drug prohibition regime’ (Begley-Taylor, 1999, pg 6). Additionally its overseas anti-drug actions in Latin America is a clear example of its desire to implement its supply-side policies alongside its willingness to coerce nations into adopting its drug control policy, disregarding differences in socio-cultural conditions. The consequence of the USA assuming such a commanding role has been tensions and contradictions within the policy-making community at all levels. The USA’s populist rhetoric of having a clear solution to the drugs problem has led to essentially the ‘ones size fits all’ prohibition policy. The over emphasised beliefs of a few powerful states has not fairly reflected global opinion on how to address the problem of drugs.
Due to the transnational nature of the production and consumption of illicit drugs a global response is required; inevitably a powerful nation such as the USA is going to take a lead in such endeavours. However the continuing failure of the prohibitionist ideology and persistence of bureaucratic myopia has led many countries to abandon policies heavily influenced by the U.S. in favour of harm reduction alternatives. The European Union has the potential to be at the forefront in the development of fresh, more realistic strategies in attempt to work towards reducing the resonating effects of drugs throughout society, losing the U.S. deterrence paradigm along the way. Is this possible? Only time will tell.
disproportional contrasts of opinion on how best to tackle the issue
an insurmountable evidence exists which against abolition, contends that Britain should eliminate its nuclear arsenal. Strategic realists believe stable nuclear deterrence can be made to work forever. However they work on an unusual paradox. Their beliefs are based on the philosophy and understanding of a state of anarchy yet they still believe nothing can go catastrophically wrong with order founded on nuclear deterrence. For many this equates to a ‘realist fiction’ (Wheeler and Booth, 1992, pg 29). Furthermore as Schell states “ it is easy to forget that nuclear peril flows from the nations that process nuclear weapons not from those that don’t” (Schell, 2000, pg42). Therefore Britain should pull its proverbial finger out and set a good example to the rest of the world. Rendell agrees and contests that “Britain and France should disarm, other nuclear powers should cut the potential costs to future generations by adopting a strategy of minimum deterrence” (Rendell, 2005, pg2). It is inconceivable, moreover unrealistic, to predict a grand treaty and instant security parity. The most promising approach is through ‘process utopia’ with intermediate stages, gradual adjustments and partial accomplishments (Wheeler and Booth, 1992, pg53). The European Union has the potential to be at the forefront in the development of fresh more realistic strategies in attempt to work towards reducing the resonating effects of drugs throughout society, losing the U.S. deterrence paradigm along the way. Is this possible? Only time will tell.
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Bibliography
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