The Polish uprisings of 1956 had contributed further to the weakening of the eastern bloc. In that year Khrushchev had announced the release of 30, 000 political prisoners and had begun to practise de-Stalinisation in the Polish government and security system. This abrupt change in political atmosphere, however, liberated an ire--the causes of which were poor living standards and constant subjugation--that had long been suppressed by the Poles. On June 28, Russian headquarters were plagued by riots sparked off in the city of Poznan, and managed to suppress the rioters only with the later arrival of Polish armed forces. The Polish people were uniform and unyielding in their anti-Soviet insurrections, forcing Khrushchev to abolish the former Stalinist Politburo in Warsaw. Wladyslaw Gomulka, an independent Polish communist and an anti-Stalinist, spearheaded a reorganised Central Committee of the Polish Communist Party in the eradication of Stalinist influences, and the annunciation of politico-economic reforms as well as the pursuit of a new policy less dependent upon the USSR. Though Khrushchev had later prudently avoided a second Polish crisis in his attempt to reinforce diplomatic relations with Gomulka, the tensions and dissastisfaction arising from Soviet misrule that had built up within the Polish society for several years would not be so easily forgotten, and would instead resonate in the minds of the Polish people for many more years to come.
Also of particular significance to the gradual erosion of the Soviet sphere was the nationalist movements in Budapest, Hungary. Like the Poles, the Hungarians were disgruntled with Soviet rule and encouraged by Gomulka's success in bringing about Polish independence to rebel against Soviet authorities. Under the leadership of Imre Nagy, from 1953 to 1955, Hungary underwent a period of political and economic reorganisation. In 1955, with the overthrow of Nagy, pro-Stalinist Rakosi, a former minister, returned to power and viciously implemented Soviet policies that were widely resented by the people. On October 23, 1956, the streets of Budapest teemed with obstreperous demonstrators, most of whom were students demanding the removal of Stalinist figureheads from government positions and the reinstatement of Nagy as Prime Minister. The proletariats joined in the fray, expressing fervent desires for democracy and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country. During the riots, the communists were struck by an attack force which constituted the Hungarian army. The situation was further exacerbated when full-blown revolution following the comeback of Nagy as Prime Minister fanned the flames of local resentment, leading to more fighting in Hungarian cities and streets. Members of the secret police were killed and political prisoners were released. The prolonging of the uprisings, along with Russian delay in implementing reforms, had contributed to the widening rift in Soviet-Hungarian relations. After the fighting, the demands for reforms and for the removal of Soviet presence continued. On November 1, Nagy represented the people in asking for neutrality, Hungarian withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and the establishment of a multi-party democracy in the country. Conscious of the threat posed to Soviet military security and to the political cohesion of the communist bloc, as well as the fact that Hungarian independence would later contribute to the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the Russians invaded Budapest to end the rebellions. From November 4 to November 11, there was bitter street fighting as the 200, 000 strong Red Army equipped with 4000 Russian tanks crushed the rebels and overthrew the Nagy government. The prime minister was captured and executed, and replaced by Janos Kadar, and Hungary came under strict Russian control again. In view of the above, Soviet intervention in Hungarian independence efforts had left an eternity of deep-rooted antipathy and resentment within the country, which served to inflict tremendous strains on Soviet-Hungarian ties.
The weakening of the eastern bloc was also contributed to by the events from 1958 to 1961, most of which were dictated by the Soviets. During the period after the sporadic uprisings in Poland and Hungary, Khrushchev had established himself well as the successor of Stalin and had decided, by means of a series of aggressive actions, to keep the satellite countries of the Soviet Union on a tight leash. The Rapacki Plan of 1958, for example, proposed a reduction in the armed forces of Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. Consequently, the revolutionary potential of these countries would be severely undermined and, in the event of a Soviet invasion, the people would be unable to put up an effective resistance against enemy troops. While such a move might have further intensified the hatred by the satellite countries of the USSR, it would also have weakened the Soviet sphere militarily. Next, the Berlin Crisis of 1961 had also played a part in distancing East Germany from the Soviet Union. The presence of Western zones acted as a magnet, drawing many East Germans who had suffered considerably under Soviet rule out of the communist zone. Since most of the migrants were skilled, qualified people, East Germany suffered greater economic losses. As can be seen, the communist bloc was weakened not just militarily, but economically as well.
Similarly, the Czech uprisings of 1968 had served to alienate Czechoslovakia from the Soviet Union. The replacement of pro-Stalinist Antonin Novotny by Alexander Dubcek as the leader of Czechoslovakia saw the introduction of religious freedom and new policies of 'Socialism with a human face', the prohibition of arrest by the secret police, the removal of Stalinists from key positions in the government, and the abolition of censorship. These proposed reforms were met with apprehension from the Soviets, who immediately began a campaign of intimidation to tighten their control of Czechoslovakia. Military operations were performed in the country in June and, in July, Brezhnev imposed several demands upon Dubcek, effectively cancelling the latter's reform programme. When in due time the Czechs failed to toe the Soviet line, Russian troops assisted by Hungarian, Bulgarian, Polish and East German armed forces invaded Czechoslovakia on August 21 1968. Under pressure, the Czechoslovak Communist Party was purged of reformers and came under the leadership of a pro-Soviet faction. This episode was soon followed by the annunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, which states and affirms the right of the USSR to intervene in the affairs of communist countries to strengthen communism. In this case, however, communism was weakened as Soviet suppression of the Czech uprising altered the mood of sanguinity in the country and embedded despair and resentment in the consciousness of the Czech society. The debilitating Soviet sphere was also contributed to by soured relations in Eastern Europe.
Soviet response to the protests against the communist Polish United Workers Party in 1980 added on to the tensions that were already in existence from the time of the 1956 Polish uprisings. The subscription of the Polish communists to the demands of local demonstrations drew the attention of the USSR, who then tried to intervene in the affair by carrying out large-scale Soviet military operations in Poland, the consequence of which was a deepening economic crisis. In December 1981, in response to this crisis, Jaruzelski introduced martial law, banning solidarity, reintroducing censorship, and arresting Walesa and tens of thousands of others like him. The Polish version of the 'Prague Springs' demonstrations further widened the chasm of antipathy in the Polish society.
While it is true that Soviet intervention in the politics of Eastern Europe reaped largely deleterious consequences on both the economic, political, and psychological well-being of the local people, there were a few instances where the continued presence of Soviet power served to strengthen, rather than weaken, the communist bloc. The creation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955, in response to the setting up of NATO, meant a unified attack force, consisting of the countries of East Europe as well as the USSR herself, in the face of a potential capitalist onslaught. Though the creation of this pact meant a tighter Soviet control on the countries of East Europe, it also stremgthened the eastern bloc by unifying the eastern half of Europe.
The annunciation of de-Stalinisation by Khrushchev, who had denounced his predecessor for his crimes against the Soviet people, on the entire communist bloc also served to improve regional relations between the USSR and the countries of East Europe. The dissolvement of the Cominform meant the end to Stalinist salami tactics and the harsh treatment of the local people by the power-hungry dictator. Other forms of Stalinist controls and restrictions were also relaxed. Khrushchev then made attempts to reconcile the USSR with Yugoslavia by making peace with the Yugoslav communist leader, Tito, indicating that there were several roads to communism. As such, Soviet attempts at de-Stalinisation and at relaxing harsh controls improved regional relations, thereby strengthening the eastern bloc.
Even so, despite the establishment of the Warsaw Pact and the efforts by the Soviet Union to purge the region of Stalinist influences, the incessant interventions by the USSR in the politics of the countries of the communist bloc served to strengthen the bloc only to a small extent. This is transparent from the many uprisings within the Soviet sphere itself, as well as the fact that the USSR was mostly impervious to the entreaties of her satellite nations. The insurrections that had transpired within the communist bloc were spontaneous, arising from the intrinsically draconian rule of the Soviets. Collectivisation attempts had proven economically detrimental and, worst of all, had enfeebled the East European people, who were perpetually haunted by spectre of famine. The absence of the rudimentary freedoms to which all humans are entitled, in particular the freedom of expression, has deprived the people of the chance to verbalise their dissatisfactions, which accumulated over the years until they culminated in local uprisings. For these reasons and several others, there was already a hatred for Soviet misrule within the communist bloc. This hatred, however, was heightened with Soviet military intervention in local affairs, which more often than not had left an indelible mark on the people of East Europe. In reinforcement of my stand is the eventuall fall of communism in 1991, which goes to show that, irrespective of how Soviet misrule was occasionally beneficial to the strength of communists, communism was doomed to fall in the first place.