At the same time, post-war capitalism in the west was going through a period of change that would result in great economic prosperity. Prior to WWII, capitalism, because it was seen as the cause of evils such as WWI, imperialism, and the Great Depression, lost some of its acctractiveness. Within this context, socialism, with its emphasis on “social justice”, was appealing. But after WWI, “nstead of a final economic crisis…capitalism experianced an unprecedented boom”(20). Unprecidented growth among capitalist nations, new consumer industries, new media technology and the emergance of the successful “welfare state” profoundly changed “the image and reality of capitalism”(20).
The justification for socialism’s existance lay exclusively on the premise that it was a superior mode of production that capitalism. But USSR simply couldn’t keep up with the western world. During the 1960s, USA experianced growth of 52.8%. Compared to capitalism, “the planned economy performed inadequately”(27). It was becoming increasingly apparent that “competition with capitalism was unwinnable”(26).
To further weaken socialism, eastern European nations became increasingly relient upon capitalism. Although the spread of socialism among eastern European states was seen as a boost for USSR, it would eventually help facilitate the downfall of Soviet socialism. Because of the prosperity of modern capitalism and the inefficentcy of socialsm, the Soviet bloc “was utterly dependant on the fortunes of capitalism”(22). Socialism was inadequablely able to satisfy such needs as consumer products. The Soviet regime was therefore forced to “borrow from the West to import consumer goods as dependency became common across the Soviet bloc”(23).
As USSR’s economy declined during the 1980’s, a significant change in leadership would result in one last effort to revamp and vitalize socialism. Brezhnev and Chernenko, both part of the older generation of rule, passed on, as did the rest of their inner circle. They were succeeded by Gorbachev, who was seen as “the long awaited ‘reformer’. They were right”(57).
When Gorbachev came into power in 1985, he “showed himself to be resolutely committed to renewing socialist ideals”(57). The problem he faced was how to solve the apparent discrepancy between socialist ideals and their realities. To revitalize socialism, Gorbachev tried to open up Soviet society (glasnost), rebuild its infrastructure (perestroika) and democritize the political and economic systems. This loosening of Russian society, however, would prove to be its final blow.
Through Glasnost, Gorbachev appealed to all members of society “through a campaign for openness in public life”(60). During 1986 and 1987, Gorbachev encouraged open discussion on many issues that were once considered taboo. The result, however, was a sense of disillutionment among many Russians. People, upon realizing the realities of past attrocities and years of being lied to became more critical of socialism. Unlike past relaxations, Glasnost caused many to “desanctify Lenin” and led to general unrest among the people. Eventually there seemed to be “no one ready to defend socialism and the Union, except those castigated as ‘Stalinists’ opposed to reform”(73).
Along with glasnost, perestroika attempted to save socialism but only ultimately undermined it. Realizing that the principle behind planned industrial growth, that of high quantity output, was causeing poor results, Gorbachev attempted to “unblock” the economy by allowing grerater flexability and autonomy. This, was wholly unsuccessful. He allowed some market flaccidity but “stopped short of permitting real (market) prices for inputs and outputs, undermining the effects of whatever autonomy enterprises did manage to excerise. Going halfway towards the benefits of market criteria turned out to be no way”(65). What he had done, in effect, was create a “halfway house”. The only way to compete with capitalism was to “go beyond partial reforms and introduce private property and the market, whose suppresion constitued the essence of socialism”(67). It was becoming increasingly evident that communism was unable to prosper among advanced capitalism.
Another reform Gorbachev implimented to reshape socialism was the democritazation of society. Gorbachev, in 1988, democrotized the party and allowed free competative elections. The requirement of officials to receive a popular mandate in order to govern weakened the Communist’s party absolute rule. In effect, however, by relinquishing the party’s central power and giving more regional power to the republic’s parliaments, due to elections, Gorbachev “exchanged a unitary structure for a federalized one”(77). What had occurred, in effect, was the creation of “parliments of de facto states”(81), as governing became decreasingly centralized.
The reforms that Gorbachev implimented in the hope of saving Soviet socialism eventually facilitated its demise. These policies reliquished Communist Party rule and threatened to cause internal implosion. The complete upheaval of the planned economy and relaxation of power “compelled even reluctant republican leaders to assume ever-greater responsibilities”(106). With this increase of republican power, the breakdown of the “halfway house” economy, the acceptance of liberal social and economic principles, and the dwindling power exherted by the Communist Party came the end of the Soviet Union. In the end, it was “the structure of the Soviet state that proved fatal to the USSR, primarily because nothing was done to prevent its use and misuse.”
Why then did the USSR, being a superpower with the capability and capacity to destroy the entire world, facing the end of its internal moral struggle to establish a more just economic system than capitalism, not lash out against the world? Or why didn’t Gorbachev and the ruling power, seeing the disasterious effects perestroika was having, deliever a knock-out blow and quell the independent republican movements and maintain the Union? The answer lies in the fact that Gorbachev and many Soviets within his generation came to the realization that although socialism needed reform, it would not be able to do so without destabilizing the entire system. This destabilizing would then only be able to be solved through a return to Stalinist meathods. Given this catch-22, Gorbachev came to the conclusion that “for him, amid the turmoil of perestroika, to have to return to Stalinist meathods to preserve the system would not only destroyed his international reputation but make a lie of his whole inner life”(177). He then therefore rejected the plausibility and superiority of socialism and instead opted for western style social democracy.
Although the Soviet Union finally collapsed during the late 1980s and early 1990s, it began down the road to dismemberment much earlier. Although it struggled to win the “war” of world supremacy for several decades, its downfall was not caused its enemies. Rather, the Soviet Union imploded from the very fact that in a modern capitalistic society, its socialist economy simply could not keep up. As its economy began to lag and become outdated, the need for reform and change became self evident. The changes necessary for successful reform, however, required refutation of basic socialist principles. Because of that inevitability, the Soviet Union, armed and able to destroy the world, quietly and peacefully conceded defeat and gave up its dream of a socially just and equal society and began down the difficult road towards a free democratic capitalistic state.