470,000 men signing the Ulster Covenant in September 1912 highlighted how Ulster Unionists weren't afraid of "using all means" to resist Home Rule. Despite priding themselves on upholding the law, the Conservatives gave their support. Their new leader, Bonar Law was determined to push the boundaries of constitutional politics to prevent Home Rule and attacked it by calling it a "corrupt parliamentary bargain" between Redmond and Asquith - the price of the Liberals remaining in power. The involvement of an influential and well respected party boosted unionist propaganda across Great Britain and made Ulster a high profile issue in British politics. The more attention is gained, the more controversy it caused, making it more difficult to resolve the crisis and the Conservatives can be held responsible for this.
However, much of the blame can be attributed to Asquith as he neglected the Ulster question. In fact, it was not until February 1912, when the general framework of the Bill had already been decided, that the cabinet focused its attention on Ulster. The cabinet failed to consider the implications of Ulster Unionist opposition despite such hostility having already been apparent during the previous two Home Rule Bills. Yet as Rees states, “Asquith preferred to hold back, waiting to see if any compromise was necessary.” Even though this was effective in the constitutional crisis, Jalland claims his procrastination strategy meant they didn't treat the resistance campaign seriously until 1913. In her opinion Asquith had missed his chance to seize the initiative in 1912, when a compromise based on some form of Ulster exclusion may have been possible, meaning the crisis over Home Rule was still unresolved because of Asquith's actions, or rather, lack of.
In addition to this, the British Chief Secretary, Birrell, was supposed to be running Ireland but was largely absent on account of his wife dying. Not only that, but the intensity of unionist resistance was underestimated and he made the error of trusting the assurances of Redmond that Ulster resistance was a “mere bluff.” Birrell didn't consider the fact that Redmond made no attempt to understand unionist fears so wasn't perhaps a reliable source of advice. However he had little other information about the likelihood of trouble in Ulster if Home Rule was imposed due to the RIC's failure to garner accurate intelligence. This was because they were used to watching nationalists so had few informers in the unionist community. Here, we see another man in charge of Ireland who did nothing to prevent the crisis until it was too late.
There are also other reasons why the Home Rule Crisis wasn’t solved, such as the unwillingness of the Ulster Unionists to co-operate with the opposition. This aversion to negotiation was encouraged by the Tories, because according to Smith, they were also "not keen on a compromise settlement around Ulster exclusion." The problem lay in defining Ulster. Four counties had Protestant majorities, two others were almost equally divided and two more had large Protestant minorities. Deadlock was reached over the “county option." Maume believes that Nationalists were not prepared to sacrifice Home Rule by rejecting partition which explains why Redmond offered to accept a transition period of 6 years. He had basically agreed to the permanent loss of the 4 north eastern counties but the Unionists rejected his concession as they wanted permanent exclusion for all of Ulster. As the Third Home Rule Bill grew closer, it was this stalemate that was partially to blame for the crisis.
The formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force in 1913 made the crisis over Home Rule reach a critical point. Carson had hoped this would force Liberals to drop Home Rule and Bew argues that the need to restrain Unionist anger encouraged him to support the high risk strategy of running guns into Ulster. The Larne gun-running saw 25,000 rifles and 3 million rounds of ammunition distributed quickly without police stopping them. It's suspected that this non-interference revealed their unionist sympathies, angering nationalists and intensifying the mistrust between the two sides which meant it made it even more difficult to solve the crisis.
In 1913, MacNeill took advantage of nationalist disillusionment and formed the Irish Volunteers to put pressure on the government. Britain couldn't stop them since they hadn't stopped the UVF so they purchased rifles and ammunition. These two growing armies now faced each other and with Home Rule Bill about to pass, if nothing was done, civil war seemed likely. This shows how both nationalist and unionist ambitions can be seen to be at fault when it comes to the crisis surrounding Home Rule.
In a final attempt to get all sides around the negotiating table, King George V proposed an all-party conference to seek a compromise. This took place in Buckingham Palace, July 1914 but by the second day Asquith knew no solution would emerge. Writing to an associate, he said he had "rarely felt more helpless." Although, both sides had agreed to partition, they couldn't agree on the fate of Tyrone and Fermanagh. So once again, the lack of negotiation between the opposing rivals is blamed for the crisis.
Although under the leadership of Bonar Law, the Conservatives deserve a large share of blame for the crisis surrounding Home Rule, they don't deserve all of it. It's true that the political game they played, aligning themselves with the unionists to advance their party's position did worsen the situation but the same can be said of Asquith's reluctance to do anything due to his own policy of "wait and see." When the clashing of aims between unionist and nationalist sides are considered, as well as their refusal to compromise, it is clear that there are a variety of groups that can be held accountable for the way in which a crisis couldn't be resolved.
by
pelican347 (student)
