However it wasn’t until 1905-06 that Germany’s policy of Weltpolitik troubled Britain. It was the development of the “Dreadnought” in Britain that gave Germany a chance to catch up. In 1908 the Liberal Government hoped to cut production but Germany had raised their production tempo to four dreadnoughts. Britain feared that by 1911 Germany would have 13 dreadnoughts to Britain’s 12. The significance of this is that the Liberal Government agreed to build 8 dreadnoughts per year. Between 1908 and 1912 Britain and Germany had talks to try and reduce their programmes for building dreadnoughts but these negotiations failed and Anglo-German relations suffered. However, the naval race between Germany and Britain cannot be counted as a direct cause of World War One. It was over by 1912 and Anglo-German relations were actually improving so this cannot count as the reason for the outbreak of war.
There was great colonial rivalry between the main powers especially during the First Moroccan Crisis in 1905. Kaiser Wilhelm ||, with his ambitions for empire, saw Morocco as a potential German colony. Also after Russia had been surprisingly defeated and had lost its honour and real power in the Russian-Japanese war in 1904, there was an imbalance of power in Europe, an imbalance of power that Germany was determined to take advantage of. The Germans felt more confident that France would not be able to fight alone. However France had generally been accepted as the dominant European power in most of Morocco so when the Kaiser visited Tangier it caused great friction with the French. Germany put pressure on the French over the issue who would control Morocco and forced France into agreeing to an international conference. Germany was shocked to see that France was supported by both Britain and Russia. This would prove crucial in the future and war at this point with Germany seemed possible. Britain however did have some responsibility in compensating for the imbalance as they opposed Germany and supported the Entente powers.
Germany’s policy of Weltpolitik was again used in an attempt to “frighten” France into territorial dispensation in Africa. In July 1911, the Second Moroccan Crisis, the German gunboat the Panther arrived off the Moroccan port of Agadir. The Germans demanded the French Congo as compensation but the French negotiated. However, British reactions were much stronger as they were concerned by Germany’s threatening behaviour. They believed that Germany was attempting once again to humiliate France and destroy the Entente. Lloyd George, Chancellor of Britain made a speech warning Germany not to push the French too far. This dispute now became a major Anglo-German confrontation. The British fleet was prepared for action and further help to France was discussed including the sending of the British Expeditionary Force. Ironically the French and the Germans were not close to war as France gave Germany a small strip of territory in Africa and it was yet another diplomatic defeat for Germany. Anglo-German relations were yet again worsening and the British and the French made new naval and military agreements. In both Moroccan crises the Kaiser was “pushed into confrontation reluctantly” says Graham Darby, for example in 1911 he had to be persuaded to send a gunboat to Agadir. This could be one of the reasons why the two Moroccan crises did not lead to war. However another factor is the economic side of things. The German government was did not know what the public opinion was and they feared that a British blockade would bring economic chaos.
International relations changed due to alliances that were made. “All the great powers felt threatened” according to Michael Gibson, so forming an alliance would make the powers feel more secure if war did break out. The first alliance that affected relations was the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1894. This was aimed specifically at Germany as France would support Russia if it was attacked by Germany or attacked by another country supported by Germany and vica versa. This alliance was significant because Germany was now faced with the possibility of a war on two fronts and the commander in chief Von Schlieffen began to work on his famous plan which played such a crucial role in turning the Balkan crisis into war in 1914. This alliance was also significant because it also helped to form the Entente Cordiale between Britain and France. The French were worried that they would be drawn into a war with Britain and Japan because of the Franco-Russian Alliance. However at this stage it was merely a “friendly understanding” as the two countries recognised their respective imperial rights in Egypt and Morocco. In 1902 Britain made an alliance with Japan because they wanted to protect their empire in the Far East against Russia who had made an alliance with France, specifically aimed at Britain. This was significant because it lead the Germans to believe that a war in the Far East was more likely and the French believed this too. The First Moroccan was significant in terms of alliances as France and Britain drew closer discussing military co-operation and there was an increased friendliness between Britain and Russia which resulted in negotiations and an agreement to resolve their differences in Asia and eventually created the Triple Entente between Britain, France and Russia. The Kaiser hoped to break the Entente but instead he “strengthened the ties between Britain and France” as Ruth Henig states. Germany’s aggressive attempt to take advantage in Morocco did lead to a degree of polarisation and Graham Darby believes that there wasn’t at this stage two armed camps prepared to go to war. However Michael Gibson disagrees with this completely as he believes that “Europe and indeed the world was divided into two armed camps and any disagreement could have led to war.
The 1907 Anglo-Russian Entente had included a section looking at Russian access to the Mediterranean and they hoped to achieve this through negotiations with Britain and Austria-Hungary. The Austrian foreign minister, Aehrenthal, wanted to link Russia’s aims with Austria-Hungary’s own wish to formally annex the province of Bosnia which had been administered by Austria-Hungary since 1878. In 1908 the new Turkish Government, the “Young Turks” were trying to revive the Ottoman Empire and avoid losing possessions such as Bosnia. Serbia, who was worried about the many Serbs in Bosnia, was angered when talks collapsed and Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia very quickly. They turned to Russia for support. Izvolsky, the Russian foreign minister, agreed to the annexation of Bosnia because he was hoping for a deal on the Straights of Constantinople. Serbia then demanded compensation from Austria who was backed up by Germany. At this stage war did look possible but with France and Britain not willing to go to war, Russia was humiliated and Serbia was angered. Fritz Fischer who is very critical of Germany and believes that Germany was to blame for the First World War believes that Germany encouraged Austria-Hungary to start a war with Serbia and continued to do so even when it seemed clear that such a war could not be localised. However a criticism of this is that Germany actually gave little support to Austria-Hungary.
When Italy declared war on the Ottoman Empire in the first Balkan war it showed the Balkan League that now was the time to gain some land from the Ottoman Empire because it was weak and unable to defend itself. As early as December 8th 1912 the Kaiser and the senior German military staff were discussing the outbreak of war and this is the main significance of the Balkan wars. The effect of the French law on the army service in the second Balkan war in 1913 was that it increases the size of their army. Ruth Henig suggests that the arms race really “hotted up” from this point, which is supported by the increase in peace-time armies by Germany, Austria-Hungary and France creating an arms race atmosphere. However John Lowe states that the main increase in army strength took place in Russia. In Germany particularly he states that the Russian army reforms caused “immense anxiety”.
Under the Kaiser Germany became much more aggressive and there is a lot of evidence to suggest that Fritz Fischer’s theory is correct. That was certainly the case at the time of Versailles and there was a consensus that Germany started the war deliberately and they were made to accept the Article 231, the “war guilt clause”. However the German society rejected the defeat and R.J.W Evans believes that German revisionism was “closely associated with the rejection of the so-called war guilt clause of the Peace Treaty”.
In conclusion, I think that the immediate cause of the outbreak of war was definitely the July crisis in the summer of 1914. However the crucial decisions made by the leading figure were in fact influenced by the rise in international tension from about 1905 which was partly generated by the German policy of Weltpolitik. It’s obvious to say that between 1905 and 1913 no-one is authority actually wanted a war and Britain in the actual crisis of the summer of 1914 was neither planning a war nor even sure about what to do in the event of one whereas the Germans as early as 8th July 1912 had discussions about a possible war. The outbreak of war was not a result of a badly mismanaged Balkan crisis in the summer of 1914, it was the final straw of long-standing rivalries.
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