The person who deserves the most credit for ending the Cold War is Ronald Reagan. Discuss

        However, in the aspect of the conclusion of the Cold War through the end of the military build up in both countries, the credit has to be divided equally between Reagan and Gorbachev. The Soviet Union had, by the early 1980s, built up a military arsenal that surpassed that of the USA, eroding the Americans’ long held qualitative advantage. In a response to this, as well as to perceived Soviet aggression through the invasion of Afghanistan, Reagan embarked on the largest peacetime military build up in American history. However, by 1986, during the time of Reagan’s second term as well as Gorbachev’s ascension to secretary-general, the two leaders both faced internal economic and political problems partly caused by the maintenance of such a large military force that forced them to end this aspect of the Cold War. Military spending had consumed 25% of Moscow’s GDP, and besides increasing the production of heavy-industries, neglecting consumer-based industries, these large forces also served to strengthened the conservatives’ and hardliners’ hold on influence and power, which Gorbachev wanted to remove. The strain on the American economy caused by Reagan’s military build up was beginning to tell, and faced with opposition in congress about the huge toll of the Cold War, Reagan had decided in his 2nd term to cut back on military spending. This culminated in the signing of the CFE treaty in 1990, which reduced the conventional forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Thus, the end of the military build up-aspect of the Cold War was caused very much by internal economic and political problems rather than any one party gaining the upper hand in this competition. In fact, it might be argued that Reagan prolonged this aspect of the Cold War through his military build up in his first term, forcing the Soviet Union not to reduce military spending and focus on their already-existing internal problems. Nevertheless, both Reagan and Gorbachev deserve equal credit for cutting back on military spending to focus on their respective problems.

        With regards to the end of the political stalemate in Europe, Reagan deserves very little credit, if any. This was because he had exerted very little impact on Gorbachev’s decision to pull out from Eastern Europe. Gorbachev’s decision to withdraw Soviet military forces and control from Eastern Europe was made with the fact that one major drain on the Soviet economy was the maintenance of a Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, granting the states economic concessions to keep them Soviet friendly, as well as the deployment of military forces to keep them under Soviet control, as dictated by the Brezhnev Doctrine. Gorbachev intended for Soviet withdrawal to facilitate the recovery of the Soviet economy through the ridding of this economic burden. While it can be argued that Reagan’s own policies actually contributed in part to the Soviet’s economic problems, like the rigging of oil prices, or Reagan’s personality set Gorbachev at ease to withdraw from Eastern Europe, these arguments are at best peripheral to the main issue at hand, and it must be concluded that Reagan deserved little credit for the end of the political stalemate in Europe.

        With regards to disengagement from the Third World, both Gorbachev and Reagan deserve equal credit. As mentioned earlier, the Soviet Union faced tremendous economic problems by the time of Gorbachev’s ascension to power, and the reformist Gorbachev was determined to correct these by cutting back on external expenditure, and that included the disengagement from the, in the words of Anatoly Dobrynin, then-Soviet ambassador to the USA, “ideological bondage” of the Third World. The term “ideological bondage” referred to the “interference on an ideological basis in the internal affairs of countries”, Dobrynin stated, for the sake of communist solidarity. Thus, Gorbachev’s decision was not only economic, but also ideological. Similarly, Reagan was facing economic troubles by the time of his second term, as mentioned earlier, providing the impetus for withdrawal. But the more crucial point was the questioning of the basis of containment, the need to fight perceived Soviet aggression in every part of the globe. In withdrawing from the Third World, Reagan was going against the long-established doctrine of containment that existed since the time of Truman, and for this Reagan deserves to be lauded. But it must not be forgotten that Gorbachev also had to disengage his country from their long-established policy of worldwide communist solidarity that existed since the time of Lenin, though the Soviet Union’s economic needs were more desperate than that of the USA. Nevertheless, Gorbachev and Reagan deserve equal credit for ending this aspect of the Cold War on both economic and ideological basis.

        Looking at the issue across time, it can be seen that Reagan deserves some credit for the end of the Cold War, though not all of it. Reagan’s different attitudes towards the Soviet Union during his first and second term can be seen to be crucial because his about turn in policy coincided with the rise of the reformist Gorbachev to power. It is in this instance that it can be seen why it takes two hands to clap. Had Reagan’s change in policy coincided with a rise in a Stalin-like Soviet leader, the Cold War would not have ended; had Gorbachev’s rise not coincided with a change with Reagan’s policy, the same would have happened. In fact, Gorbachev deserves more credit in this respect because he initiated the desire to end the Cold War when he first met Reagan, at a point in time when Reagan was still sceptical about Soviet intentions.

         It is at this juncture that the role of personalities in the ending of the Cold War must be examined as an underlying factor, and yet again, both Reagan and Gorbachev deserve equal credit. Then-Vice President George Bush described Gorbachev as having “a disarming smile, warm eyes, and an engaging way of making an unpleasant point and then bouncing back to establish real communication with his interlocutors. However, the most important point was that as then-Secretary of State George Shultz remarked, Gorbachev was “totally different from any Soviet leader I’ve ever met.” Reagan also had an equally important role to play, and had long insisted that he could get through to a Soviet leader if he could ever meet one face-to-face, because up to then, “They keep dying on me.” Both men’s relationship was the best yet between any two leaders of the Soviet Union and the USA. While this is not to say they did not have their disagreements, like in Reykjavik in 1986 over SDI technology, their inner desire for an end to the Cold War pressed them on in negotiations. Their relatively harmonious working relationship set the foundation upon which negotiations for the end of the Cold War would be held. As in any relationship, it takes two to tango, and as such credit ought to be equally shared.

        All in all, both Reagan and Gorbachev deserve credit for ending the Cold War, and in some aspects Reagan deserve more credit, which in others Gorbachev.