However, Anschluss also represented Hitler’s opportunism. Notes written from Goebbels’s diary revealed that Hitler had kept “his watchful eyes on opportunities for German expansion”, suggesting that Hitler was always waiting for opportunities to expand German territory, an argument put across by Kershaw. In fact, it was Goering who pressed Hitler to take actions. Kershaw argued Goering was pushing the pace for Anschluss, perhaps for economic interests over Austria. Hitler was waiting for a crisis in Austria which would provide the excuse for German intervention and not invasion. This arrived on 9th March 1938, when Austrian Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg announced a plebiscite on the independence of Austria. Hitler seized this opportunity to intervene in Austrian affairs and pressed Schuschnigg to resign. The National Socialist Arthur Seyss-Inquart took over the chancellorship and formed a new government. With Austrian National Socialists in power in Austria, troops of the German Wehrmacht and the SS crossed the German-Austrian border unopposed on the morning of 12th March 1938. The proclamation of Anschluss into the Third Reich was announced the following day.
Taylor argued this was a last minute decision and the belief that Hitler’s seizure of Austria was a deliberate plot was a myth. He argued that the crisis was one provoked by Schusschnigg and not Hitler. Kershaw also suggested the view that the decision for annexation of Austria came only after the military invasion. The German military lacked preparations when they marched from the frontier to Vienna. The fact that 70% of their vehicles broke down indicated clearly there was neither military preparation nor any back-up plan. Had Hitler made any plans initially, such a situation would not have occurred. Hitler’s address to the masses on the balcony of Linz town hall showed that he did not have any intentions to annex Austria. Kershaw suggested that the decision to annex Austria might have come from the “delirious reception” Hitler received at Linz. The Anschluss thus represented Hitler’s opportunism where the decision to annex Austria came at the last minute.
Although Hitler might have intentions to annex Austria into the German Reich long ago, it was not one of the maturing of carefully thought out plans. Thus I would find it appropriate to agree with the structuralist argue that Hitler was indeed an opportunist. Anschluss came at a point when Hitler least expected it he was smart enough to seize to seize the opportunity.
Czechoslovakia
Bullock had argued that following the annexation of Austria, the annexation of Czechoslovakia would be the “second necessary step in the development of [Hitler’s] programme for securing Germany’s future”, the second objective that was discussed during the Hossbach Conference on 5th November 1937 which outlined Hitler’s view of the future. It was agreed that Austria and Czechoslovakia should be taken simultaneously. However, this did not occur accordingly as planned. Anschluss with Austria had instead, improved Germany’s strategic position in central Europe, to allow Hitler to take over Czechoslovakia should an opportunity arise. He might have thought of using Austria to “encircle the Czechs and act as a satellite in the conflicts to come”, which in some ways indicated his programme in achieving Lebensraum for Germany.
Taylor argued that the conclusion which drawn from the Hossbach Conference showed that Hitler did not really have any concrete plans as to what he wanted. He might have been taking a gamble as usual, hoping that by some chance, he would be successful in achieving aims in his foreign policies. In a situation similar in Austria, I do agree with Taylor that the crisis over Czechoslovakia was presented to Hitler rather than him creating it. Hitler merely took advantage of the situation. According to Kershaw, it was the “fatal calculation” made by Schuschnigg that gave Hitler the chance he long awaited. Hitler seemed to be least interested in what was the next step he should undertake after the Munich conference. Evidence showing Hitler spending time at the Berghof “drawing dream plans for the rebuilding of Linz” revealed perhaps he was waiting to take over Czechoslovakia through another internal crisis. This opportunity arrived in March 1939 when President of Czechoslovakia Hacha dismissed Tiso the Slovak Premier from office and subsequently declared martial law in Slovakia. The latter then appealed to Hitler for help, who was taken by surprise by the turn of events. He was leaving for Vienna to celebrate the anniversary of Anschluss. Even Alan Bullock agreed, as he puts it, that it was not long before Hitler was able to seize the opportunity that he waited for, showing that Hitler was relying on opportunities. Protests by the British and French ambassadors against Germany’s occupation was countered by the argument that Hitler had “acted only at the request of the Czech President, just as the occupation of Austria had been undertaken only in response to the telegram sent by Seyss-Inquart”. Hitler had spent no more than three days in the process of take-over lasted no more than three days and he was back in Vienna on the 18th. Both fate and opportunity had worked in favour of Hitler once again in allowing him to complete his aims.
Conclusion:
The Hossbach memorandum was supposed to reveal Hitler’s plans and provide a summary of Hitler’s foreign policy in 1937-38. Although it indicated that Hitler had some plans in his mind, it was not very specific. Through the examination of the above examples, it would be appropriate to conclude that Hitler was an opportunist. Although much of Mein Kampf was put into action, there was doubt as to whether he was following some form of agenda or programme. Although ideas were laid out in Mein Kampf, it did not mean that they would be implemented inevitably. There was no timescale stated as to when they would be implemented too. In the words of A.J.P. Taylor, I agree that Hitler “exploited events far more than he followed precise coherent plans”. Alan Bullock also believes that be it planning or spontaneity, Hitler had only one programme: the gain of power. Thus the structuralist school which stated that Hitler did not have any concrete plans to which he diligently adhered to seems more appropriate. Most of the time, Hitler was simply waiting for opportunities which he could take to achieve his aims.
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Notes
Stephen J. Lee, “Aims of Hitler’s Foreign Policy” in “European Dictatorships 1918-1945”, (Great Britain, Routledge, Taylor &Francis Group, 2000, 2nd edition), p.217
A.J.P. Taylor, “Hitler: A ‘Traditional’ German Statesman”, in “Hitler and Nazi Germany”, ed.Robert G.L. Waite( United States of America, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc, 1966), p. 94
Alan Bullock, “The Counterfeit Peace, 1933-7” in “Hitler: A Study in Tyranny”, (Great Britain, Hamlyn Publishing Group Limited, 1973), p. 315.
Gerhard L. Weinberg, “German-Italian Relations and the Anschluss” in “ The Foreign Policy of Hitler’s Germany: Starting World War II, 1937-1939”, (United States of America, The University of Chicago Press Chicago and London, 1980), pp.261-262
Ian Kershaw, “Ceaseless Radicalization” in “Hitler 1936-1945:Nemesis”, (United States of America, W.W. Norton & Company, 2000), p.44
Taylor, “Hitler: A ‘Traditional’ German Statesman”, p.99
Kershaw, “The Drive for Expansion”, p.79
Bullock, “From Vienna to Prague, 1938-9”, p. 439
Taylor, “Hitler: A ‘Traditional’ German Statesman”, p.96
Jackson J. Spielvogel, “Hitler’s War” in “Hitler and Nazi Germany A History”, (United States of America, Prentice Hall, 2001), p. 206
K. Hildebrand, “German Foreign Policy: from Revisionism to Expansionism” in “The Third Reich”, (Great Britain, George Allen & Unwin, 1984), p.30
Bullock, “From Vienna to Prague, 1938-9”, p. 480
A.J.P. Taylor, “Second Thoughts” in “The Origins of the Second World War”, (Great Britain, Hamish Hamilton, 1965), p.X
Lee, “Aims of Hitler’s Foreign Policy”, p. 218
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