To what extend did German foreign policy become more openly "Nazi", rather than purely nationalist in the course of 1938?

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To what extend did German foreign policy become more openly “Nazi”, rather than purely nationalist in the course of 1938?

In 1925, many of Hitler’s ideologies and visions for the future were published in his book, Mein Kampf. He spoke of Gross Deutschland, autarky, lebensraum, anti-Semitism and the Aryan race, amongst many other topics. Factors within this may sound perfectly nationalist – for example, Gross Deutschland was the desire to unite all German speaking people as one. However, the anti-Semitic attitude which Hitler held was purely a hatred for the Jews, and he claimed they were responsible for everything that he did not like. The policy of lebensraum was to provide living space for the people of Gross Deutschland – space which would be claimed by force These attitudes were surely not nationalist, and leads to the view that Hitler was never really just a nationalist; he was just a Nazi whose actions and attitudes could be (and were) well disguised as nationalism.

     In 1933, Germany left the League of Nations, shortly after also leaving the Disarmament Conference. This move was easily hidden under a veil of nationalism, due to it allowing Hitler the overturn of the Treaty of Versailles – surely a move which any nationalist would have strived for. Many people outside of Germany sympathised with Germany over the terms of Versailles due to its apparent harshness, and leaving the League brought much happiness to the people of Germany, having been subject to humiliation by it for several years. Being free of the League would allow the Nazis to achieve their greater aims for the future too however, including anschluss with Austria and Lebensraum. Anschluss appeared nationalistic (an element of Gross Deutschland), but also provided Hitler with a stepping stone to the East, where he would achieve Lebensraum – a somewhat more Nazi policy.

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     In conjunction with leaving the League (and the overturn of Versailles), Hitler had long aimed to rearm Germany on par with its neighbours. Rearmament may have been seen as an inevitable consequence anyway, regardless of nationalism or Nazism, if only for the defence of the country. However, the rate of rearmament in Germany, and the money being flooded into it was somewhat alarming, yet Hitler would not admit the damage it was causing the economy, despite the ever decreasing availability of raw materials. It would seem there was only one thing on his mind, which consequently made the ...

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