Another one of the reasons behind the tensions is political. There were many political events which caused much unhappiness among the Chinese. For example, the Soviets did not provide any concrete help when China faced the 2nd Quemoy-Matsu crisis in 1958. The Soviets, on the other hand, shook off the blame by saying that it was the Chinese fault for not consulting them about the plans in handling the crisis because the Chinese wanted to be independent and to follow their own paths to socialism. There have been other instances where the Soviets have cited the Chinese fault for wanting to seek their own path to socialism and not always being on the side of the Soviets as a reason as to why the Soviets are so hostile toward them. For example, China's statement after WWII that the most suitable country to get aid from is USA angered the Soviets because it showed that the Chinese was not totally against their main enemy. Also, the Soviet Union was angered by Mao's questioning of Khrushchev legitimacy as the leader of the socialist bloc and his questioning of why Beijing cannot be the centre of the socialist bloc. Mao later fashioned himself as the true defender of the Marxist-Leninist doctrinal purity and these moves were all criticised by the Soviets as showing signs of not wanting to follow the Soviet path to socialism. However, the Chinese move in both cases can be argued to be not desires of wanting to follow their own path to communism but just wanting to protect their own sovereignty. In the first instance, it is understandable that China chose USA because the Soviet Union provided China with very little and very inconsistent aid. Furthermore, it was difficult for Mao to trust the Soviet Union because it had previous supported Chiang Kai Shek. In the second instance, Mao had questioned the legitimacy of the Soviet Union because Khrushchev's ascension to power was truly not clear-cut. Also, Mao did not want to forever remain subservient to the Soviet Union, as can be seen when they were delegated the responsibility of helping North Korean during the Korean War when the Soviets did not even help, that’s why he questioned the legitimacy of why the Soviet Union has to always be the centre of the socialist movement. All these unhappiness caused the tensions between the two countries to build up very fast and only further convinced the Chinese the need to find their own path to socialism.
Clashes in economic interests also led to tensions between the two countries. For example, when Mao introduced the "Great Leap Forward" in 1958, the Chinese believed that Mao's plan to make China reach the fully industrialised state quickly by developing small scale industries in peasant communities was done purely in the economic interests of China. This plan was hoped to boost production with cheap methods and to, in turn, bring in more profits. The Chinese viewed this as a purely economic interest and no one felt that it was driven by the want by Mao to make China seek its own path to socialism. However, the Soviets viewed this plan with much suspicion and saw it as China wanting to veer away from the Soviet economic model of large scale, centrally directed, urban industrial production. Khrushchev refused to support the "Great Leap Forward" and even encouraged CCP leaders to speak out against it. Peng Dehuai became one of these leaders that Mao decided to purge as a form of retaliation. While it is arguable as to whether the "Great Leap Forward" was implemented totally without the underlying desire of the Chinese to seek their own path in socialism, we should also remember that the Soviet Union did not understand that the situation in China was different and had different needs because it did not have an large urban population to start off with and thus, it was only natural that China was unable to follow its economic model. This lack of understanding of the Chinese situation among the Soviet leaders only encouraged the Chinese to further want to follow their own path to socialism.
Territorial fights, some of which are historically deep-rooted, also led to much unhappiness and tensions. Mao was intent in recovering all lost territories and rights that have been previously lost to the Soviet Union. For example, he wanted back territories like the Amur River Valley and the Outer Mongolia area. He also wanted to stop the Soviet Union from having any more special concessions in Manchuria. When negotiations over the Sinkiang boarder broke down in 1964, it led to direct clashes to fight over Damansky Island and Goldinsky Island. From the Chinese point of view, this was purely fighting for their own territorial rights and there was no other hidden intent. However, the Soviets viewed the territorial fights and the cutting off of special concessions as a sign from the Chinese that they now have separate interests from the Soviets and it is no longer vital to keep strong ties between the two countires and not quarrel over such issues. This change in attitude, to the Soviets, stems out of the fact that the Chinese are now embarking on their own path of socialism. The looting of resources in Manchuria by the Soviet troops, however, only further validated the stand that the Chinese should seek their own paths to socialism because the Soviet provided not much help, if there was even any.
In conclusions, the differing perspectives that China and Soviet held during the period leading up to the Sino-Soviet split, allow us only to agree to a small extent to the statement that the tensions were due to the Chinese desire to seek their own path to socialism.
