In the 1850’s and 1860’s Prussia experienced industrialisation, leading to further growth. In the 1860’s about two thirds of Germany’s ironworks lay in Prussian territory. Railways were also built for transportation of goods and future movements of troops. During the industrialisation Prussia’s exports increased whilst Austria’s decreased. Prussia’s economic position had improved before the appointment of Bismarck and Prussian leadership had been successful in increasing their dominance by taking advantage of the strength of their economy. The strong economy made Prussia increasingly relied upon by other German states for things such as trade and Keynes argues that without Prussia’s solid economy, “the German nation would have been a mere shell”. Prussia’s military was also ever increasing and strengthening, as a result of economic development and by 1860 Prussia already had the edge over Austria with more reserves in the army and superior weaponry. This strong military made Prussia the ideal candidate to unify Germany and benefited them politically as other countries become aware of the threat they posed. The fact that Austria was already falling behind Prussia at this point, prior to Bismarck coming into office may suggest that it was in fact the strength of the Prussian state or even the weakness of Austria that allowed Prussia to gain influence and power. When Bismarck came into office he only had the problem of solving the political crisis as other events pre 1862 had placed Prussia in an advantageous position.
Bismarck claims in his memoirs that he wanted to unify Germany and that he was in full control of events, indicating he thought he was significant in securing the unification. However it is more likely that Bismarck was an opportunist who was able to use his advantageous economic position and diplomatic skills to take advantage of events rather than creating them. Bismarck was in fact “a master strategist of Realpolitik” who’s goal was to expand and strengthen Prussia in any way possible, which unintentionally led to the unification of Germany. Lemieux, who said when referring to Bismarck “He skilfully used diplomacy and alliances in pursuit of this goal”, supports this view and there are a number of events, substantiating this argument.
Prior to 1862 Prussia’s economic and political position had significantly improved and they had the upper hand over Austria but the unification of Germany was still unlikely as Austria remained an obstacle, and it was both the strength of the Prussian state and Bismarck’s pursuit of realpolitik, willingness to engage in wars and manipulation of events which allowed Prussia to eventually secure the unification of Germany.
There was a power vacuum throughout Europe and very few countries were concerned about Bismarck’s actions as they were dealing with problems of their own. Bismarck wanted to make Prussia more dominant in Germany, which involved weakening Austria. This phase of the unification had already begun prior to Bismarck coming into power, with the Zollverein, which had already improved Prussia’s economic position. War between Prussia and Austria looked likely if Germany was to unify. However, although Prussia had already advanced militarily (prior to Bismarck’s appointment), Bismarck wanted to control when the war took place so Prussia would be further prepared, increasing the chances of victory. Bismarck used his diplomatic skills to delay the war and between 1864 and 1865 promoted an alliance with Austria to give Prussia more time to prepare for the likely conflict.
In the Schleswig-Holstein crisis the two countries worked together to stop the annexation of the duchies. At the Gastein convention it was decided that Austria would get Holstein and Prussia would get Schleswig. In Bismarck’s mind this was just a short-term solution and he described the solution as “papering over the cracks”. Bismarck was always preparing for the conflict with Austria, which he believed, was drawing ever closer. Following the Schleswig-Holstein crisis Bismarck was able to wage war on Austria. He assured there would be no opposition from other great powers by making an alliance with Italy promising Venetia for help in the event of a war while, hinting to France that they would get some of the Rhineland if they stayed neutral in the case of an Austro-Prussian war. Britain were unlikely to get involved as they operated a policy of non- intervention and Austria had lost Russian support in the Crimean war saga. The Austro-Prussian war did eventually break out when Bismarck provoked Austria into war in 1866 and Prussia won with considerable ease. Bismarck’s policy of realpolitik paid off once again and he secured allies with which he never intended to co-operate (he never gave France any land). This war was won because of a combination of factors including the strength of Prussia, weakness of Austria and Bismarck’s diplomatic skills.
The Austro- Prussian war had led to the creation of the North German Confederation and Germany was one step closer to unification but France still caused a problem and once again Bismarck needed to use his skills to overcome this final hurdle in the unification by excluding France as he had done with Austria.
The Hohenzollern crisis of 1868 gave Bismarck the opportunity to manipulate events to favor him and isolate France. Spain were in need of a new monarch and the throne was offered to Prince Leopold, a distant relative of the King of Prussia. However, Bismarck was disappointed to hear that pressure from France who were aware if Prince Leopold became king, it would alter the balance of power further in favor of Prussia resulted in the invitation being refused. The French, thinking they had the upper hand demanded that no Prussian royalty would ever take the Spanish thrown and Wilhelm communicated this to Bismarck in the form of a telegram. When Bismarck received the telegram he saw it as the perfect ammunition for war and distorted the letter (Ems telegram) so that it sounded as if the king insulted the French.
This, “encouraged France to declare war and thus play into his [Bismarck’s] hands”(Stiles), making France look like the aggressors. Bismarck had already Isolated France as he had done with Austria. Italy would only agree to an alliance if French troops were removed from Rome, which was unlikely and Austria although interested, would only make an alliance if Italy did so. The southern states then declared their support for Prussia who won the war due to the strength of the Prussian state and a superior army. The Unification of Germany was complete. After the war Bismarck made the treaty harsh on the French as he wanted to weaken them but the fact that France recovered a great deal earlier that Bismarck had anticipated suggests he may not have been such a ‘skilled’ leader.
The aggressive foreign policy used by Bismarck to unify Germany was arguably only possible due to the strength of the Prussian state. The strength of the military, which began to develop prior to Bismarck, was undoubtedly the key to the victories for Prussia in times of conflict, and Bismarck’s role, although significant was of less importance. The weakness of other powers such as France and Austria also played a key role. Nevertheless for the unification to take place surely there would have to be popular support for a united Germany.
Prior to the unification, the German confederation consisted of 39 separate states, established by the Congress of Vienna. Generally the inhabitants of the individual states and rulers identified themselves with their own local state rather than the nation and it was only after 1848 that the feeling of nationalism developed. Some historians suggest that German unification came about due to a nationalist mass movement. John argues that although Bismarck influenced German nationalist feeling, German nationalist feeling influenced him on a greater scale. However it can also be argued that Bismarck had little to do with creating nationalist feeling which solely stemmed from disliking of the French- “German nationalism was anti-French in origin” (Waller) which resulted from the various times the French had attacked Germany. This firstly led to local loyalties but then extended to wider areas where there were widespread festivals celebrating defeats over napoleon organised by the Nationalverein. This was prior to Bismarck joining office indicating he had little influence on nationalism.
By 1866 Bismarck had succeeded in unifying a large part of Germany and this gained him a great deal of support even from liberals. With this support Bismarck introduced an indemnity bill in 1866, which made his previously illegal tax collections of the previous four years, legal. The indemnity bill of 1866 split liberal opinion and moderate liberals who supported Bismarck united with liberals in other parts of the country to form the national liberal party who supported Bismarck. Bismarck was not a nationalist or liberal but used the support to his advantage. A nationalist feeling spread through Prussia and there were celebrations for the anniversaries of victories over Napoleon. It could be argued that this nationalist feeling could have led to the German unification rather than Bismarck’s desire for unification. However it is clear that rather than a unified Germany, Bismarck wanted to expand Prussia, but this led to the same result and the nationalist feeling, when taken advantage of, made the job a lot easier.
Undoubtedly, the unification does not have one single cause. The strength of the Prussian state was key in allowing the unification to take place as it put Prussia in a both dominant and powerful position. The economic development of Prussia began prior to Bismarck coming into power, which suggests he had little involvement in it although the period of growth did continue during Bismarck’s period in office. There is no denying that Bismarck did take advantage of situations but it would be wrong to evoke that Bismarck was always in control and created the events which took place which is what he would lead one to believe through his memoirs. Bismarck clearly set out to simply expand Prussia rather than to unify Germany. The fact that he ended up unifying Germany would suggest he wasn’t in control of events and the skills of Bismarck weren’t the cause of the unification. If Bismarck had not been in office between 1861 and 1871 the unification still may have taken place because there was national feeling, Prussia was strong, Austria were weak and any leader is likely to have been able to stumble through the process of unification as Bismarck did. This suggests that the strength of the Prussian state played a more important role in the unification than did the skills of Bismarck.
TOTAL WORD COUNT: 2995