Russia too played a role in the escalation to war in 1914, indeed as an empire it had much to gain from going to war. Russia like Austria-Hungary was being torn apart by internal instability. There was much social unrest and threats of another revolution; people had lost regard for the Tsar and his Ministers. As well as this Russia had been humiliated in 1905 when it was defeated by Japan, supposedly a ‘second rate’ nation. A war would not only divert the attention of the people and perhaps save the monarchy but also a victory would re-establish Russia to its previous status as a great power. In the Russian was cabinet there were those who wanted war, including the war minister Sukhomlinov. They were an influential group who had the ear of the Tsar. Russia has also been regularly attacked for being the first of the Great Powers to order General mobilisation. The historian A.J.P Taylor argues that this then made war unavoidable, as it could not be stopped in time due to train timetables and logistics. Russia did on the other hand have little choice. It saw itself as the leader of the Slavic peoples and felt that it had to protect Serbia from Austrian aggression as it had promised to do so in 1908. Furthermore Russia had to save face because of the events of 1913 when it had failed to support the Serbians and to do so again would destroy its credibility and its position as a ‘great power’. The Tsar had originally ordered partial mobilisation against Austria but by doing this he left Russia exposed to attack from Austria’s ally Germany. As a precaution to this he eventually ordered general mobilisation. Russia would have preferred to remain out of war but it felt it had to make a stand; Krivoshein (Russia agricultural minister) stated that while war should be avoided if possible, Russia should now take a firmer stand. It was felt that Russia was now prepared economically and militarily, thanks to the ‘Great Programme’ initiated by Sukhomlinov if war presented itself. It was this confidence that also motivated the military leaders because as Keith Wilson described it, “the use of force to support Russian diplomacy was no longer precluded by military weakness”.
There were other concerns among the Russian cabinet, there were fears that Turkey might collapse at any moment and that Germany might fill the vacuum. Russian fears seemed to be supported by the construction of the Berlin-Baghdad railway line. Russia also received a ‘cheque blanche’ from the French, which merely served to strengthen the Russian resolve to stand to aggression from the Central Powers. The Tsar himself wanted peace and this was shown by his hesitation in ordering mobilisation, yet the influential military leaders such as Sukhomlinov who advocated war manipulated him. Russia, despite her importance in the escalation of war, was not the major factor in the outbreak for war. Russia had been put in a very difficult position by the actions and aggressions of the German backed Austrians, whereby they either went to war or last their ‘world power’ status and it was this ahead of the other advantages of war that motivated a Russian response. Russia in short did not scheme for war but was forced to react to circumstances brought about by German foreign policy in order to maintain itself.
Another approach to the First World War is to argue that it was inevitable and that no country actually set out to start it. War had been avoided in 1908,1911 and 1913 but this served only to contribute to the tension that existed in Europe. It had to break at some stage and in 1914 it did. The alliance system that was in place for much of the start of the 20th century also contributed to the sense of inevitability. The alliances provided links across which a crisis could spread until eventually all the great European powers were involved. Sooner rather than later a relatively minor conflict would bring all the nations into a clash that would result in a war. These alliances were however purely defensive at heart, they were designed and signed in order to prevent the outbreak of war. More significantly there were not particularly binding. Russia showed this in 1913 when if failed to support Serbia. In 1914 the majority of the powers that were to become involved preferred peace and in the case of Austria it only wanted a localised war in the Balkans. Germany manipulated its ally and it was the aggression Germany showed therefore that persuaded the other ‘great powers’ that they had to make a stand.
It should be argued that German Foreign Policy that played the instrumental role in the escalation of war had its roots in the 19th century. Otto von Bismarck had unified Germany in 1871 as a result of the Prussian victory over France. The hard core of the new German empire were the Prussians and it was they who provided most of the military leaders. The victories in the 1860’s and the knowledge that Germany had the best army in the world meant as the historian I. Geiss described it that the “Prussian military caste was cocksure”. It gave them an arrogance and confidence that helped push Germany into war in 1914.
Germany had emerged an empire and an increasingly important economic and military power under the helm of the reserved and conservative Bismarck. However he was sacked in 1890 and to quote John Röhl “Imperial Germany under Kaiser Wilhelm II embarked on a long term bid to secure ‘world power’ status”. Germany became obsessed with gaining an empire under the sun and the policy of Weltpolitik to achieve this. However by 1909 Germany had been out manoeuvred by Great Britain and isolated and surrounded after the formation of the Triple Entente the members of which were rapidly militarising and matching German power (Russia had implemented the Great Programme in 1912-1914 and France had lengthened military service). As well as this Germany’s only serious ally Austria-Hungary was in a state of rapid and terminal decline due to the nationalist movement among the ethnic minorities within the empire. It was realised in Berlin that if Germany wanted to achieve its goal of “Weltherrschaft” it would have to either ally with Britain or start and win a continental war. The first option would involve a revolutionary change in German policy and the abandonment of the “Tirpitz System”. Consequently many of the leaders had their minds set on war. They knew that if they had to fight a war the longer they waited the more their chances of victory deteriorated. In December 1912 there was a meeting of the war council in Germany and the prospect of war was discussed. This meeting could be interpreted, as routine where they discussed what would happen in the eventuality of war. Every country had their own preparations and precautions so the existence of the von Schlieffen plan does not imply they wanted war. However at this conference Admiral von Müller made one damming entry to his diary saying that he wanted a “postponement of the great fight for 18 months” thereby implying that war should be unleashed in the summer of 1914. The Chief of Staff General Moltke was also present at the meeting, being a military leader he was a strong advocator of war.
In 1914 Germany acted in a provocative and unrestrained manner. She issued a ‘blank cheque’ to Austria-Hungary on the 5th July, portraying German support whatever the circumstances with Serbia. This was valid in many ways because Jagow realised that Austria-Hungary had to be supported, if it fell then Germany would be left completely isolated and ineffective as a ‘great power’. They also felt bound to stand by her after their half-hearted support in 1913 and that firm action would deter Russia from going to war. The support however gave the Austrians the confidence to act as they did towards Serbia. This provoked Russia and then Germany was able to enter the war in defence of an ally. In short Germany was able to escalate a localised war into a European one.
The Kaiser played an important role in the events leading to the war. He supported the aggressive policy of Weltpolitik; he had after all sacked Bismarck in 1890. He also acted in a very aggressive and often provocative manner over foreign matters. In 1896 he had sent a telegram to the Transvaal President Kruger congratulating him after he had destroyed an attempted British uprising. In 1905 he paid a visit to Tangier and this precipitated the Moroccan crisis. On the other hand when it actually came to going to war in 1914 he desperately tried to find a way out. However at this stage he was no longer in control, power lay with the Generals like Moltke who were committed to war. Indeed in the build up Germany did not use any diplomacy in order to resolve the situation, which shows their determination that war had to happen.
Germany also had serious internal problems, to quote the historian Bergahn, “Practically from the moment of its birth, the German Empire was threatened by a latent political crisis”. The political system and constitution was extremely rigid and a countryside based social elite ruled the country. However their power base was threatened by industrialisation. Social unrest was caused by high taxes needed to pay for the armament and resentment for the monarchy. Many of those from the social clique saw war as a method of diverting social attention and as many of the military and diplomatic leaders were from within the clique, this was reflected in the foreign policy.
The Great War was the result of an accumulation of a number of factors. The position of Russia and its resolve to stand up to Germany was critical in the outbreak of the war. Austria’s determination to declare war on Serbia and to settle the internal problems that existed was also aided the tension and the eruption of war. However both Russia and Austria did not aim to create a European War; Austria wanted a localised war in the Balkans and the Russians reacted to circumstances in the only way they could in order to maintain its position in the world. Germany however both occasioned events and responded to events beyond their control in such a way that could bring back a General European War through their Foreign Policy.
Serbia had emerged from the Second Balkans war of 1912-13 a much more powerful and substantial nation. The defeat of Bulgaria meant that it almost doubled in size and had created a far greater threat to the Austria-Hungarian empire. This in turn had done much to fuel the tension between the two states.
Other influential figures within the Austrian cabinet include Conrad von Hotzendorff the Chief of Staff who had been calling for a preventive attack on Serbia for years.
Russia and Austria had tried to co-operate over the Balkans; for both empires it was an area of great importance and disputes were consequently frequent so there was a desire to maintain the peace indeed this had kept the Balkans relatively quiet for 30 years. However the Balkans Crisis of 1908 when Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina killed all Austro-Russian co-operation. It convinced Serbia Austria aimed to destroy it and it also convinced the Russians that the Austro-German unity was a direct threat to them. Accordingly Russia strengthened ties with Serbia, as did Austria with Germany thereby laying the foundations for the war to break out in the Balkans.
The historian Bulow argues that German went to war due to the incompetence of and the mistakes made by the politicians and the military leaders. Bulow has seven answers as to where Germany made crucial mistakes that consequently resulted in war. He includes the issuing of the ‘blank cheque’ to Austria as the first crucial mistake and he also includes the German belief that Britain would remain neutral in the case of war as another error. However there are seven crucial mistakes all of which contributed to the outbreak of war. There are too many mistakes being made by top statesmen and leaders for this to actually have been the case. Had Germany really issued the ‘blank cheque’ by mistake then surely they would have been more hesitant and careful from then. However Germany carried on acting in the reckless manner allowing, Austria to issue an ultimatum that Serbia could not accept and therefore they must have known what they were doing and consequently were preparing a European war.
Moltke believed that war was Germany’s best option. If Germany wanted to achieve its European dominance and an Empire to rival that of Britain it would have to go to war. Men such as Moltke had been preparing for war for years indeed the Schlieffen plan had been formulated in the late 1800’s in the event of a war against France and Russia. These Generals placed so much faith in the plan that to quote Rohl they “did not feel impelled to seek a political or diplomatic solution to Germany’s grave problems at home and abroad”. Moltke himself had been unhappy with the peaceful outcome of the Moroccan Crisis in 1911, such was his desire and drive towards war.
In 1911 there was increased tension after the Agadir Crisis when the French had occupied Fez and consequently broken an agreement with Germany. It allowed Germany a pretext to send a gunboat to Agadir. Although the French in effect conceded it persuaded Britain to aid its support behind the French, leaving the Germans isolated other then Austria in Europe. This in turn served to encourage the German Generals that war was the only option.
The historian Berghahn put together a thesis blaming German “internal pressures” for pushing Germany into a war. Berghahn blames several factors within Germany. Firstly there was the crisis between the Prusso-German political systems whereby the political system had been based upon the rigid Prussian elite and this was being threatened by increased industrialisation. Secondly there was Tirpitz and his Navy. The cost of creating the large navy was reflected in the taxes and this caused social unrest. Thirdly the paralysis of the Monarchy at home, which involved inflated resentment towards the ruling elite who were ruling increasingly by decree and not through the Reichstag.
