Why was Germany so quick to offer this blank cheque? Her motives for promoting the start of WW1 were many and varied. One of the arguments held up in Germany’s defence was that in 1914 she was being encircled by the Triple Entente and had no choice but to break out of it to protect her independence. This enciclement did exist and was not kindly disposed towards Germany but it was also entirely of Germany’s making. The origins this encirclement lie with Wilhelm II. His decision to reject the Reinsurance treaty of 1890 on the basis that he could not ally with both Austria and Russia due to their conflicting interests, was a fatal move. After the rejection of the treaty an unlikely partnership was formed between Autocratic Russia and republican France based on mutual distrust of Germany. The Kaisers lack of diplomatic skill resulted in exactly what Bismarck had worked so hard to avoid, powerful enemies on both sides and the knowledge that if a war was to be fought it would now be on two fronts. This increased Germany’s feelings of entrapment and added to her desire to go to war to escape from the ‘stranglehold’ of France and Russia.
Wilhelm II was a determined, forceful leader but despite his strong interest in military matters was neither a skilled commander or diplomatic. He was determined to see Germany play a major role in world affairs under his leadership and the main obstacle to his dreams seemed to be Great Britain. “Among European countries at the turn of the century the definition of excellence and greatness was shaped by Great Britain, whose power had to be confronted if Germany was to achieve her destiny”6. Despite his English heritage he was fiercely jealous of Britain and was determined to become a power on the same scale. To do this he believed that British naval mastery would have to be challenged. Building a navy to rival Britains would provide tangible evidence of Germany’s growing power, satisfy nationalist force at home and symbolise the nations firm intent to become a leading world power. ‘ The new naval program, was, in short directed against Great Britain…the Risk Theory…envisaged a German fleet …that was so strong that in the event of a war with Great Britain it could take offensive action against the British home fleet’7. Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz hoped to increase Germany’s navy to such a size that if it came to war they would either be so superior to Britain that they could destroy the British fleet or that Britain would be inclined to avoid conflict with Germany and would open favourable negotiations.
This naval strategy was totally misconceived both as an instrument for securing world power and as a weapon with which to bully Britain into diplomatic negotiations. Germany’s intimidating attempts to influence the world stage merely strengthened forces of opposition to her ambitions in Europe. Britain responded by building a bigger and better navy, resulting in costly arms wars and by forming the Triple Entente, which placed Germany in an even worse position than before. The threat Germany posed to France by intervening in Morocco and her antagonistic behaviour towards Britain resulted in the strengthening of the ties between the allies. Through miscalculation and a lack of good leadership Germany created her own cage, with enemies on all sides. She went to war in 1914 to break out of a hostile enciclement of her own devising.
Germany was not only weak abroad, her domestic situation was also rapidly spiralling out of control. Germany had gone from being a small collection of states to a powerful industrial giant in an exceptionally short period of time. In the years between 1890 and 1914 her population increased dramatically and the economy soared. This had profound social and political implications.
“If this state were a great monarchy with strong political unity furnished with all the material strength that Germany possesses-how could any safe existence be left for Germany’s neighbours?”8 The emergence of a hugely powerful Germany upset the fragile balance of power between the Great Powers and posed many problems to Germany’s rulers. Could Germany exploit its economic strength to establish itself as a leading power without scaring the other countries into forming defensive alliances against it? In both domestic and foreign policy the German leaders failed to meet the challenges thrown to them by Germany’s massive growth and the fragility of Europe’s “safe existence” was soon shattered.
Many German people immigrated to the industrial areas. Here they either found wealth, which led to questioning the existing social order or they found horrendous living and working conditions and were forced into striking. The Social Democrats were soon the largest political party in Germany with a third of all the votes. However, “neither the Reichstag nor the Bundesrat had much influence on the shaping of foreign policy or its diplomatic and military tools. The constitution placed these responsibilities directly into the hands of the Kaiser”9. The Reichstag was mainly for show and had so little real power that it could make very few real changes. Ultimately, in Wilhelm Germany, the Kaiser’s decision was law and despite the growth of the SDP the Kaiser, Chancellor and leaders refused to work with them or make any of the changes they begged for. They were seen as enemies of the state but to refuse to make any concessions to a party that size was bound to cause trouble and despite their repeated attempts to cripple the SDP nothing worked and they were left with growing social unrest.
One way of quelling voices of dissent and justifying glaring inequalities in the social system was by relating social position directly to levels of patriotism. The elite saw their privileged positions as their just rewards for their strong support of the imperial state. Groups that wanted to bring about social or political change were portrayed as unpatriotic and disloyal and the government tried to weaken their appeal by stirring up feelings of nationalism.
Germany looked to imperial and naval expansion and to a vigorous foreign policy to quell these voices of dissent at home. Tirpitz cited one of the benefits of that, “in the national purpose and economic gains consequent upon it lies a strong palliative against trained and potential Social Democrat”.10 Attempting to quell voices of dissent through invoking feelings of patriotism and nationalism was a common tactic but one that backfired as the growth of fervent nationalist feelings soon put pressure back on the government to succeed in their ambitious aims.
Only a few months before the war Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg complained that, “every day Germany sees its population growing by leaps and bounds; its navy, trade and industry are making unparalleled developments . . . it is forced to expand somehow or other; it has not yet found that ‘place in the sun’ which it is due.”11
One of the main reasons for Germany’s going to war was greed combined with the need for respect. As she developed as a nation Germany wanted her own “place in the sun” or overseas colonies as all the other major powers had. Eager to be on an equal footing, Germany felt deprived and hoped that though war she would gain lands and so be respected by the other countries’. The ever-expanding population of Germany also played a part in this desire, as the need for lebensraum became more pressing.
There were factors that led to war that were out of Germany’s control. Undoubtedly the most important one of these was the trouble in the Balkans, which stemmed from its prime strategic position and the growth of nationalism which led to a desire for self determination and so conflict. Schmitt argued that “more than any other circumstances this conflict between existing governments and their unhappy minorities was responsible for the catastrophe of 1914”12. The conflict between minority groups and their governments was what led to the disintegration of the Turkish Empire. This upset the balance of power, resulting in conflict between Austria and Serbia and consequently war in the Balkans.
Both Russia and Austria aimed at expansion in the Balkans due to its access to the Mediterranean straights. F. R. Bridge argued that they’re policies were motivated by a quest for security that brought them into constant conflict. No matter what their motivation for interference in the Balkans was, the existence of the Turkish Empire had acted as a ‘shock absorber in the international system”13 and was all that stopped direct conflict. After this buffer was removed in 1912 conflict in the Balkans became inevitable as Austria and Russia found themselves in constant dispute.
It must be established that it was solely due to Germany and the Schlieffen plan that conflict in the Balkans meant conflict on the continent. The German government gladly took this risk when they offered the blank cheque to Austria in 1914. Despite this, the events in the Balkans from 1908 to the eve of war may well have been enough to trigger a war without Germany influence, albeit on a far smaller scale. The Bosnian Crisis’ and Balkan wars led to tensions between Austria and Serbia increasing violently leading to Austria’s [WORD] ultimatum and to the formation of the Serbian Black Hand Group that would murder the Archduke, and so act as the catalyst to the outbreak of war. They also increased feelings of solidarity between Russia and Serbia, the Tsar declaring in February 1914, "For Serbia, we shall do everything”14.
The importance of the growth of nationalism and the denial of self determination cannot be ignored in the debate on the origins of WW1 as they greatly added to the tensions that led to it but it is essential to also consider the part Germany played. The blank cheque and Schlieffen plan meant that Germany knowingly transformed a localised conflict into war on a vast scale.
Whilst discussing the issue of causation it must be remembered that Austria, as Germany’s main ally, equally shared the blame doled out by the Treaty of Versailles. Views on what motivated Austria’s aggressive foreign policy, especially in relation to Serbia, differ. Whatever her motives, Austria’s behaviour in the Balkans, her invasion of Serbia and her refusal of self-determination to minority groups all contributed to the outbreak of WW1 in a major way and for this Austria bears a sizeable amount of the blame. Despite this, without Germany’s full and unconditional support Austria would not have embarked on its fatal confrontation with Serbia. Germany’s desire to profit economically and diplomatically from the crisis in 1914 not only started the war but also widened it and it is for this that the blame is placed most heavily on Germany.
The Communist leader Lenin believed that the policies of pre-war Europe were inherently aggressive as a result of their development as capitalist states. Lenin viewed the First World War as an ‘imperialist struggle among the great capitalist powers for the reallocation of world resources’15. It cannot be denied that Germany’s development as a leading capitalist state and her desire for an empire exerted a huge amount of pressure on foreign relations. The Anglo-German commercial and naval rivalry and scrambles for territory all helped provoke the situation. However, colonial and trading disputes were at a minimum at the beginning of the twentieth century, better than they had been for many years. Traditional rivalries involving areas seen as strategically and militarily important were posing far more of a threat to international security. It was not the capitalist system, which gave rise to ambition but traditional desires for prestige and influence. If Lenin’s view is to be taken seriously Serbia’s status as an industrialised power in 1914 must be questioned along with to what extent Capitalism was actually exerting great pressure on the Russian and Habsburg courts. Also, why did the USA, the most advanced capitalist state of all not join until 1917? Germany’s advancement as a state resulted in a desire for an empire, certainly for economic but more for prestigious reasons. Capitalism is apportioned some of the blame but cannot be cited as a main cause as it ignores so many other causes of the war. It is a view that was very useful for communist states as it gave the people a reason to feel superior to capitalist states, despite the fact that they were often worse off.
As a united state Germany posed a massive threat to other countries, “The emergence of the new empire had shattered the old international system. Germany’s, and Europe’s challenge was to create a new one into which it would fit comfortably”16. Germany and Europe failed their challenge. Germany’s arrival on the international scene created fear and suspicion from the outset, her behaviour confirmed all fears and mostly due to her, and her allies actions, the world was plunged into war on a scale never previously imagined. This cannot be said to be all Germany’s fault, as it must be asked if through their own diplomatic shortcomings the other countries helped cause the war or whether any actively wanted war.
Extensive research has suggested that neither Russia nor France wanted war and that Britain wanted to avoid military conflict but her policies were fatally unclear. Whether a clearer British stance on her duty to her allies and a stronger determination to honour the Triple Entente would have caused Germany to rethink her foreign policy is uncertain but to think that this would have prevented war is wrong. Austria was hell bent on waging war on Serbia and that July of 1914 saw a ‘fateful meshing of aggressive German Welkpolitik with an even more aggressive, irresponsible Habsburg Balkanpolitik.’17
The formation of alliances shrouded in secrecy has also been cited as one of the causes of WW1. It can be argued that had these treaties been widely known and understood then there would not have been any miscalculation on behalf of leaders who were uncertain of other countries’ plans. In 1904 Britain entered the Entente Cordial with France. In 1907 a similar agreement was signed with Russia creating the Triple Entente. Liberal academics such as G. Lowes Dickinson believed that that this devious and often secret diplomacy was responsible for the atmosphere of mistrust and hostility that led to war. It is true that countries were drawn into war by their mutual commitments and by the military plans that followed them but armed camps in themselves do not necessarily cause wars. Often the mutual fear can preserve peace. The blame cannot be placed heavily on the alliance system, as it wasn’t as strong as it seemed. Despite her part in the Triple Alliance Italy did not join the war until April 26th 1915, when she came into the war on the side of the Triple Entente. Britain also became military involved without being bound by any treaty. Germany’s unconditional promise of support to Austria and rapid declaration of war on France and Russia far exceeded its treaty obligations-which could only mean that Germany wanted a European war.
In the 1920’s and 30’s the theory that Germany had always held, of collective responsibility, gained ground. It was thought that every country shared the guilt and that some factors were simply beyond the control of a single nation. Lloyd George summed up this feeling when he wrote, “the nations in 1914 slithered over the brink into the boiling cauldron of war without any trace of apprehension or dismay”18. The view that the countries entered into war gladly is, to some extent, right. War was used as a solution to domestic problems and as a unifying, moral boosting event. The wide scale death and destruction of the First World War had never been seen before and all countries involved envisaged a short, victorious war. There was a generation of men who had been brought up on tales of heroism and adventure and saw this new war as their opportunity to experience this for themselves. Lloyd George’s view that war was an inevitable and unstoppable force is a convenient excuse for every country that played a part in its beginnings. This view must be massively re-worked to bear any semblance to the truth. It is true that there were many factors that contributed to war that were out of a single nations control but there were also those that could have been prevented and also countries’ that actively and knowingly set a path for war.