If we are to believe the Hossbach Memorandum, remember this was a copy of a copy and not an original document, Hitler had set out a clear agenda that included the domination of Eastern Europe for living space. Taylor contends that this was mere daydreaming and that it was pure fantasy to suggest that he had a plan for European domination. Nevertheless according to the document Hitler again had stated that he believed in Social Darwinism and that the German desire for living space in the East was a right. This suggests as the Intentionalist Historians have always maintained that Hitler planned a war from the start. The Nazi’s had run Germany on Militaristic lines and geared the nation for a war in the east against Bolshevism. Hitler it can be argued invaded Poland as a first step towards the invasion of Russia. Historians therefor like Roper and Bullock have used the memorandum as evidence that Hitler planned a war from the start. This is the basis of the Intentionalist argument.
According to Hossbach another of Hitler’s aims was revenge on France. This was a country that seemed hell bent on keeping Germany down. France had invaded Germany in 1923 and many Germans wanted revenge for this as well as the loss of the First World War. France dismissed the idea that Germany should be awarded equality in armaments in 1933 and this was the cause of the German withdrawal from the league. Hitler also knew that if Germany was to fulfil her desire for lands in the east the France had to be defeated first. Again the evidence, if we take the Intentionalist view is that he had planned a war of aggression from the outset.
One of Hitler’s most obvious aims was the desire for the unification of German speaking peoples. Under the Treaty of Versailles millions of Germans were left under the rule of foreign powers mainly Czechoslovakia and Poland. Hitler had stated from the outset that people of the same blood ought to be in the same Reich. Hitler put this desire into practice when he invaded both Austria and the Sudetenland in 1938. Austria was of course the land of his birth and many Austrians regarded themselves as Germans anyway. No European power intervened on the part of Austria and as far as the Sudetenland was concerned Britain and France were willing to hand the territory over to avoid a conflict in the region. The Munich agreement was seen as a success for British foreign policy of appeasement. It was only natural then, that in the face of such acquiescence on the part of Britain and France, Hitler would demand the return of the German city of Danzig, with a population of over a million. It was this demand that would eventually lead to war when the Germans invaded in September 1939.
Although Hitler’s aims contributed to the war, Taylor’s argument is that the other factors were just as important. Taylor contends that the policy of appeasement was a key contributing factor in the cause of the war. Appeasement was a policy whereby war could be avoided through negotiation. Historians on the right like John Charmley believe that it was the only logical policy that could be followed considering the weakness of Britain’s economic and military position. Chamberlain was well aware what a world war would do to Britain and her Empire. Appeasement had been the policy adopted by the British government since the signing of Versailles. Most British governments felt a sense of guilt associated with Versailles and tried to distance themselves from it at every opportunity. The British wanted a Germany that could recover and adopt its former position of strength as a trading partner. Britain saw a wickedness in Versailles and turned a blind eye to German breaches of the Treaty. There are two basic arguments with appeasement. The first suggests that it was a weak policy that fed Hitler’s appetite for more territorial demands in Europe. This may have been the case and it is likely that Hitler invaded Poland thinking that the British would accept this when in fact they did not. Hitler, acting on the basis of his past successes, honestly did not think Britain would declare war in 1939 when he invaded Poland. He had gotten away with the Rhineland, Austria, Sutendenland and Czechoslovakia after all. The second argument put forward by revisionists is that Chamberlain was right to follow this policy and that he was only pressurised by others such as Halifax and Churchill to guarantee Poland’s borders and subsequently declare war on Germany in 1939. Chamberlain according Charmley should have followed appeasement through to its logical conclusion. This would have ultimately given Germany a free hand in Eastern Europe. If this led to a war between Germany and Russia “all the better for humanity” as Baldwin earlier stated. Instead the blunders that accompanied the policy of appeasement confused the German leadership and ultimately led to what has become known as the “wrong war”.
Another key factor in the cause of war was the failure of collective Security. Set up as an all-powerful organisation to prevent another war the League of Nations had no real power and lacked authority. Richard Overy argues that it did not reflect the changing balance of power that occurred by the 1930’s. The USA, Russia and Germany were not members despite the fact that they were the largest and most powerful nations on earth. When faced with a serious challenge as happened in Manchuria the League showed that it had no real power. In fact it took a year before that league actually delivered its verdict on the Japanese invasion by which time the invasion was complete and the Japanese simply ignored it. Likewise when Italy invaded Abyssinia they, too, learned that no repercussions were likely to occur. Britain and France had courted Italy as a counterweight to Germany but the timid sanctions that they applied to Italy did more harm than good. It failed to prevent the Italian conquest and simply pushed Italy into the arms of Germany.
The final factor that contributed to war was the Nazi Soviet Pact. This was signed in August 1939 between Germany and Russia. At the time, and even now, it seems incredible that a treaty could have been signed between two adversaries with such opposing political views. Yet this is indeed what happened. Stalin was playing for time. He believed that he had been snubbed by the British at the Munich Conference, he was aware that storm clouds were brewing and the only option was a treaty with Germany. This would give him time to prepare his own armed forces for any future conflict. Likewise Germany knew that they had to isolate Poland militarily and diplomatically. The British had always discounted the Soviets and Chamberlain had no love for the communists anyway. With the signing of the Nazi Soviet Pact Poland’s death knell was sealed and Germany could invade without fear of retaliation by the Russian bear. John Charmley argues that Britain’s guarantee to Poland in 1939 was a major blunder. For the first time in British history, the decision as to whether or not she would go to war was out of her own control. Britain had given a guarantee to a right wing military dictatorship that had acquiesced in the destruction of Czechoslovakia. Such a dictatorship argues Charmley was to pull Britain into a war that destroy Britain as a world power and replace one European dictator with another.
In truth the cause of the war was a series of mistakes and misjudgements on the part of European statesmen including Hitler and Chamberlain. To blame Hitler solely for the war is clearly wrong and lacks any clear analysis or judgement. Hitler was clearly intent on expanding German territorial dominance over Eastern Europe. Whether this was the sole cause of the war is debatable. Taylor’s argument that Versailles left Germans both angry and intent on revenge is credible as is his view that Versailles did nothing to prevent Germany from reasserting her power later on. The League of Nations clearly failed in its duty to protect weaker countries. Finally appeasement sent Hitler the wrong signals to Hitler in that it simply fed his appetite for further territorial expansion.
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tbruce739 (student)
