To what extent was the adoption of a scorched earth policy after 1900 by Britain in the Boer War justifiable.

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Ashley Register

To what extent was the adoption of a scorched earth policy after 1900 by Britain in the Boer War justifiable

Those that would argue that the destruction that was wrought during the period when General Lord Kitchener exercised his well-known "Scorched Earth Policy", whereby all Boer farms were destroyed, and the inhabitants taken to concentration death camps was justifiable are generally in the minority.  

It was in these camps that between 25,000 and 29,000 Boer women and children died, not to mention the more than 15,000 thousand black people whose deaths and numbers were never properly recorded.   This method of warfare has left seeds of bitterness which today, after one hundred years, has still not entirely been forgotten.

In early March 1901 Lord Kitchener decided to break the stalemate that the extremely costly war had settled into. It was costing the British taxpayer £2,5 million a month. He decided to sweep the country bare of everything that can give sustenance to the Boers i.e. cattle, sheep, horses, women and children.

This scorched earth policy led to the destruction of about 30000 Boer farmhouses and the partial and complete destruction of more than forty towns. Thousands of women and children were removed from their homes by force.  They had little or no time to remove valuables before the house was burnt down. They were then taken by oxwagon or in open cattle trucks to the nearest camp.

Conditions in the camps were less than ideal. Tents were overcrowded. Reduced-scale army rations were provided. In fact there were two scales. Meat was not included in the rations issued to women and children whose menfolk were still fighting. There were little or no vegetables, and no fresh milk for the babies and children.

However, it is important to realise whether the British were left with any other options, and how does this tie in with the changing image of war and the changing moralities that are associated with this notion?  It is also essential to look at the minority of non-Boer accounts at this time, and how perhaps the notion of a non-justifiable result to the actions of the British are the cruel practices of a more humane theory behind the policy.

How much reality is there behind the stories from people who had said “If only I had taped my Grandmother’s stories” (Fransjohan Pretorius); the stories that were thus carried down through the generations; was this an analogy of ‘Chinese whispers’, and how many of these ‘myths’ are erected without acquiring intimate knowledge about the period.  Finally, how much of the allegories are embroidered with an excess of emotion surrounding the deaths.  Moreover, how much of the stories that one hears about glass and blue vitriol in the food, and fish hooks in tinned meat can be explained legitimately – we now know that sugar crystals could have been mistaken for glass, and although it’s true that barbs were found in the tinned meat, this was probably a result of the poorly manufactured produce from the USA that British soldier’s were also subjected to.

Therefore, can J.C. Fuller’s analysis of the Boer War as “The Last Of The Gentlemen’s Wars” with it’s images that manifest an element of chivalry be accurate.  It would appear that despite the evidence of destruction and suffering caused by the actions of the British, I come back to my previous point that in theory, British policy was not as harsh in it’s planning, but in reality, and in a deplorable course of fate and circumstances, it became this way.  There is evidence of this notion; that in planning, and as demonstrated by the Hague Convention of 1899, that the destruction of property must be limited to what was “imperatively demanded by the necessities of war” (CD 800, International convention with respect to the laws and customs of war by land).  This clause allowed the burning of property only under the condition that the Boers had fired upon the British troops whilst under the cover of a white flag.  However, and with regard to the notion that action in theory and in reality are not always the same, the judgment of the circumstances by which the burning of property was allowed, was not as accurate as the clause had anticipated.  Thus, although the clause may be seen by some as an attempt to legitimize the actions of the British, it could also be seen, and far more likely, that when not in the field itself, that chivalry and the notion of “a gentleman’s war” was very much in place in the war.

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The continued move towards a guerrilla style warfare sparked a change in British policy, and thus the order for farmhouses in the immediate vicinity of attacks on British rail and telegraph connections, to be burned.  Once again, the interpretation of this order in the field was flawed as demonstrated by the entire burning of the town of Bothaville; justified at the time only because it was used as a base for the commandos in their attacks on the railway lines and thus seen by many as a totally barbaric and unnecessary action to be taken.  However, there is counter-evidence, evident ...

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