To what extent was the strength of the French army the main reason for Napoleons military success until 1808?
by
cautiousducky (student)
To what extent was the strength of the French army the main reason for Napoleon’s military success until 1808?
Throughout Napoleon’s early reign until 1808, it is undisputed that the French army enjoyed an unprecedented amount of success on the battlefield in its numerous campaigns against its foes. It is therefore astounding that following 1808, its successes start to dwindle to the point of Napoleon’s ultimate demise in 1815. Consequently, many historians have disputed the true nature of Napoleon’s early military successes. In order to evaluate this debate, one must assess three key factors: the strength of the French army, the weakness of the opposition and Napoleon’s ability as a commander.
It is clear that the inherited strength of the French army played a decisive role in Napoleon’s military success until 1808. As David Chandler quotes, ‘the weapon was ready forged’. The levees and levees en masse of the preceding revolutionary governments had introduced thousands of new conscripts into the army which meant, in terms of sheer numbers, Napoleon had the command of a vast, unstoppable force which was practically unrivalled on continental Europe until 1813. In addition, the expanding population of France and her empire meant the prospect of an indefinite amount of men. Napoleon himself stated, ‘I can afford to lose 30,000 men a month’. This meant that Napoleon could effectively win battles simply by overwhelming his opponents. The army inherited by Napoleon also had a democratised officer core, which meant the officers had earned their positions based on their talent and their ability to command, rather than their social standing. Having capable, competent and reliable officers in the army was undoubtedly very advantageous, as demonstrated at the battle of Jena-Auserstedt where General Davout was able to gain a decisive victory against the Prussian main army despite being outnumbered two to one. The development of divisions and corps in the internal organisation of the army and, furthermore, the development of weapons and tactics was integral to its success. Strategies such as living off the land, which was often used by Napoleon, ensured the army could move rapidly over enemy terrain, as it did not rely on supply lines, and the use of corps meant sections of the army could march closely ahead of each other and provide reinforcements quickly should one encounter an enemy force. Other innovations included the policy of amalgame where recruits were trained ‘on the march’ by veterans. This meant new troops could be deployed instantly, instead of undergoing months of preliminary training at a barracks, but also developed comradeship among the troops and officers. Many of the soldiers in the French army were deemed ‘citizen soldiers,’ alluding to the fact that they were fighting passionately for their hard earned liberties gained during the revolution. This generally meant there was high morale among the troops. In terms of financing, the state of war set up by the revolutionaries provided limitless spending on the military and many factories were converted to solely supply to army. However, despite these numerous advantages that were introduced prior to Napoleon’s ascension, the state and achievements of the French army in 1799 would suggest that it was Napoleon who successfully implemented these changes. Following on from Chandler’s quote, though the weapon was ready forged, it was Napoleon who successfully wielded it.
