Moreover, agreeing with the above point, is what modern historians have noticed: that the terms of the Treaty were ‘relatively lenient’. For example, looking at the statistics concluded by modern historian Henig, we see that ‘It deprived her of about 13.5% of her territory, 13% of her economic productivity and about 7 million [or 10%] of her inhabitants’. Therefore, this extends my above point that ‘the Allies could have dealt Germany much harsher blows’. This leads me on to my next reason for justifying the Treaty, which was that the Allies begun to insufficiently implement the Treaty, thus making it’s consequences not as harsh on Germany.
Because it was never properly implemented, Germany didn’t suffer as they would have, had the terms been followed through. The reason for the terms not being correctly implemented lay with the allies, who began to see the Treaty as too harsh and felt guilt towards Germany, who therefore, exploited this guilt by adding more resentment. In the end, the Rhineland was de-militarised and a considerable amount of reparations were left unpaid. Had the allies given more support, Germany may have felt a much harsher impact of the Treaties.
On the other hand the previous point that the allies gave up on implementing the Treaty could aid the opposing view that the terms were short-sighted because the fact that Britain, America and Italy gave up shows the Treaty to be one of which was doomed to fail. Henig argues that ‘the victorious alliance, which had defeated Germany and negotiated a set of peace terms, had crumbled away. It was this critical collapse, rather than the provisions of the peace terms themselves, which ensured that the Treaty of Versailles was never fully accepted or enforced. Negotiations at the peace conference exposed the divisions between the victorious powers and opened the rifts.’ This agrees with the statement that the Treaty of Versailles was shortsighted as the allies weren’t strong enough to initiate it’s terms. Furthermore as stated in ‘The Treaty of Versailles 80 Years On’, ‘Britain, the United States and Italy, had little stomach to enforce the resulting settlement on a resentful and protesting Germany.’ France was the only power willing to punish Germany fully and Britain was more interested in securing military budget than aiding France. The fact that the powers gave up on the Treaty proves it’s failure when looking at historian William Carrs’s ‘A History of Germany’: ‘the Versailles Settlement would last only as long as the victorious powers were in a position to enforce it’.
Moreover, the Treaty can be seen as short-sighted as Germany had unwilllingly signed the war guilt clause, meaning they would instantly resent punishment, as they were forced into accepting them rather than being on their own terms. This was seen when Germany paid no attention to the disarmament term, and begun to re-arm in secret. Also proving the Treaty to be Shortsighted is historian A.Lentin stating about Germany, ‘victor should either conciliate his enemy or destroy him. The Treaty of Versailles did neither. It did not pacify Germany, still less permanently weaken her.’ This adds to the argument that the Treaty was doomed to fail where it shows its incapability to achieve anything. It didn’t do what it was set out to do and was ‘by no means fatal’.
The Treaty of Versailles can be seen as harsh when we look at the way it was presented originally. Firstly, Germany were forced to accept punishment, and as Keynes stated in 1920, ‘the German economy would be destroyed by the post-war Versailles Treaty’, and ‘a series of treaties which overlooked the really important issues of economic recovery, food, fuel, and finance would further exacerbate the situation.’ So, at the time of the Treaty, putting the terms into context together, the Treaty seems like one which is an attempt to destroy a country, taking away everything from economic supplies to land and reparations. When adding all the terms together, it could be argued Germany would suffer greatly from the harshness of the terms. Historian Anthony Wood demonstrates the extend of its impact: ‘the fundamental significance of Versailles was emotional rather than rational’. He goes on to state that it indicated the desire to achieve ‘national humiliation of Germany’ and that Germany must ‘alone suffer as a result of the hated Treaty’.
From evaluating the works of several historians and my own research, I have discovered that at the time of the Treaty of Versailles, it’s terms were seen as emotionally and physically punishing on Germany, who was forced to give up most economic resources, pay mass reparations and lose population. However, I feel that the terms, although already quite harsh, could have been greater. Clemenceau could have had his way in the Conference and Germany as a country would have found it much harder to recover. The Allies could have collectively pushed the terms through so that Germany couldn’t limit them, meaning the terms would have had a significantly harsher effect. Then again, unable to effectively enforce this treaty, a harsher one would not have been able to lead Europe any closer to peace. Therefore I feel the Treaty of Versailles was as harsh as it could be given the circumstances of disharmony between the powers, but Germany could have faced much worse.
