The Marshall Plan was introduced very quickly as ‘Marshall felt there was no time to lose’. The swift action of Marshall and his team came about from his visit to Germany where he felt that ‘the recovery of Europe has been far slower than had been expected’ which would indicate the US wanted to provide help for Europe over other reasons such as the reaction of Marshall after visiting Germany. ‘He was shocked by what he saw. Europe was ruined and – after the coldest winter in record – starving’ and therefore Marshall Aid was introduced. However, ‘Marshall told Truman that all Europe would turn Communist unless the US helped.’ Marshall’s initial altruism appeared thus; however, the US was ultimately set upon halting the spread of Communism. The details of his plan were swift acting, and released within a short period. He released the information at a low profile event that did not have any of the media present. The immediacy of Marshall’s announcement emphasises the idea that Marshall did not have time to go through official roots, which would have taken far too long – too long for Europe to wait. It is also a way of showing that Marshall did not care about the international glory that could come about from providing Europe with so much help. Marshall said in a short speech that the plan was to be put in place as to:
‘Restore the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole… Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.’
The US’s eagerness, as displayed by Marshall, to help the European community emphasises their altruism in how they were prepared to sacrifice millions of dollars to help them. This sacrifice would not only show the altruism of the US, but the help they were willing to give to friends of the state.
The Marshall plan was not completely driven by the selfless nature by the kind-hearted Marshall; instead, it was a way of looking at what the countries of Europe had, and what they could take. The Plan was aimed at disclosing all of the details of a state’s economy and some were unhappy at this, ‘Stalin and Molotov were suspicious – the terms Marshall was proposing were quite incompatible with the closed Soviet economy.’ This is resultant of the terms and conditions, which the Marshall Plan proposed. The basis of theses clauses was at the benefit of the US economy, by constraining ‘governments, businesses and labour unions to collaborate…and above all it blocked any returns to the temptations that had so stymied the inter-war economy.’ The plan behind doing so is to prevent the situation in which the US found themselves facing in 1929 – the depression caused by the Wall Street Crash. By providing the European states with this aid, the ‘Marshall Aid would create a captive market for American goods in western Europe … and help American farmers and businessmen threatened by falling domestic demand after the end of the war’ Thus showing that the US was providing them with the economic prosperity to keep money flowing through the American economy. The US would also benefit through creating a ‘strong Europe’ in that then they could relieve the tension between France and Germany – ‘France’s desperate need for German reparations would be replaced by Us credits, and the marrying of the French and German economies would reduce French fears of German economic power.’ As well as helping the Germans after the state it was left in, the French (who at this point were demanding war reparations from Germany for the devastation across their lands), were being helped by the US and thus alleviating their frustration. The author of the source would have been looking in at the situation as opposed to focusing solely upon the Marshall Aid. However, even though a lack of focus upon the aid itself is present, the events around it add up to what inevitably caused the war. Therefore, Source B indicates that the Marshall Aid was a factor. McCauley, an English University lecturer poses no biased threat to the presentation of the source in that he appears to both study and research the USSR and the USA.
Although the US was driven by the economic benefits provided by the aid, the political motivations for introducing the Marshall Plan were evident. With Communism being a fear of Truman, and of the US, ‘a main objective of the Marshall Plan had been to win the mouths and minds of the West European peoples so as to prevent them from turning Communist,’ thus showing that the US intended to contain the spread of Communism. Even though the US government planned upon containing Communism, ‘the Plan would never have been granted by Congress unless a considerable amount of emphasis had been laid on the danger of Communism in Europe and the significance of US aid as a protective device’ showing that Marshall had difficulty in solely aiming it as an aid package. The difficulty that Marshall had in developing such a package is gathering the financial support, therefore both the President and Congress would need to be persuaded to act in the best interest of the US and thus as ‘protective device’ halting the spread of Communism. This in itself proves that the motivations of the US could not have been altogether altruistic. The language used by Balfour shows that Congress were not solely interested in helping the European community purely based upon need and depravation but for the awareness of the spread of Communism across Europe.
The US intended to ‘win the mouths and minds’ of the Europeans which suggests that the US intended to manipulate them, or at the very least use the Marshall Plan as a front for the tackling of Communism. The US had a belief that if one state were to be overcome by Communism, another would also then fall – present a domino effect across Eastern and Western Europe. Even though they (the US) did intend upon using this as a method of utilising the money to block communism ‘by linking it to anti-Communism the concept would be very popular in the USA’ and therefore easily passed in Congress. The US’s motives involving the containment of Communism was the main motivation of the Marshall Plan, and it could be interpreted that ‘Marshall - following Truman’s lead – was constructing a Cold War grand strategy’ which indeed would be the containment of Communism over all other things – even if the reconstruction of Europe was necessary to help the US economically. Interpretation C is clearly in support of the view that the US had other motivations behind the development of the Plan. The source can be reliable in that it was written a decade after the fall of Communism in Russia, which emphasises the knowledge known to historians at that point. Gaddis’ book focuses on the entire era (The Cold War) and therefore an extensive body of research is presumed to have been taken, as well as the assumption that the book will discuss many other issues and subsequent events. Both Interpretation B and C look at the Marshall Plan in a brief manner and therefore may overlook aspects of the period which may add to the view that the US were using the Marshall plan to benefit themselves.
Overall, it is clear that the events through which the Marshall Plan was administered were mainly for the benefit of the US. Having said this, there are implications in that Europe was to be put before them, but only with a subversive motive – to block Communism as well as helping the US maintain their finances adequately. The benefits of a prosperous Europe were immense for the US in that they would undoubtedly be financially bettered. Even though the US and Europe were both together in respect to stopping the spread of Communism, the US had plans to be altruistic in helping its allies, even if there were other factors that influenced the decision(s) to help. Without a strong Europe, there could be no USA, and inter no Europe without a strong USA. The Communist threat was so powerful in the eyes of the US it had to be stopped, and it was this which ultimately drove the US to instigate the Marshall Plan – against the altruistic belief that the US wanted to help purely because they could.-
Interpretation D, From: Tony Judt, Post war, A History of Europe Since 1945, published in 2005.
Interpretation D, From: Tony Judt, Post war, A History of Europe Since 1945, published in 2005.
Interpretation D, From: Tony Judt, Post war, A History of Europe Since 1945, published in 2005.
Interpretation D, From: Tony Judt, Post war, A History of Europe Since 1945, published in 2005.
From: Martin McCauley, Origins of the Cold War1941 – 1949 Third Edition, published 2003.
From: Jeremy Isaacs, Cold War, published in,1998
From: Jeremy Isaacs, Cold War, published in, 1998
From: http://www.johndclare.net/EC9.htm
From: http://www.johndclare.net/EC9.htm
From: Jeremy Isaacs, Cold War, published in,1998
Interpretation D, From: Tony Judt, Post war, A History of Europe Since 1945, published in 2005.
Interpretation D, From: Tony Judt, Post war, A History of Europe Since 1945, published in 2005.
From: Martin McCauley, Origins of the Cold War1941 – 1949 Third Edition, published in 2003.
Interpretation B, From: Martin McCauley, Origins of the Cold, published in 1983.
Interpretation B, From: Martin McCauley, Origins of the Cold, published in 1983.
Interpretation A: From: Michael Balfour, The Adversaries, published in 1981.
Interpretation A: From: Michael Balfour, The Adversaries, published in 1981.
Interpretation A: From: Michael Balfour, The Adversaries, published in 1981.
Interpretation A: From: Michael Balfour, The Adversaries, published in 1981.
Interpretation B: From: Martin McCauley, The Origins of the Cold War, published in 1983.
Interpretation C: From: J. L. Gaddis, The Cold War, published in 2003.