The policy itself relied upon the notion that the existing territorial disputes in Europe could be met without resorting to even the threat of violence. Most significantly this applied to the claims of Nazi German for Austria and areas of the Czechoslovakia which contained the Sudeten Germans. The belief of the general populous of Britain was that these Germans deserved the self-determination they were claiming and so the Anschluss was widely accepted however the issue became more heated when concerning the Germans of the Sudetenlands. The policy began to gain much criticism from powerful members of the Commons such as Churchill who saw the concessions given to Germany in order to avoid war as simply giving in to the aggression of Hitler’s brutal regime. “All that the ‘intense exertions of the Prime Minister’ had been able to secure was that the ‘German dictator, instead of snatching the victuals from the table, had been content to have them served to him course by course’”2 This was however not a commonly held view by either of the Houses of Parliament and even the impassioned speech from which this quote came from, only managed to maintain the 30 abstains upon the Conservative bench.
The First World War must be seen to be one the defining factors in the nature of the policy as for the first time Britain was able to witness the massive destruction of modern warfare. This was something they were understandably keen to avoid leading to a new ideology emerging upon the ideas of self-determination and defensive foreign policies. Britain however was not alone in its belief that war should be avoided as much as possible as stated by the French politician Phipps “All that is best in France is against war, almost at any price”3. It was this common belief in avoiding war which was to lead to the policy of appeasement being stigmatised with shifting of blame and responsibility between the great states of Europe, as each country sought to cite its non aggressive foreign policy as a means of removing its responsibility to the Czechoslovakian state.
It was generally felt that the German military was both larger and more advanced on the ground and in the air than the other two European powers; Britain and France. This was however incorrect at the time of the Munich conference but with neither power committing to a large re-armament programme for the fear of it seeming hypocritical in the face of solving the dispute through diplomacy, the German army was soon almost as powerful as the both of them put together. The main problem was the over exaggeration by the British in an attempt to err on the side of caution, a discussed by Boxer in "Appeasement". Although in August 1938 German fighters and bombers numbered 2 007 in total with only 1 194 “combat ready”, the British estimate of German forces was 2 292 total virtually all thought to be combat ready. Most important was the massive over estimation of over the number of combat ready bombers because of the British public’s belief, and indeed the politicians’, belief that, as Baldwin exclaimed “The bomber will always get through”. This fear again seemed to confirm the British politicians belief that appeasement was the only option.
There was also a common belief that appeasement would allow the British army to re-arm itself against the might of the German army so that when the unavoidable did happen Britain would be in a better place to defend itself. Indeed polls from 1938-1939 show almost half the British public supporting the policy for exactly this reason, although again this was a misconception, as in Sept 1938 the German air strength numbered 2 847 with 1 669 immediate reserves and France and Britain had between them 3 436 with 1 642 immediate reserves. Had the British public and politicians known this, would they have preferred a more assertive foreign policy?
By Sept 1939 however Germany had increased its force to 3 609 first-line strength aircraft and 2 893 immediate reserves while Britain and France had, between them, 3 703 first-line strength and 1 600 immediate reserves, with much of its force out dated 3 800 out dated reserves.
This would obviously lead to the conclusion that Britain was in a better position to fight Germany in 1938 than in ’39, something contradictory to public opinion of the time. Because of this neither the British nor French governments made any real attempt to threaten Hitler with the consequences of non-compliance and he was therefore able to use their appeasement as a means of continuing his path to European dominance.
It is now known that Hitler was in very close contact with Henlein, the Sudeten leader, and the orders he gave him to negotiate with the Czechoslovakian government while continuing to “demand so much that we can never be satisfied”4 were to contribute to the lack of compromise between the government and Sudetens. Because of this lack of compromise the British government was faced with two clear choices; either simply give Hitler what he wanted in the hope that this would end his territorial disputes or give him a definite threat that if he stepped out of line there would be a coalition to oppose him and protect the Czech state. There were many factors in their decision to opt for the first approach however this is not to say that this was the only reasonable approach by a long way. Firstly there was a general feeling towards Czechoslovakia amongst the cabinet that, as A.J.P. Taylor explains “Despite appearances, she was a state of nationalities, not a national state”5. This unwillingness to fully recognise the legitimacy of the Czech state, along with their dislike of the Czech nationals led them to the conclusion that the Czech boarder, as set out by the Versailles settlement, was not worth defending with any great passion, something that went against the great principles of 19th century diplomacy set out by Metterninch and the Congress of Vienna. Indeed had a war been fought in 1939 and Britain had been victorious, the Czech state would probably have been broken up anyhow and therefore there was a common belief that it was not worth risking lives to defend the borders. Czechoslovakia was also quite away from Britain’s sphere of power and therefore there was an understanding that in providing proper protection they would probably trigger another full scale European war, something both governments were keen to avoid, especially as the matter seemed so far away from Britain’s interest. This is particularly well illustrated by Chamberlain’s statement in August ’38: “Its unimaginable that we should be making preparations for war about a far away people of whom we know nothing”.
Had the British and French government understood fully the threat of Germany from this non-intervention It is not unreasonable to assume they would carried out a different foreign policy and the French made clear their intentions from the start to honour their alliance with the Czech state and Britain theirs with France. This however was not the case and the governments sought instead to keep peace in Europe by making friends with Hitler as Chamberlain and his colleges went on numerous trips to Germany to try and bring about a compromise that would please the Sudeten Germans, Germany and the Czech state. Towards the end of the diplomatic discussions statesman Sir Horace Wilson was sent to Hitler with a two fold message, firstly that Chamberlain felt a commission of Germans, Czechs and a British representative should be set up to best work out the logistics of transferring the Czech territory over to Germany. Secondly, there was a warning that if Hitler attempted to take the territories by force, and France chose to honour its commitment to the Czech state, then Britain would act on the side of the French and oppose Germany. Here for the first time Britain was prepared to back up their agreements with a threat of force if they were disobeyed. This was always the other option going on the understanding that the Sudeten Germans had viable claims to be part of the German state. Strangely this part of the message was not conveyed to Hitler as Wilson felt that Hitler was not in a state to receive it after an heated speech from Hitler claiming he would soon "have Czechoslovakia where I want her"5. Instead he decided to meet again with the Führer the next morning. Here again was a case of Britain failing to do what was necessary in the face of Hitler's aggression.
This threat towards Hitler would however still have constituted appeasement and so it cannot be really considered another option but instead a different approach. The only other real different approach was collective security through the League of Nations. This was something strongly supported by certain members of the cabinet who felt the successes of the League of Nations in dealing with the disputes between Finland and Sweden and Germany and Poland in the early 1920's was proof of the effectiveness of the League. These problems were however largely dealt with because of the pressure separately applied by the member states of the league on the disputing countries and not by the League's mandates themselves and the failure of the League to solve the disputes of Abyssinia and Manchuria seemed to highlight weaknesses in the theory of collective security. In both cases the League failed to take appropriate action, only calling for a "moral sanction" against Japan for its invasion of Manchuria. Although it did impose economic sanctions against Italy after it's invasion of Abyssinia including arms sales, it also imposed arms bans against Abyssinia weakening it severely. In 1935 an agreement was then signed allowing Mussolini most of Abyssinia. Those in favour of the policy of appeasement cited the inactivity of the League in dealing with these disputes as clear signals that Britain would have to solve the problems of the Nazi state through its own diplomatic means. The league was most harshly effected by it's lack of a coalition army to back up its mandates and without the force of the Americans behind them both Mussolini and Hitler effectively chose to ignore them.
In light of this it would appear that by 1938 Appeasement really was the only option in the face of a crippling World War to protect a state and people of whom the British policy makers appeared to care little. Had there not been a massive public support for the avoidance of war and had some politicians not actually admired Hitler for his ruthless destruction of the "Red menace" then perhaps Britain would have carried out this policy with a different manner but as it was they seemed, in general, more than happy to give Hitler what he wanted, when he wanted, a fatal mistake if ever there was one.
Bibliography
www.rpfuller.com/history/4.html
Appeasement in Action British foreign policy 1931-37 pgs24-45
Churchill R.Jenkins pgs524-529
Chamberlain and Appeasement R.A.C Parker pgs156-181
Europe; Grandeur and Decline A.J.P Taylor pgs238-285
The origins of the Second World War A.J.P Taylor pgs191-233
Churchill R.Jenkins pg 526
2 Churchill R.Jenkins pg 527
3 Chamberlian and Appeasement R.A.C Parker pg172
4 The origins of the Second World War A.J.P Taylor pg 192
5 The origins of the Second World War A.J.P Taylor pg 190
5 Chamberlain and Appeasement R.A.C Parker pg176