On the other hand, the GMD was widely perceived as corrupt. By the time of the end of World War II, it had been in power for 10 years with no results to show for it. It had alienated its support base, middle-class businessmen, in the years leading up to the Second World War with its attempt at nationalising banks and raising taxes. Its unpopularity meant regular draft-dodging and desertion, and Chiang responded by conscripting by force – draft-dodgers would have their property taken away from them, for example. The economic recession caused by the invasion also negatively affected the GMD’s reputation, as it tried to solve the problem by printing more bank notes. However, this instead led to a devaluation of the currency and massive inflation, causing more resentment against the GMD. All this led to low morale in his army, as his men ended up fighting for something they did not like, which naturally led to lower effectiveness on the battlefield. When compared against such numerous forces with as high morale as Mao’s, GMD loss was perhaps inevitable.
The Japanese invasion widened the gap between the amount of supporters for the CCP and the GMD. When the Japanese invaded, the Communists were strategically positioned close to their frontlines, and actively fought against the Japanese, earning the respect of the people. In contrast, the GMD refused to fight, even giving up the valuable territory of Manchuria without resistance. Chiang thought he could negotiate with the Japanese; however, his non-aggressive tactics massively hampered the people’s faith in the party and caused factions within the party. This disunity would only feed Chiang’s paranoia and lack of trust in his officers when civil war finally broke out. Chiang’s original tactic of non-aggression was changed only due to the Xian Incident in 1936, where his right-hand man, leader of Manchuria Zhang Xue-liang, worked with the CCP and kidnapped him out of desperation. Although Chiang was never in real danger at any time, this incident left a large impression on him and his already low trust in his officers was shattered. He would promote only the loyal, regardless of skill, and would supply only the regiments who he saw as having no threat to his position. This meant that many soldiers were under-equipped, which affected their morale and fighting ability adversely. There was no shortage of weapons either. Many stories describe Chiang instructing soldiers to guard warehouses of weapons without actually allowing soldiers access to them. Upon defeat, those weapons were relinquished to the enemy. Although these stories were during World War II, it is an example of Chiang’s insecurity and unwillingness to trust his subordinates, something that persisted in the Civil War, leading to GMD defeat.
World War II also had many other far-reaching consequences for the GMD. The Nationalist Army fought the brunt of the scripted battles with the Japanese, such as the Ichigo Offensive, while the CCP focused mostly on guerrilla fighting. This led to the total decimation of the Nationalist Army in World War II, and its already forcibly conscripted men were made even more war-weary. Many high-ranked officers of the Nationalist Army were also killed in action, leaving inexperienced soldiers to take their place. Therefore, it can be said that the Japanese invasion weakened Chiang’s army, but did not affect Mao’s army, as the constant stream of peasant supporters made replenishing the ranks of the Red Army a simple task.
Furthermore, when the Americans entered the war, Chiang believed that they would set up bases in China from which they would attack the Japanese. He would then be able to use these forces to mop up the remaining Red Army fragments. However, that did not happen, and instead the war ended via the nuclear bomb. This was a massive military and political blow to Chiang for two reasons. The obvious one was that he would not obtain his reinforcements. Also, since his government was based in Chongqing, in south China, while the Japanese had surrendered in the north, this meant the Nationalist Army was unable to liberate freed villages as quickly as the north-based Red Army. Therefore, the Red Army could gain more supporters and an even better reputation. This also meant that Chiang had to travel to north China to accept the surrender. The fact that he had to travel at all reflected poorly on him and his party as if he were the rightful leader of China, he would actually have been there, fighting off the Japanese. This led to many people turning to support the CCP, simply because it was the only alternative. Again, the loss of popular support was probably the most decisive blow for the GMD – without a base of supporters, there would be no funding, and more importantly, no justification for the common soldier to fight for the Nationalist Army.
All this led to the Red Army quickly gaining domination over the Nationalist Army in the Civil War. Although Nationalist troops possessed superior equipment (when supplied) and outnumbered Red Army troops 4-to-1, the constant zeal and superior strategy of the Red Army led to the eventual defeat of the Nationalists in decisive battles in Mukden, Hsuchow and Beijing. In all of these battles, Chiang was notorious for making poor strategic decisions – in one battle, he even exposed his troops to an attack on three fronts. Mao on the other hand was happy to let his highly-qualified general Lin Biao command the attack and drive the Nationalists back. Therefore, one can conclude that Chiang’s continued unwillingness to trust his officers, coupled with his military ineptitude, was the final nail in the coffin for the GMD.
In summary, World War II and the Japanese invasion had the effect of promoting the CCP over the GMD. The failures of the GMD only drove their supporters away, while the CCP, as the alternative party, reeled them in. The very peasant support base that the GMD never bothered to obtain would help the CCP win the civil war and contribute strongly to the GMD’s loss.
