However, as historians have investigated the workings of the Nazi state many have come to revise their view of Hitler. It is argued that there were significant limits to Hitler’s power and that for a long period he had to exert power pragmatically. For example, over the Jewish issue, there was a distinct lack of radical legislation against Jews. This was largely because Hitler feared the response of the international community. This consideration was best illustrated on the boycott of 1933 that was limited to just one day because of this concern. Hitler also had to take caution over the economy and had to follow the conservative policies of Schacht, even though Hitler wanted greater emphasis on putting Germany on a war footing. However, this is not the most convincing argument to claim that Hitler was a weak dictator because these limitations only applied for a short period and Hitler ultimately overcame them.
A far more persuasive and important argument to support the claim that Hitler was a weak dictator is that once the Nazis were firmly established in government historians find little evidence to suggest that Hitler dictated the details of government or closely directed the implementation of policy. On the contrary, there is much to suggest that his lifestyle and work habits became much too casual and erratic for him to do so effectively. The best description of Hitler’s rather lethargic working day is supplied by one of Hitler’s adjutants Fritz Weidemann, who commented “Hitler normally appeared shortly before lunch.” Indeed Hitler’s laziness seemed to make him totally disinterested in government. He certainly did not like the administration of government and on many spheres of policy he was not properly informed as Weidemann illustrated when he remarked that Hitler “disliked the study of documents.” This meant that when Hitler did make decisions it was possible that he could have been manipulated by one of his subordinates, like Lammers, as Hitler rarely took the time to investigate and study issues. Furthermore, Hitler aloof stance also transcended into the process of decision making. This was illustrated in a reported discussion between Lammers and the Lord Mayor of Hamburg when it was reported that Hitler “found it difficult to make decisions about personnel.” One of the best examples of Hitler wriggling out of the formulation of decisions was after the Nuremberg Laws over the issue of what constituted a Jew. On two occasions Hitler was meant to deliver in speeches his opinion but on both opportunities he disappointed government officials. With little direction from Hitler many in government were left to make decisions by second guessing Hitler and taking decisions on their own initiative. Therefore, it is contested that Hitler was hardly a strong dictator as he was rarely involved in the process of government.
It is also claimed that without coherent orders from Hitler the political order in Nazi Germany degenerated into near anarchy with rival state and party institutions competing for areas of authority in the political sphere. An example of the confusion between the state and political institutions were shown by the conflicts between Minister of Education, Robert Ley and the newly created Nazi Youth Leader, von Schirach. The disorder was increased further by the creation of so-called ‘Superministers’, like Goring, who interfered and infringed on a number of areas of authority that had already been reserved by other ministries. It is argued by a number of ‘structuralist’ historians, like Mommsen, that Hitler’s ineptitude and lack of leadership allowed such anarchy to prevail. Such arguments about Hitler’s leadership lead logically to the conclusion that the Reich suffered a crisis of leadership caused by Hitler being a weak dictator.
In response a number of so-called ‘intentionalist’ historians have argued that the chaos created in the political structure was not a sign of weakness on Hitler’s part but a deliberate policy by him. For some Hitler did not interfere and allowed this disorder to exist in the political system because of his deep believe in the virtues of Social Darwinism. They claim that with rival institutions in conflict they would accept only the best ideas and policies. Another claim is that it was a deliberate Machiavellian tactic by Hitler to safeguard and even increase his power. This so-called ‘divide and rule’ strategy is claimed to have limited all Hitler’s subordinates’ power as their work was always being checked and challenged by other subordinates. Furthermore, with rival subordinates in constant battle they would only get their plans adopted by getting the personal approval of Hitler and hence increasing the power of Hitler, as he was the final and ultimate arbitrator. Finally it is advocated that Hitler did not like to interfere in the political arena to preserve his prestige. By being detached from policy making, Hitler could not be blamed or lambasted for any unpopular policies. Therefore, it is argued by these structuralist historians that the political chaos does not show Hitler as weak but in contrast was a deliberate ploy by him.
However, the debate on whether Hitler was a strong dictator should not hinge on whether he created a chaotic political structure on purpose or not. A more compelling consideration is that no matter the cause of the chaos and the lack of personal interference from Hitler, policies and the tone of Nazi Germany still went generally in the direction prescribed by Hitler. In Mein Kampf and in various speeches Hitler had expressed his general aims and goals for Nazi Germany, and once in power it was left to others to interpret the implementation of these objectives. As Ian Kershaw argues Hitler undoubtedly had weaknesses but his subordinates still ‘worked to the will of the Fuhrer.’ The fact that Hitler did not have to get too involved in the political arena showed his strength as loyal subordinates worked feverishly to interpret his general premises and formulate policies to match them. Furthermore, when Hitler did get involved his will was accepted. For example, he was able to over-rule the highly successful Schacht, the Economics Minister over the issue of the direction of the economy of the economy after 1936. Prior to 1936, Schacht had been virtually autonomous in the formulation of Germany’s economic policies. However, when Hitler decided that the economy needed to prioritise rearmament, Schacht’s protests were ignored. Another example were Hitler’s orders to invade Poland even though Goring, who had up to this point been largely responsible for Nazi foreign policy, opposed such a move.
