Also Kennedy at the time did not want to look soft on communism after his failed attempt at overthrowing Castro in the Bay of Pigs.
However from the Soviet’s point of view, General Anatoly Gribkov (chief of missile operations, Cuba) said ‘America deployed its missiles without any qualms. They placed their Jupiter missiles in Turkey, in Italy and the federal Republic of Germany. They could do it, so why couldn’t we do it to defend the Cuban revolution and the Soviet Union.’ (Timewatch - Missile Crisis)
Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko responding to American accusations of offensive materials in their ‘sphere of influence’ retorted that there were ’No offensive materials - only defensive’. (Timewatch - Missile Crisis)
Evaluation of sources
The two sources I have selected for evaluation are a Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on 18 October 1962 meeting with President Kennedy and a book written on Kennedy’s decisions in the Cuban missile crisis.
The first is a primary source in the form of a cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko written on 20th October 1962. The source is a declassified cable about Gromyko’s meeting with President Kennedy. The source justifies the Soviets decision to put missiles in Cuba.
The purpose of the source is to illustrate the Soviet’s position on the Cuban issue and to give a Soviet assessment of the actions taken by the USA.
It goes on to further mention that ‘the Soviet government stands for the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, against the interference of one state into the internal affairs of others, against the intervention of large states into the affairs of small countries.’ The Soviet Union’s foreign policy is being repeated here to justify its action of defending Cuba from American interference.
We can tell that this source is reliable and accurate because it is a cable from the Soviet Foreign Minister giving an exact account of the meeting. The fact that the cable was written two days after the meeting tells us that the Soviet Foreign Minister must have written facts as it happened. The source gives us events as it happened, having the advantage of time and retrospect.
The limitations of this source is that because it has been written by the Soviet foreign minister, some of the facts might not be entirely true as the Soviets were trying to defend their foreign policy in Cuba. Since the source is a private Soviet document, the facts could easily be biased towards the Soviet Union.
The second source is secondary and gives a view of Kennedy’s role in the missile crisis after more than 40 years since the incident. The source thinks that the Soviets were not justified in placing missiles in Cuba.
The purpose of the source is to distance itself from the personal views of Kennedy in the crisis (in the 1960’s Kennedy was commended on his handling of the situation but in the 1970’s and 80’s he is seen as reckless and dangerous) and talks about the crisis in its historical context. The author claims that the president had a ‘remarkably open view of the Russians’ and that the Soviet leader Khrishchev was unpredictable and was at fault for almost starting a nuclear war. The source praises Kennedy’s handling of the cuban missile crisis.
The value of the source is that because it was written so many years after the crisis, it gives an argument on the Cuban missile crisis looking back through time. At the time of the crisis, sources from the US and the USSR would be written to make their own side look as if they came out a winner but this sources looks past all the biases and sees things in a historical sense.
The limitations are that some information would not be accurate because it was written so many years later. The source would have to rely on other primary souces to get most facts therefore making it unreliable.
Analysis
The Cuban missile crisis became one of the tensest episodes in cold war history. It was the first time relations were pushed all the way to the brink, causing each side to decide carefully what to do. With the fear of a nuclear war, one must ask the question why Khrushchev did something this dangerous. Khrushchev knew the risks and dangers of putting missiles in Cuba and didn’t even attempt to conceal the missiles in Cuba. It was as if he wanted the US to know what his plans with the missiles were. There are many reasons to why Khrushchev probably did something so risky. Khrushchev saw Cuba as a communist country geographically close to the US and decided to help Castro against US influence. The missiles, Khrushchev claimed were merely there to scare the US away from attacking Cuba. In addition, Khrushchev saw the missiles as a bargaining means, by which he would be able to get concessions in return for removing the missiles.
Khrushchev wanted Kennedy to make the first move. He wanted to see what Kennedy would do in a tense situation like this.
The initial American response to the situation was disbelief over the danger Khrushchev had initiated. It was heard at an Excom meeting - ‘I must say I don’t really see the rationality of the soviets pushing it this far unless they grossly misunderstand the importance of Cuba to this country.’ (Timewatch - Missile Crisis)
It was clear however that the US government would not tolerate soviet missiles in Cuba and would do all they can to remove it. Robert Kennedy states that the Soviets ‘should understand that if they did not remove those bases, we would remove them.’ (Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis).
The Soviets too were in a difficult position as what to do next. Khrushchev was quoted as saying "I found myself in the difficult position of having to decide on a course of action which would answer the American threat but which would also avoid war. Any fool can start a war, and once he's done so, even the wisest of men are helpless to stop it-- especially if it’s a nuclear war." (Khrushchev Remembers)
The missiles in Cuba had a major impact on the cold war. It was a very precarious decision by the Soviets who even thought it would lead to war. The missiles more importantly had a global implication. Not only would the US be at risk but the entire world would be in danger if a nuclear weapon exploded.
Cuba was at risk, if the Americans attacked and were ready to fight back. The American threat to Cuba caused more superpower confrontation which could have lead to a nuclear war capable of causing total devastation. ‘The slightest spark or false move by either side could have triggered a nuclear catastrophe’ said General Anatoly Gribkov, chief of missile operations in Cuba (Timewatch - Missile Crisis)
Furthermore the entire course of the cold war was changed after the crisis. After reaching such a high point in conflict, the sides agreed to many things including a test ban treaty causing a period of détente and co-operation.
Conclusion
The Cuban missile crisis was handled well by both sides. Khrushchev realizing the dangers of war was too great, turned back his ships avoiding nuclear disaster. ‘We were eyeball to eyeball and the other side blinked’ – Dean Rusk US Secretary of State. (Timewatch - Missile Crisis)
Deals between the two countries were made and Missiles in Cuba were to be exchanged with missiles in turkey and the US could never invade Cuba.
The Cuban missile crisis opened up communication between the two sides. Both superpowers realized they had come so close to nuclear war because of lack of communication. Therefore a hotline to the Kremlin and the white house was put to further improve relations.
However Khrushchev being the one to back down was seen as weak and therefore lost his position in the Soviet Union.
Khrushchev’s strategy was very risky and almost caused a nuclear war, but many historians differ as to whether or not he was justified in placing missiles in Cuba.
Word count -1,821
List of sources
Bennet, Jeremy. Timewatch - Missile Crisis. BBC TV Production.
Cable of Andrei Gromyko’s meeting with President Kennedy. Obtained by NHK. Provided to Cold War International History Project. National Security Archive. Washington, D.C..Translation by Vladimir Zaemsky.
CNN Productions. 1998. Cold War – Volume 4. Warner Home Video. California
Kennedy, Robert. 1969. Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New American Library. New York
Khrushchev, Nikita. 1970. Khrushchev Remembers. Little Brown & Company. Boston
Lowe, Norman. 1988. Mastering Modern World History. Macmillan Master Series. London.
Walsh, Ben. 1996. Gcse modern world history. John Murray. London.
Weisbrot, Maximum Danger: Kennedy, the Missiles, and the Crisis of American Confidence. Ivan R. Dee Publisher. Chicago