Five months after the SALT agreement was signed, the USSR was given ‘Most Favoured Nation’ status by the US and trade offices were opened in Moscow and Washington, thereby establishing a trade deal between the superpowers and further developing the détente. Only three months after that (January 1973), influenced by the ruthless ‘Christmas bombing’ campaign by the US, a Vietnam peace settlement was signed in Paris and the last American troops were withdrawn from Vietnam, meaning that another source of US – Soviet confrontation had been overcome. In June 1973, Brezhnev and Nixon signed an agreement on the prevention of nuclear war and it can be said that this was the high point of détente, as from this point on détente would be plagued by crises, leading ultimately to its failure.
Domestically, both sides reaped the awards of their efforts between 1971 and 1973. After being able to declare that peace was at hand in Vietnam (an issue which had so troubled the U.S.) and aided by the warming of the American people to the prospect of the Cold War coming to an end Nixon won a landslide election in 1972 (Cohen, 1993). On the Soviet side, the ruling class of the nation were pleased that the U.S. had recognised strategic equality between the superpowers, that little had been sacrificed in the efforts and that the trade agreement would bring economic gains (Cohen, 1993). Generally, the development of détente was brining new hope for a better world, as “Around the world there was a perception of a new and less dangerous era dawning” (Cohen, 1993, p.191).
The first challenge to détente came with the October 1973 war in the Middle East with the Soviet-allied Egypt attacking the U.S. - allied Israel and by doing this, dragging the superpowers into unwanted confrontation. Both sides supported their allies with air-lifts to supply them with more weapons and then managed to work out the terms for a cease-fire. The highest point of superpower tension came after this though, as Israel made advances, the cease-fire broke down and Brezhnev issued a warning to Nixon that they would intervene. The U.S. reaction was to put their troops on high alert, warning Moscow not to intervene, and put pressure on Israel to comply with the cease-fire. A direct confrontation was thus avoided but “neither side was satisfied with the actions of the other” (Cohen, 1993, p.195). The Americans were disappointed about what they saw as an obvious Soviet attempt at trying to weaken the American position in the Middle East and the Soviets were frustrated by the outcome of the war and the way in which the US had forced them to back down (Cohen, 1993). Furthermore, one could say that the war showed the limits to which the superpowers could control the development of détente, as their links to other countries meant that any confrontation between those would lead to at least an indirect confrontation and cause tension.
Following the war, Henry Kissinger’s ‘shuttle diplomacy’, which effectively lead to a confirmation of the cease-fire after Months of talks and numerous visits to the Middle East, resulted in the sidelining of Soviet influence in the Middle East and to another major setback to détente. It showed that the U.S. had no intention of giving the Soviets a major role in the Middle East, even if they may have conceded strategic parity to them (Cohen, 1993). The Soviets felt their equality was being undermined by America’s actions and that the Americans were exploiting the situation to gain power in the area and since equality was one of the main things Brezhnev wanted to get out of détente, this was very disappointing for the Soviets (Kent and Young, 2004). On the other side the American public, influenced by the fact that their government had publicly exaggerated the Soviet threat to get Israel to comply with the ceasefire, believed the Soviets had treated them badly and weren’t playing their part in détente, despite the fact that they had shown restraint throughout the war and had been involved in finding terms for a ceasefire (Kent and Young, 2004).
Domestic issues in America during this period also played a large role in the failure of détente. The Watergate affair led to a loss of power of the President and Congress reasserting itself as a major player in the U.S. foreign policy after the Nixon - Kissinger years of what many saw as an “Imperial Presidency” (Cohen, 1993, p.196). This lead to President Ford having to accept the Jackson - Vanik amendment which made the trade deal with the U.S.S.R dependant on human rights issues. The Soviet reaction was to scrap the deal as they viewed it as interference in their domestic issues and in doing so terminated one of the main parts of the positive developments which had been made between 1971 and 1973. Congress also played a part in the outcome of the Angolan war of 1975-76, in which both superpowers again supported different sides. With the economic problems America faced and the unwillingness to send American troops into yet another conflict (the mess in Vietnam still in the back of many a politicians head), Congress refused to meet Kissinger request for more money for the conflict, resulting in further involvement by the Soviets and eventually a victory on their side (Cohen, 1993).
The interpretation of what ‘détente’ actually meant were viewed differently on both sides and this was a major problem too. To Brezhnev, détente meant reaching an equal status with the U.S., retaining their Eastern European stronghold and coming to agreements on trade and SALT, whilst at the same time pursuing the ‘national liberation’ of less developed countries, i.e. supporting communist revolutions in the less developed world (Kent and Young, 2004). The American view differed; they widely believed détente included that the Soviets accept the existing world as it is, especially the less developed countries and to many (particularly conservative) politicians in America, the Angolan war was another sign of Soviets not being interested in détente. Clearly, with such a different interpretation of the situation it is very hard to see how détente could ever develop at all.
By 1976, the word détente had become so unpopular in America that President Ford prohibited his election team from using it (Kent and Young, 2004). As this shows, anti-détente sentiments were high in the U.S., with politicians doubting that American interests were being represented by persevering with it and the American people showing their opposition to it by voting Ford out in the election and replacing him with President Carter.
President Carter, who won the election that year, believed in a more idealistic approach to foreign policy, focusing on human rights and as seen before, the Soviets saw this as interfering with their domestic issues. Also under Carter, the SALT 2 negotiations, probably the only sign of any détente left at all by 1979 stalled following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, were suspended. The ‘Carter Doctrine’ which followed showed the U.S. reverting back to a confrontational stance in the Cold War and in effect, with both sides now not showing any commitment to a relaxation in tensions, this was the confirmation of détente’s failure.
Bibliography
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Cohen, W.I. ed. (1993), The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations, Volume Four, America in the Age of Soviet Power, 1945 – 1991, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
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Froman, M.B. (1991) The Development of the Détente, Coming to Terms, London, Macmillan Academic and Professional LTD
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Kent, J. and Young, J.W. (2004) International Relations Since 1945, Oxford, Oxford University Press
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(Oxford English Dictionary online)
