Austria-Hungary was worried about the possible dissolution of its empire. It desired to crush Slav nationalism, the main factor of instability. Austria – Hungary wanted the preventive war to survive at all as a multi-national state. The assassination of Archduke Ferdinand at Sarajevo on 28th of June 1914 by a Serb nationalist Gawrilo Princip from “Black Hand” terrorist organization revived the Balkan question and enabled Austria-Hungary to reappear misleadingly as a Great Power. It is argued that Austria-Hungary did not need Germany to provoke her into an aggressive response to Serbia. Austria-Hungary played its own part in driving the crisis to escalation. When the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia, some points of which would not only give Austria-Hungary power over Serbia, but also be incompatible with Serbia's dignity as a sovereign state, was rejected, it was hardly a surprise to those involved in its construction. Austria-Hungary was unwilling to consider a compromise and declared war on Serbia on 28 July. The Austro-Hungarian government chose to risk a punitive strike against Serbia to stabilize the crumbling empire; it should know well that this would probably mean European war. Although Austrians could have hoped for Russian neutrality, they ought to have realized how humiliating would it be for her to stand aside and to look how her Slavic brothers of orthodox faith are suffering oppression. As the problem of nationalities had not been solved by the government of Vienna within the framework of the Dual Monarchy it became a problem of European importance.
Russia was concerned about a loss of face after several diplomatic and military defeats (war against Japan in 1904-5, Bosnian crisis in 1908). The Russian government was also worried about domestic instability (revolutionary activity, worker unrest). The Tsar hoped to score a foreign policy success that would divert attention of society away from domestic problems. Russia was vitally interested in controlling the Dardanelles. Pan-Slavism and the feeling of an inevitable clash with the Germanic race also played a role in making war acceptable to St. Petersburg. The Russians must have felt that their prestige as leader of the Slavs would suffer if they again failed to support Serbia.
The French had a feeling of humiliation by Germany in Franko-Prussian War and
hoped to win back Alsace-Lorraine, realizing that this would not be possible without a major war, but except for their strong desire of being assured by British government that Great Britain would not stand by in case of German aggression on her French ally, their attitude in July 1914 is agreed by most of the historians to be rather defensive.
Britain in particular identified her strength and future with the colonial empire, which seemed to be threatened deliberately by Germany and her new fleet. Although, according to words by Winston Churchill, it would take Germany some time to overtake Britain as far as capital ships were concerned, Admiral Sir John Fischer, First Sea Lord at the British Admiralty from 1903 to 1910 suggested to King Edward that war, since it was bound to come, might have better come while Britain still holds the superiority in the naval race. Great Britain was especially concerned about the threat of German competition and her declining share of world trade. English businessmen resented the lost of trade to German firms. Many historians point out that Germany was already well on the way to economic victory; one leading German industrialist remarked in 1913: “Give us three or four more years of peace and Germany would be the unchallenged economic master of Europe”. Britain would be therefore justified to undertake diplomatic actions leading to putting strains on German expansionist policy in order to protect her own predominance in the world, so that any movement of encircled Germany, even with a significance of a mere gesture in support of her Austro- Hungarian allies in military actions in the Balkans, must have ended with war waged against her two greatest neighbours: Russia and France. By isolating Germany and sending inconsistent signals, Britain was also at least partially responsible for wrong conclusions, relating to a probable scale of European conflict that was to break out, of the German leaders.
In 1961 a German historian, Fritz Fischer in his book “German Aims in the First World War” argued that Germany had to bear the main responsibility for the outbreak of the war. Fischer's main theses were: 1) that the German government under the Kaiser's direction deemed a European war inevitable, prepared for war, and decided to seize the next opportunity to start it. Fischer points out the expansive aims of the industry and Junkers; 2) that the German government and general staff precipitated an escalation of the Austro-Serb crisis in order to launch what they considered a preventive strike against Russia and France.
Germany, after her failure in taking control over Morocco, might have come to feel that she could expand her overseas empire only after she had destroyed the European Balance of Powers.
In foreign politics, Germany was effectively isolated. Diplomatic means to counteract the encirclement of the country had proven counterproductive and seemed exhausted. Russia, moreover, was industrializing rapidly, its population grew at a pace that alarmed Germans, and their concern heightened when Russia, with French money, began to build strategic railways. Germans now feared that they could be crushed within a few weeks if France and Russia decided to wage a two-front war against their common antagonist. The German generals therefore advocated a "preventive war;" they accepted war as inevitable and believed the military situation to become increasingly unfavorable in the future. Certain circles of the German General Staff thought the chances of success for Germany were greater in 1914 than they would be in the succeeding years. Additionally, it’s worth remembering that it was Germany who rejected suggestion for a five-year halt in the arms increases made by Russia during the First Hague Conference in 1899 and suggestion for stabilizing naval armaments on existing levels made by Britain during the Second Hague Conference in 1907.
In domestic politics, governing had become more difficult for the Imperial Government because the Social Democrats had grown in strength (they had already been the greatest party in the Reichstag and they were demanding that the Kaiser give legislative power real influence on governing and a right to control the executive). German leaders had therefore considered war as a way of dealing with domestic tensions and as a mean to maintain political domination of privileged upper-classes; war should unite the people in a wave of nationalism and made them forget about political problems.
Elements in German nationalism such as racialism, aggressiveness and authoritarianism have been regarded as long-term trends in the Germanic outlook which make the Germans the most likely disturbers of European peace. In Germany, too much freedom from political control tended to be given to the military leadership because of the special esteem in which the army was held. There was an inflated emphasis on military values. German nationalists preached not only the inevitability but also the desirability of war as a mean to advance the cause of civilization by elimination of the “unfittest” nations and survival of the “fittest” (they believed in main principle of Darwin’s theory of evolution in its’ perverted form). In the words of general von Moltke ‘Germany’s preordained role in civilization’ could only be fulfilled ‘by way of war’ .
Fischer aruges that the Balkan crisis was the excuse that Germany was looking for. Berlin was at this time free to advise either peace or war; and without hesitation she assured Vienna of absolute and unconditional support. The Kaiser sent a telegram urging Austro-Hungarian government to attack Srebia and promising German help without any conditions attached.
This was like giving the Austrians a blank cheque to do whatever they wanted. Germany's insistence that Austria-Hungary strike immediately may have been the key reason for Austria-Hungary's retaliation.
After ordering general mobilization by Russia (29 July) the German government, under increasing pressure from the generals, on the 31st of July sent an ultimatum to St. Petersburg, demanding that mobilization be stopped. The Russian government did not bother to reply. This prompted the German declaration of war to Russia on 1st August. On 3rd August the Germans declared war on France.
One of the German war plans, known as the Schlieffen Plan, urged a fast knockout of the French army and then a turn to the eastern front. But to win quickly in the west the German armies needed to surround the French, which they could only do by marching through Belgium.
When the Germans entered Belgium, whose neutrality they had recognized (by the Treaty of London of 1839 both Britain and Prussia had promised to guarantee that) , Britain demanded a German withdrawal and, when that condition was not met, declared war on Germany on 4 August. War declarations followed between Russia, France, and Britain on the one side and Austria-Hungary on the other.
Through the violation of Belgian neutrality, however, the Schlieffen Plan, according to Gerhard Ritter and A.J.P Taylor, proved a diplomatic catastrophe and showed how extreme militaristic tendencies in the army expressed by reckless bringing this plan into life destroyed all the remaining possibilities of quick diplomatic action by the government The German General Staff, and in particular general von Moltke, claimed to have no plans alternative to that one, what was not true, accordingly to book “Inventing the Schlieffen Plan” by Terence Zuber; and insisted on full Schlieffen Plan instead of partial mobilization against Russia only, suggested by Wilhelm II.
In conclusion, it has to be said that at present time the majority of historians, together with Richard Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig, the editors of a collection of essays “The Origins of World War I” (2002), accept the opinion that ultimate responsibility for war rests with Germany and that her outbreak was deliberately provoked by German leaders. However, particularly in the light of aggressive Austro-Hungarian moves and misleading diplomacy of Great Britain it would be wrong to blame Germany alone. The more closely we study the origins of the war the more clearly the general truth emerges that no state was entirely free from blame. All had their national policies and ambitions which could not but clash fatally some day. For many of the states, to be sure, a European War might seem to hold out the possibility of achieving various desired advantages: for Serbia, the achievement of national unity for all Serbs; for Austria, the revival of her waning prestige as a Great Power, and the checking of nationalistic tendencies which threatened her very existence; for Russia, the accomplishment of her historic mission of the Slav leader; for France, the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine and the ending of the German menace; and for England, the destruction of the German naval and economical danger. Distrust between different European states was at a peak and ruling circles were dominated by the idea that war was inevitable. Each state government accused the other of aggressive intentions; each accepted the risk of a war and all of the states were not willing to abandon their conflicting interests.