Why did Britain become involved in a European War in 1914?

The naval race was intensified in 1906 when Britain launched a new superior vessel, HMS Dreadnought.  With significantly higher speed and weapon capacity, Germany was provoked to respond.  Within a few months she had created her own version of the ship; however, by 1909, due to increased public pressure stirred up by the Conservatives’ slogan ‘we want eight and we won’t wait’, Britain had a 60 per cent margin of naval superiority over Germany with a fleet of eight Dreadnoughts.

Perhaps a slightly more significant factor was the alliance systems being created by the French-Russian Alliance, the Entente Cordiale and the Anglo-Russian Entente, essentially the Triple Entente, which resulted in Germany being the eventual enemy.  Prior to 1904 Britain’s main concerns in Europe rested in struggles with France and Russia rather than any substantial German threat.  The Fashoda incident in which France was forced to concede the Nile to Britain after a prolonged six month argument was a clear sign of weak Anglo-French relations.  Russia also a posed a threat, not only to British rule in India, but also with her expansionist intensions in the Far East, demonstrated in the Boxer rebellion in 1900.  Russia also posed a threat to British trading interests in China.  These disputes, however, were eventually settled by the signing of various colonial agreements.  

Germany viewed the Entente Cordiale, signed with France in 1904, as a deliberate attack against German ambitions.  Apart from minor territorial agreements such as Siam becoming a buffer state between British Burma and French Indo-China, it was agreed that in return for British control in Egypt and the Nile Valley, France would have predominance in Morocco and in the event of the fall of the sultan Morocco would come under French rule.  Germany was particularly antagonised by this decision since it had been made without her consent or consultation.  Britain, however, argued that the Entente with France was not made to deliberately antagonise Germany but that there were more predominant motives.  The Russo-Japanese war was currently taking place in the Pacific, and with France being an ally of Russia and Britain of Japan, both the British and French were concerned that that the war may escalate into Europe.  They hoped to avoid this by settling other outstanding disputes by coming to some sort of understanding or agreement with each other.  The British also hoped that their present alliances with Japan and Russia may enable Britain to gain some sort of concession from France, given that Britain could choose to defend her ally Japan at any given time.  At the same time, Britain hoped that the French alliance with Russia would deter Russia from trying to destabilize British rule in India.  It can therefore be seen that the Entente Cordiale was not a deliberate direct attack against Germany, although, despite these ulterior motives, Germany still opposed the Entente and in protest, initiated the first Moroccan Crisis in 1905 which further worsened Anglo-German relations whiles strengthening the Anglo-French Entente.

In protest to the agreement of French predominance in Morocco, the Kaiser went to Tangier and publicly advocated the importance of the independence of the Sultan and how Germany was prepared to defend both her own interests and Moroccan interests in the event of a French take over or assault.  The Kaiser also demanded a conference be held to finally sort out the status of Morocco, thus completely undermining the status of the Entente Cordiale.  This took place the following year in Algeciras in Spain.  The conference was significant because it exposed Germany’s isolation in Europe.  All countries, with the exception of Austria-Hungary, supported France, and even the U.S.A and Italy who were supposed to be a member of the Triple Alliance, had supported French claims in Morocco.  For Germany the conference had had an adverse effect, instead of testing a weak, non-military Entente, with the intensions of splitting it up, it had encouraged military conversations to take place between Britain and France.  Although still, no military plans were cemented, the ideas were in the background, and this together with heightened isolation provoked Germany to make a distinct change in her foreign policy.

Without the support of Austria-Hungary, as the Algeciras Conference had confirmed, Germany would be completely isolated.  She therefore turned her foreign policy to concentrate on the maintenance of Austria as a significant power.  She aimed to prevent the Austro-Hungarian Empire from crumbling and to strengthen the bond between the two countries, for she could not afford to lose Austria-Hungary as an ally as she had done with Italy.

With both the consequences of the Algeciras conference and the launch of the dreadnought in 1906, tensions continued to rise between Britain and Germany.  It was not therefore surprising that minor colonial differences were finally put aside and Britain entered into an Entente with Russia in 1907.  Like the Entente Cordiale, there was no military commitment, and in respect of the German problem, the most the Entente provided for was to keep a check on German ambitions.  Similarly, Britain argued that Germany was not the sole reason for her signing the Anglo-Russian Entente but that she wished primarily to secure her position in the Far East and India.  Outraged by this new Triple Entente and knowing full well that it was not a military agreement; Germany wished to again test the strength of the alliance hoping to prove it sufficiently weak enough to be undermined by her own alliance with Austria-Hungary.  The opportunity to do this arrived in 1909 when a crisis developed in over Bosnia and Herzegovina.

In an agreement between Russia and Austria-Hungary, Bosnia and Herzegovina were to be controlled by Austria on the understanding that she would use her contacts with Constantinople to gain free Russian access to the straits in times of both peace and war.  Germany favoured this agreement as it meant the obvious maintenance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, however, Britain was not so enthusiastic as access to the Straits would enable Russia to advance more easily into the Nile Valley and eventually into India.  This lack of enthusiasm was within reason as Austria-Hungary took control of Bosnia and Herzegovina whilst Russia gained nothing.  Tensions escalated between the two countries, and on the brink of war, Germany volunteered to mobilize her army in support of Austria-Hungary as soon as the Russian army was mobilized.  Opposing both Austria-Hungary and Germany, with very limited French or British support, Russia was forced to back down.  Much to Germany’s delight her alliance with Austria-Hungary has proved far superior to that of the Anglo, French and Russian Entente, giving her a clear upper-hand in the situation.  She was able to benefit from this advantage in 1911 when a second Moroccan crisis arose in port Agadir and the town of Fez.

When an outbreak of local disorder arose in Fez, French troops were immediately sent to take control of the situation; however this was a breach of the agreement decided at the Algeciras Conference in 1906.  In protest, a German battleship arrived at Port Agadir expecting the French to instantly back down without support from Britain.  Britain, however, was adamant that Germany should not be permitted to exercise her power over France and allow expansion of the French Empire to take place pending her permission.  In these circumstances the balance of power in Europe would have substantially swung in Germany’s favour which was the antithesis of Britain’s foreign policy objective.

To Germany’s surprise, Britain announced her dedication to France and declared that she was prepared to go to war over the issue.  Germany demanded compensation, and it was only because of this announcement by the British that France came to realize the seriousness of the situation and granted compensation in the form of her territory in the Congo.  The crisis blew over on Germany’s acceptance of the Congo but it critically severed all remaining relations between Britain and Germany.

As it can be seen, the second Moroccan crisis was just one in a long line of events that collectively contributed to a consistent deterioration in Anglo-German relations.  Despite these, there was an attempt to repair the damage in the period of 1912-14.  Concerned with certain flaws in the Schlieffen Plan because of the improved Russian railway system and a revival in the Russian army, Germany was aware that she would not be capable of fighting a war on two fronts and was therefore willing to co-operate with Britain.

The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, soon put a stop to all co-operation on the Continent, however, and initiated a chain reaction of events that were to spiral out of control until the outbreak of war.  During the escalation of the July crisis it is doubtful that there was anything Britain could do to prevent war, however this did not mean that Britain should herself become involved.  Both the Entente Cordiale and the military discussions held after the Moroccan crises did not necessitate British support in the event of a war and it was therefore not a binding alliance that urged Britain to participate.  The Treaty of London, however, had guaranteed Belgium neutrality and the obvious violation of this would come when German troops invaded France.  Despite the terms of this treaty, it is still very unlikely that its violation would have been enough to necessitate British intervention.  

Although there had been a long standing build up of events which had collectively deteriorated all relations with Germany and an eventual war was a very real possibility, to gain a full insight into why Edward Grey was so insistent that Britain should join the war it is also necessary to consider British domestic politics at the time.  It can be argued that the Treaty of London was utilised only for the justification of the decision to go to war, and that the real deciding factor was the struggle to retain power from the Conservatives.  Letters written from the former Conservative leader, Bonar Law, and former Foreign Secretary, Lord Lansdowne, expressing their support for war were viewed as an attempt by the Conservatives to win power from the Liberals.  Aware of strong public opinion in favour of the war, Grey threatened to resign if he did not get the support he required from his Cabinet.  The resignation of Grey would have almost certainly guaranteed the resignation of Asquith resulting in either a coalition government or a new Conservative government; party political considerations were therefore enough to ensure Grey got support from the majority of his Cabinet.

Further domestic factors must also be taken into account when considering the reasons behind the final decision to enter the war.  ‘With Ireland in turmoil over Home Rule, Belfast seemed a greater threat to peace than Berlin’ and not only did the Government need a distraction from this and other domestic problems such as industrial strife and the militant campaign being pursued by the Suffragettes, but they were also concerned that a war in which they were not involved would result in a massive growth in either German or Russian power, both of which would lead to the erosion of Britain’s position of pre-eminence in the world.  Previously European rivalries in both India and china had occurred because of the collapse of existing power.  Britain viewed the collapse of Ottoman rule in the Balkans and the related threat of Slavic nationalism as direct competition to the balance of power.  

To say that Britain’s involvement in a general European war was inevitable would be unjust.  As we have seen, despite the strains caused from the collection of previous events, there were efforts and signs of improved Anglo-German relations in the final period leading up to the war.  The build up of events commencing with the refusal by Britain of Germany’s Continental League in 1898 would have certainly carved a well established rift between the two states, however, in retrospect, it is clear that it was not only a combination of the long standing poor relations with Germany that attracted Britain to war, but the final decision to enter was also highly dependent on domestic factors.  It can therefore be said that both long term international relations and short term domestic issues contributed significantly to Britain’s entrance into the First World War; if domestic circumstances had have been different then perhaps this would have had some bearing on the eventuality of war for Britain.  As it stood, the anti-German feeling that had been smouldering for years were finally surfaced and the war was to be fought and over by Christmas.    

Bibliography

Chamberlain, M, E, ‘Pax Britannica’?  British Foreign Policy 1789-1914, fifth edition 1999, (London: Longman)

Kennedy, P, The Realities Behind Diplomacy,1985, (London: Fontana Press)

Reynolds, D, Britannia Overruled, British Foreign Policy and World Power in the 20th Century, second edition 2000, (Essex: Pearson Education Ltd)

Robbins, K, The Eclipse of A Great Power, Great Britain, 1870-1992, second edition 1994, (Essex: Pearson Education Ltd)

Williamson, D, War and Peace: International Relations 1914-45, fourth edition 2004, (Bedford: Hodder & Stoughton)

Young, J, W, Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century, 1997, (London: Arnold)

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