With Mussolini’s help, Britain, France, Italy and Germany held a final meeting in Munich on 29th September to decide the fate of the Sudetenland. This was done without consulting the Czechs or Russia. The Munich Peace Agreement was eventually signed, and Chamberlain came back to Britain with the “Peace of Paper” which indicated the “desire [of Britain and Germany] never to go to war with one another again.” In the agreement, the whole of the Sudetenland had been handed to Hitler without conflict or any invasion. In Britain, this was seen as a huge triumph, and signing this agreement with an ordinary and sane head of state would indeed have been some kind of accomplishment.
However, this agreement meant nothing to Hitler – we are not sure if he even read it thoroughly before supposedly agreeing to its terms and signing it. A mere two days later, Hitler invaded the Sudetenland even though this was slightly unnecessary. Benes resigned, as Czechoslovakia had been completely betrayed.
At the time the agreement was signed, Britain was certainly not ready for a full-on war to settle a conflict between Czechoslovakia and Germany. Its economy was already suffering rather badly as a consequence of the First World War, and memories of it were still fresh in the public’s mind a mere nineteen years later. To the British people, the idea of going to war at this point would have been thoroughly unpopular, as no one particularly wanted to relive the horrors of the Great War.
Chamberlain’s advisors supported this idea, telling him that Britain would never win a war against Germany. Importantly, the USA too were completely against going to war. Although historians now believe that British intelligence reports about the state of the German armed forces were wholly exaggerated, the thought of going to war against a country equipped to such a superior extent must have been rather difficult for Chamberlain. In this way, one can see the factors which influenced Chamberlain to appease Hitler rather than confront him.
Nevertheless, the question of whether Chamberlain was justified in appeasing Hitler is a much harder one to answer accurately. Although the public in Britain were openly relieved that war had been averted, many people were starting to question the value of appeasement as a policy. Appeasement had merely delayed a war rather than precluding it. Utilising the policy encouraged Hitler, and showed him how Britain was prepared to back down if faced with a conflict. Chamberlain’s critics feel that if he, with Deladier, had faced up to Hitler from the start, Hitler would simply have backed off.
However, it is important to note that Chamberlain did not have the benefit of hindsight in 1938. Looking at the facts in retrospect gives us an immense advantage when it comes to making the right decision. At the time, no one was sure of what the outcome and results of the agreement at Munich would be. Churchill, who criticised appeasement but then went on to become Prime Minister when Chamberlain was proved wrong, was a relatively unimportant politician at the time. It was infinitely harder for Chamberlain to make the right decision then than it for historians to analyse the facts now, with the benefit of a great deal more knowledge.
Hence, I feel it is necessary to say that one cannot definitely say that Chamberlain was wrong to appease Hitler, nor can one blame him for the course of action he chose to take. Although it is easy to say now that Chamberlain was in no way justified to appease Hitler, Chamberlain and his advisors had come to the conclusion that war in 1938 had to be avoided at all costs. Chamberlain had no way of knowing that Hitler would invade the Sudetenland on the 1st of October that year. I believe that one cannot condone Chamberlain’s actions, but even though history has proved him to have been unsuccessful, one cannot say that he was in no way justified by attempting to appease Hitler.
