Parliament’s army at the beginning of the war was inefficient to an extent, largely because of the regional command both sides seemed to have adopted. Military and political advisers clashed and the result was a weak army, which wasn’t united in its aims and spirit. This showed as the Royalists were securing base after base e.g. York. At this point, the Royalists were winning, largely because the Parliamentarians were not co-ordinated enough and didn’t have the immediate resources the royalists had access to (but Parliament’s resources would increase into the war as they sought an alliance with Scotland and taxed the public. Events that preceded the early stages of the war would tip the balance in parliament’s favour. Their support base proved vital after the Battle of Edge hill. If Parliament had not had the support of the ‘London trained Bands’, Parliament would have been in an extremely vulnerable position.
The Battle of Edge hill had left the road to London clear for the Royalists. However, their defeat at the hands of the ‘London trained Bands’ prevented the Royalists taking London, which would have almost guaranteed a victory for the King. London was the one base the Royalists needed to secure most, but due to that area being in support of the parliamentarian army, they met opposition. Therefore if it hadn’t been for Parliament’s supporters of that area, it’s questionable whether they would have been able to win the war.
Parliament’s eventual methods of warfare and the general decisions made, compared with their style of delegation and warfare at the start of the war had been greatly improved, but without the Royalists misjudging situations their victory may not have been as convincing, if at all. Within Parliament there was division; the peace party and the war party. Charles relied too heavily on the more moderate MPs and on negotiation rather than active force, even if he was in a position to attack. His failure to optimise only weakened his case and whilst he was taking the more diplomatic route, Parliament were busy playing catch up be restructuring their army. This is one modification the Royalists failed to achieve. They were still acting as independent regions, whereas Parliament was attempting to nationalise its army. Fairfax was put in total command and Cromwell in command of Cavalry. Both were ruthless and had an awareness of politics, but realised that they should not interfere in the active war effort. This was known as the ‘Self Denying Ordinance’. They now had a national, professional army of 22,000 and pending attacks were synchronised and planned in such a way that they would overwhelm the Royalists. Parliament’s initiative far outdid any of the Royalist’s methods of combat, as Parliament was winning each battle, one by one. It’s clear then that Parliament’s chances of winning the entire war were increasing rapidly. The string of successes to follow the evolvement of the new model army included the Battle of Nasey in June 1645. This all but destroyed the Kings Army. One of the most devastating defeats for the Royalists was the loss of Bristol, this drove the Royalists back into the south west and Wales, reducing their catchment area. This was replicated around the country. Although both sides had not adopted a convincing method of warfare, before the restructuring of Parliaments army, the Royalists had managed to gain an early advantage despite their own misjudgements and in some cases weak leadership (Battle of Edge hill). This early advantage of the Kings’ acted as the stimulus for Parliament, realising that they had to do something. The restructuring of their army marked the turning of the tide and with the string of victories that followed almost definitely set them on the path to victory. The Royalist’s complacency, (subsequent to having led in the early stages of the war), only provoked attacks. They had not made the sufficient modifications to match Parliaments. The Parliamentarians had progressed leaving the Royalists trailing.
The Self Denying Ordinance and the general changes within the army are convincing theories as to why Parliament eventually won the war but outside factors cannot be ignored and if certain some of the issues had not come to anything it is debateable whether Parliament would have had a victory, if a victory at all. The amalgamation
of the Scottish Covenant Army and the Parliamentarian Army was initiated by Pym.
In return for the Scots help in the war campaign Parliament signed the solemn league and covenant vowing them to introduce the Presbyterian system into the Church of England. It’s not known whether Parliament would have kept its part of the deal as Pym, the driving force behind the partnership, died later that year.
However, the Committee of both kingdoms was established which meant a collaborated war effort and extra resources, all of which would add to mounting opposition against the Royalists. As the King’s resources were static, if not diminishing due to the loss of bases and ports, parliaments were increasing, resulting in an overwhelming force that could not be overcome. The King’s territory was being taken from him at such a rate. Cromwell and the Scottish Covenant’s army defeated the Royalists at Marston Moor, meaning they could now end the King’s rule of the whole of the North Country. This event didn’t guarantee Parliament’s victory but it was symbolic of the kind of opposition the King was being faced with.
In comparing the resources the two sides had access to Parliament seemed to have the upper hand. Both sides were financed, but money was only donated to the King his income was sporadic unlike Parliament’s money which was constant due to taxes. Parliament could therefore maintain a certain level of expenditure beneficial to their war efforts. The Royalists could not afford to maintain a consistent supply of resources which is why their resources were low at points, perhaps explaining some of their defeats. Parliament also had control of the navy, a powerful force, which was instrumental in defending bases such as Plymouth and Hull.
Although upon the outbreak of the war the king managed to obtain most of the expertise he failed to develop these resources. With the amount of expertise within his army and the military advisers he had at hand, had he modified and strategically directed his army in the early part of the campaign and beyond, he could have possibly overcome the Parliamentarians.
The King’s complacency at the battle of Edge hill showed poor leadership and lack of resources. He was unable to beat the rebel group which was one of the most significant defeats of the war. Securing London would have guaranteed eventual victory but Parliament’s loyal supporters prevented this from happening. The Self Denying Ordinance, the new model army of 22,000 men, who devastated the King’s main army at Naseby was fundamental in Parliament’s victory and the unified approach of Parliament’s army was formidable because it was on a national scale and with the Royalists still fighting as regional forces it’s no wonder the Royalists failed to win. To add insult to injury the amalgamation of Scottish and Parliamentary troops (due to the Solemn League and Covenant) only strengthened the already victorious Parliamentary army. It’s impossible to name one event in particular. Parliament’s victory was due to a chain of events, some of which were more significant than others. The combined efforts of Pym, Fairfax, Cromwell and all those within Parliament resulted in a justified victory.
Katy Goff