- In 1939, British Prime Minister, Chamberlain promised protection to the Poles, in case of an attack.
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In August 1939, on the incentive of the French, the British foreign secretary, Halifax proposed a loose alliance to the Soviet ambassador in London, Maisky. To which Maisky replied ‘The Soviet Union will look after its own security. To accept the ambiguous proposals of Britain would mean for us to lose freedom of action which would make war inevitable.’
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The British then prepared for more serious talks in Moscow on August 15th.
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On August 15th, the British delegation rejected the proposed Shaposhnikov Plan during the military talks in Moscow.
- The head of the British delegation, Admiral Drax objected to the Soviet demands of naval intervention in the Baltic.
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August 21st, Stalin announced the state visit to Moscow of Ribbentrop, the German minister of foreign affairs.
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On August 23rd, the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact was signed in Moscow, which granted Russia a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, prevented Russia from fighting a far on two fronts (Eastern Europe and Japan) and provided Russia with more time to rebuild its internal strength.
Word Count–572 words
C. Evaluation of Sources
Vulfson, Mavrik. 2002. Baltic Fates. Riga. Bota.
Baltic Fates by Mavrik Vulfson is a study in two parts. The first of which, ‘Fragments of Truth’ deals with Soviet foreign policy in Europe prior to the Second World War, and is the one this study refers to. The purpose of this section is to shed light into the international relations prior to 1940. The source’s value for shedding insight on Soviet foreign relations lies in the fact, that the author, a diplomat himself has compiled much of the evidence from personal contact with figures from diplomatic circles of the time period. Thus, the source has detailed information about Soviet international relations, which may not have been available to other historians at the time of the writing. The author also draws much information from his interviews of Hans von Herwarth, ‘known affectionately in diplomatic circles as Johnnie’, who was a diplomat in the German Embassy in Moscow in the 1930s and was present at the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact. However, herein in lies the source’s weakness, as Vulfson seems to have grown sympathetic towards Johnnie and his colleagues, and at times overstates their importance in the events of 1939.
Radzinsky, Edvard. 1997. Stalins. Riga. Zvaigzne ABC, 2004.
Edvard Radzinsky’s Stalin is a study of Stalin’s life and his ascension in politics. Since the author is Russian and has had access to archives that may have been denied to many foreign historians, such as the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (Former personal archive of Stalin), the Former Archive of the Central Party and the State Archive of the Russian Federation (Former Central State Archive of the October Revolution). The author’s fascination by Stalin’s phenomenal character and personality cult, is a central aspect of the book, which hints of Russian neo-nationalism, and the author may perhaps have over glorified Stalin’s role and value as a historical figure in some respects. However, this does not seem to be the case with sections dealing with foreign policy, as the author is quick to recognize Stalin’s failures and the fact that he wasn’t an internationally minded man. This source is valuable in tracing the development of Soviet foreign policy, because the author enjoys privileged access to many Russian archives, and thus he gives insight into the internal workings of the Party organs e.g. Politburo.
Word count-392 words
D. Analysis
Since Stalin believed a European War to be inevitable, ‘expecting his country to enter it late and on the winning side’, his chief concern was to do everything for the USSR to ultimately be in the winning alliance. Even though, Stalin had declared that the USSR had no territorial ambitions, contemporary Soviet literature planted expansionistic slogans in the minds of the Soviet people, through literary works such as those of Kogan and Kulchitsky. It is safe to say, that Stalin’s official policy on expansion, was just a trick used to create a false sense of comfort amongst nations neighboring Russia, and that the USSR had not abandoned intentions of expansion. If not those of the international community, the minds of the Soviet people were certainly being ripened for Soviet wars of territorial conquest.
It is unlikely that Stalin had premeditated to sign an agreement with the Germans, because even as late as August 15th 1939, the Soviets were still engaged in promising talks with the French and the British, as well as the Germans. Thus, Stalin’s foreign policy goals were opportunistic in nature he was looking to strike the best deal i.e. one that would delay Russian participation in battle for as long as possible, one which would allow Russia to emerge, as the victors of such a war with minimum damage incurred on their own nation. This accounts for the fact that, Russia was willing to negotiate with the Nazis, as it would do anything to strengthen its position in the short-term. Furthermore, the pragmatic nature of Stalin’s foreign policy decision making, is reflected in the fact that he did not dispose of Litvinov, but spared him, in order to use him during the eventual rapprochement with the British, which he probably already anticipated at the time.
It is clear that the USSR did not hide the fact that it was negotiating with both the capitalistic nations and the Germans. Since all parties knew that their proposed alliance was not the only one Russia had on offer, they would be inclined to sign an agreement more favorable to the Russians. Furthermore, through these simultaneous talks Stalin was aware of the British promise to give military assistance to Poland, as well as Hitler’s intentions to invade it. Given The Red Army’s poor condition following the Great Purges, an agreement with the West would mean entering a war as soon as Hitler made his first move. However an agreement with Germany would incur no direct military obligations, as there is no open front for Russia to confront the West, as opposed to the two fronts that would open upon an agreement with Britain and France.
Another factor worth considering is the fact that the British and French were unwilling to cooperate with the Russians for ideological reasons. They only made their first concrete steps towards rapprochement in the summer of 1939. Prior to this, their attitude towards the Russians can be viewed as being unserious e.g. the symbolic nature of the French-Russian treaty over Czechoslovakia was best demonstrated in Stalin’s absence in Munich. Stalin was clearly upset by this, as he called a Politburo meeting in the middle of the night. Furthermore, Stalin knew that the West were distrustful of him, and Germany and Russia had enjoyed successful military and economic cooperation in the past, thus at least in the short term an agreement with the Germans was the safer move.
Word Count-571 words
E. Conclusion
Stalin’s foreign policy in the late 1930s ‘remained one of fence sitting’
It is clear that he skillfully manipulated with both parties, to ultimately push them into offering the terms most beneficial for the USSR. Ideological differences were not seen as an obstacle to diplomatic relations in the short term, where land and power were to be gained, especially since any Party members who would object to this had been removed during the Great Purges. The main reasons for Stalin’s reconciliation with Hitler lay in the fact that, such rapprochement helped Russia avoid a two front war, allowed it to enter the war late at a strong position, whilst it had rebuilt its forces and the other nations were slowly being exhausted by the fighting. Moreover, a pact with Germany granted Russia a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, thus enabling the Communists to acquire more territory and spread their ideology.
Word Count-151 words
- Bibliography
Corin, Chris , and Terry Fiehn. Communist Russia Under Lenin and Stalin. London: John Murray, 2002. P 254-264.
De Jonge, Alex. Stalin and the Shaping of the Soviet Union. New York: William Morrow, 1986. P 355-367.
Diller, Daniel. Russia and the Independent States. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1992. P 45-47.
Radzinsky, Edvard. Stalins. Ed. Marika Taube. Trans. Gunta Silakalne. Riga: Zvaigzne ABC, 2004. P 486-510.
Vulfson, Mavrik. Baltic Fates. Comp. Emma Bramnika-Vulfsone. Ed. Emma Bramnika-Vulfsone. Trans. Geoff Murrell. Riga: Bota, 2002. P 27-66.
Endnotes
Radzinsky, Edvard. Stalins. Ed. Marika Taube. Trans. Gunta Silakalne. Riga: Zvaigzne ABC, 2004. P486.
De Jonge, Alex. Stalin and the Shaping of the Soviet Union. New York: William Morrow, 1986. P358.
Radzinsky, Edvard. Stalins. Ed. Marika Taube. Trans. Gunta Silakalne. Riga: Zvaigzne ABC, 2004. P488.
Vulfson, Mavrik. Baltic Fates. Comp. Emma Bramnika. Ed. Emma Bramnika. Trans.Geoff Murrell. Riga: Bota, 2002. P29.
De Jonge, Alex. Stalin and the Shaping of the Soviet Union. New York: William Morrow, 1986. P360.
Vulfson, Mavrik. Baltic Fates. Comp. Emma Bramnika. Ed. Emma Bramnika. Trans.Geoff Murrell. Riga: Bota, 2002. P 53.
Corin, Chris , and Terry Fiehn. Communist Russia Under Lenin and Stalin.London: John Murray, 2002. 254-264.
Vulfson, Mavrik. Baltic Fates. Comp. Emma Bramnika. Ed. Emma Bramnika. Trans.Geoff Murrell. Riga: Bota, 2002. 27-66.
De Jonge, Alex. Stalin and the Shaping of the Soviet Union. New York: William Morrow, 1986. P358.