cinema shows.’ Surely many, if not most, people were sceptical of ‘the Cult’ yet the sheer
volume of propaganda must have made any alternative to Fascism seem unobtainable.
Propaganda was also used outside of expressing the genius of the Duce. Fascist
‘achievements’ were stressed and exaggerated greatly, again the control of newspapers was
important here. However, the tools of the propaganda machine extended to parades, public
holidays and processions through the streets. All of these would undoubtedly keep the
public happy to some extent but surely could not be solely responsible for the public’s
extensive support of the Duce.
Another aspect of Mussolini’s popularity was the Fascist intervention into the Italian
education system. This is closely linked to the regime’s programme of propaganda yet is
significant enough to warrant closer inspection. In this section I intend to look at how the
Fascist regime altered the education system and how influential these changes were on the
Italian youth. In order for the Fascists to mould the education system to their specifications
they first had to gain greater control over the professors. This was achieved in three ways.
Salaries were increased to make the professor’s jobs more comfortable, and rules were
introduced governing the conduct of teachers. By 1933 all teachers had to be members of
the Fascist Party. In addition to this it was made clear any signs of dissent would result in
dismissal. Through these incentives the Fascists were then able to change the system in any
way they wanted while ensuring the professors would remain happy to teach.
The changes introduced by the regime were far from subtle. Evidence of censorship
exists. An example of this is the banning of several history books along with all regional
dialects. The Libro Unico, a standard government textbook was introduced. ‘The Cult of
Mussolini’ was also supported in schools in an attempt to influence more impressionable
young minds. Mussolini’s aim was for a Fascist education system that would ensure ‘the
whole school...must educate youth to understand Fascism.’
Due to the age and vulnerability of it’s audience, the Fascist changes to the
education system must surely have strongly influenced the young minds subjected to the
censored, propaganda-laden, militaristic-style teachings of the regime. Evidence exists of
Mussolini’s increased popularity amongst the nation’s youth. Photographs were taken of
school girls saluting Mussolini’s residence as they walked by and many students held strong
Fascist beliefs by the time they reached university. This is shown by increased membership
of the Fascist party amongst young adults. However, the regime was not in place long
enough to expose sufficient generations to an education full of exaggerations and half-truths.
As such Italy never became a nation full of people raised by a Fascist education system and
so the changes to the system never reached their full potential.
Further examples of Mussolini’s attempts to increase his popularity can be found in Fascist
policy towards culture. The Duce wanted to incorporate Fascism into Italian culture in
order to endorse his regime and also to gain intellectual credibility and therefore add to the
‘Cult of Mussolini’. The regime wanted to control culture. If they succeeded in this they
would gain much greater control over the Italian people. This period was known as ‘the
time of the carrot and the stick’. This meant intellectuals, artists, scientists and professors
were first offered incentives then threatened to bring them into line with Fascist policy
towards culture. ‘Carrots’ included the Fascist Academy which offered good jobs and fat
salaries to leading professors. ‘Sticks’ included the law passed in 1931 in which lecturers
and teachers were compelled to swear a daily oath to the Duce and the creation of the
Ministry of Popular Culture, responsible for media censorship.
These tactics gained the regime vastly increased control over the input into Italian
culture during the coming years. The regime was able to introduce Fascist-inspired culture
in four main areas - literature; music; art and architecture. Of these, Mussolini personally
found art boring and felt literature was useful only for propaganda. Music and architecture
were different. The Duce desperately tried to come across as a competent musician posing
for many photographs clutching various instruments. Architecture also appealed to
Mussolini as he felt it could be used as a very obvious lasting memory of the regime and it’s
power. The Fascists were also keen to create a cultural autarky where Italian culture would
be completely independent with no foreign influences.
The Fascist stranglehold on culture was not exploited as effectively as it might have
been. The censorship over new art and literature pieces was interpreted differently between
rivals in the Fascist leadership, Bottai, Minister for Education favoured a liberal approach
letting through more sensitive works. The Italian Fascist art was also less clearly defined
than that of Nazi Germany and so never reached the same level of influence. Although it
seems culture was intended to be used for propaganda purposes, much like the education
system, it never reached it’s full potential.
Throughout this essay I have looked more at how Fascist policy was used to increase
Mussolini’s popularity rather than any actual events which achieved this. One such event is
the Concordat between Mussolini and Pope Pius XI. This was a deal between the Fascist
regime and the Catholic Church which held enormous influence over the Italian people. The
terms of the agreement, put simply, were that in return for land and state bonds the Church
would publicly support Fascism.
Mussolini hoped that by winning the Church’s support he could ensure the lasting
support of the Italian people. The deal was, in the short term, considered to be a major
achievement on Mussolini’s part, later described as ‘Mussolini’s greatest, but least
Fascist, policy.’ An example of Church support resulting from the Concordat was the
backing of the war in Abyssinia, the Church described it as a ‘crusade’.
The Concordat was only moderately successful as both sides benefited from the
deal to some extent yet were compromised by it as well. The Catholic Church was
associated with Fascist tyranny. Borgese, a Professor of Literature, exiled in 1931 said
‘The Church became ancillary [an aid] to atheistic tyranny, and tyranny rewarded it by
making it supreme in the elementary cell of society...Over her new black shirt Italy
donned her old black gown [dress of the clergy].’ Fascism was also damaged by the deal
as it restricted the regime’s power. Mussolini could no longer be seen as ‘spiritual authority’
of Italy as, under the Concordat, Catholicism had been recognised as the sole religion of the
state and the Pope it’s leader. This meant the Italian Fascist regime was no longer
totalitarian.
From the areas I have studied in this essay it appears that most attempts to increase the
popularity of Mussolini only succeeded to a certain extent. Even so, from 1925 to 1936 it
appears that the Duce was personally very popular. Mussolini was seen to provide stability
at home and remarks from leading foreign statesmen suggested he was successful abroad.
The regime did not demand excessively from the public yet provided reasonable prosperity
for the public. Foreign events, such as the successes in Ethiopia fulfilled the patriotic and
nationalistic needs of the Italian nation.
This suggests why, to start with, Mussolini was popular and no opposition was
needed. No radical overhaul of the running of the country had occurred under the Duce’s
dictatorship and so few people felt the need to oppose him. It is significant that penal
colonies set up by the Italian Fascists held fewer than 5 000 political dissidents while the
concentration camps in the more radical Nazi Germany held several hundred thousand. This
would suggest that Mussolini’s popularity to the masses lay in the regime’s relatively relaxed
style of Fascism which did not overly intrude into the private lives of the public and placed
the country under no immediate threat.