Actus Reus and Mens Rea

Alex’s actions were not due to insanity because it was not a ‘disease of the mind’, but external factors beyond her control.  External causes include “concussion, the administration of an anaesthetic or other drug or hypnosis”.

Lord Denning stated clearly in Bratty –v- Attorney General for Northern Ireland,

“The requirement that it should be a voluntary act is essential, not only in a murder case, but in every criminal case.  No act in punishable if it is done involuntarily: and an involuntary act in this context…means an act which is done by the muscles without the control of the mind, such as a spasm, a reflex action or a convulsion…”

In Bratty –v- Attorney General for Northern Ireland, the defendant had killed a girl and was charged with her murder.  Evidence was put forward that he might have been suffering from psychomotor epilepsy at the time of the offence.  It was held that the defendant was guilty and even though the jury rejected his defence of insanity, he appealed, only to have it dismissed by the House of Lords.

It is also important to remember that the likelihood of the external factor happening again is miniscule and therefore insanity cannot be the reason for acquittal.

If you look at the case of Hill –v- Baxter, where Lord Goddard CJ stated “…there may be cases where the accused could not really be said to be (acting) at all.  Suppose he had a stroke or an epileptic fit…acts of God…he might well be in the driver’s seat…but in such a state of unconsciousness that he could not be said to be driving…”

This statement is true in Alex’s state, she may have entered the office with her limbs being flung in all directions, but she was unable to control this and as Lord Denning mentioned in Hill, a person cannot be responsible for their actions if a ‘swam of bees enters their car’.  So in Alex’s case it was an external factor, which induced her to react to the incidence and lose control of her reflexes.  David’s apparent fear that she was about to attack him were beyond her control and therefore if she had injured David she would be able to claim ‘automatism’ as per Lord Denning in Dervish  “the accused’s own word will rarely be sufficient unless it is supported by medical evidence” medical evidence would have been available in Alex’s case, as she had a severe allergic reaction to the bee stings.

David’s reaction to Alex as she came into the office were defensive, he could be convicted of GBH or even murder if it is proved that he acted with excessive force and that his actions caused Alex’s death.  When analysing David’s position, areas of self-defence and medical negligence have to be addressed.  

Self-defence and non-insane automatism are the two defences, which cancel out the element of actus reus in a crime.  A claim of self-defence is justificatory to the def actions.  As per Lord Griffiths “a man about to be attacked does not have to wait for his assailant to strike the first blow or fire the first shot; circumstances may justify a pre-emptive strike”.

The statement emphasizes the fact that if the defendant fears attack then they can defend themselves without prosecution of the force is believed to be reasonable.

For a self-defence claim to be accepted the defendant must have felt that their actions were “just and reasonable” in the circumstances.  In Palmer –v-R the defendant was convicted of murder and appealed.  The judge directed the jury to acquit the defendant on the basis of self-defence if it complied with the following “the force used must not be by way of revenge and he must have believed on reasonable grounds that the force used by him was necessary to prevent or resist the attack…” Lord Morris added to this on appeal to the privy council the following statement “If death results from the use of an unreasonable degree of force in self-defence, the offence will be murder proved the accused meant to cause death or grievous bodily harm, if the jury thought that in a moment of unexpected anguish, a person attacked had done and instinctively thought was necessary that would be “most potent evidence” that only reasonable defensive action had been taken; …self-defence either succeeds so as to result in an acquittal or it is disproved”.

So for a claim of self-defence to be successful, the force used must be reasonable and free from any revenge or intent.

In David’s case, as in Attorney General for Northern Ireland, the question of reasonable force will be paramount and in the said case Lord Diplock stated that “reasonable force” was a matter always for the jury.

Lord Diplock explained that “the jury should remind themselves that the postulated balancing of risk against risk, harm against harm, by the reasonable man is not undertaken in the calm analytical atmosphere of the ct-room…but in the brief second or two….

The resent case of R -v- Owino pinpoints some very vital points of law.  Collin J emphasised the aspect that “the jury have to decide whether a defendant honestly believed that the circumstances were such as required him to use force to defend himself from an attack…”.  Even though the defendant in this case was found guilty, the principle still applies.  Did David believe that he needed to use such force?

In David’s situation, Alex was coming towards him and he believed that she was attacking him, so he felt he was in imminent danger.  In protecting himself, he hit Alex with a chair.  Was “reasonable force” used?  In order to answer this question the issue of retreat must be addressed.

“English law used to adopt the strict approach that a ‘retreat to the wall’ was required before extreme force could be justified”.  However, it has now been accepted that this should be just one element of the equation.  The Draft Criminal Law Bill states that “the fact that a person had an opportunity to retreat before using force shall be taken into account, in conjunction with other relevant evidence in determining whether the force was reasonable”.

This is very appropriate in David’s case as he was unable to retreat and was backed into the office as Alex was in front of the door.

Another issue, which has to be discussed, is whether David can still be held liable, because after Alex had retreated he hit her again?

In R –v- Clegg, the defendant was on duty in Northern Ireland.  He shot and killed the driver and passenger of a stolen car.  The defendant claimed self-defence as the car was driving straight for him.  The judge accepted that the first three shots could be in self-defence, but not with the fourth shot.  It was held that the fourth shot was significant in causing the deaths and that the danger had passed when the fourth shot was fired and so the defendant was convicted of murder.

This principle maybe used against David, as Alex was retreating into the corridor and so the danger to David had passed.  It could be held that David is guilty of murder, if it is proved that Alex died from her injuries, as in R-v- Clegg.

Causation is a major element of David’s case.  If it is found that the doctor and nurse’s actions have broken the chain of causation, David may well be acquitted of murder.

In R-v- Jordan, the defendant stabbed the deceased, who died two days later in hospital.  Jordan was convicted of murder and appealed on the grounds that medical evidence proved that he was not responsible for the death.  The stab wound was mainly healed at the time of death.  It was discovered that death was due to an adverse reaction to the antibiotics administered.  Two doses were given and as a result the patient died.  It was held that the treatment given was “palpably wrong” and that death was not the result of the stabbing.

This case has not been overruled, but the courts have placed restricted guidelines on what constitutes ‘palpably wrong’.

“Even though negligence in the treatment of the victim was the immediate cause of death, the jury should not regard it as excluding the responsibility of the accused unless the negligence treatment was so independent of the acts and itself so potent in causing death that they regard the contribution made by his acts as insignificant”.

In David’s defence, Alex died from internal organ failure due to the bee stings, not from the injuries inflicted on her by David.

The doctor and the nurse both neglected to notice Alex’s swollen face and she was left unattended in the hospital corridor.  David’s actions caused Alex’s broken ribs, wrist and collarbone, but not her allergic reaction to the bee stings.

As stated above the jury must find the cause of death so independent to David’s actions and it can be proved that David should be not be held liable for Alex’s death, but could be convicted of grievous bodily harm.

In conclusion to this problem the main elements to mention are that there are two ways in which the actus reus of a crime can be cancelled, by non0insane automatism and self-defence.  Both these defences are present here and both have been proved in accordance with the law.  Alex if she had survived would not have been convicted of assault, as her actions were the result of non-insane automatism and therefore beyond her control.

As regards David, he honestly believed that Alex was going to attack him and as a result acted in self-defence, hitting Alex but not causing her death.  The medical treatment can be said without a doubt to be ‘palpably wrong’ as the staff’s failure to diagnosis Alex’s condition resulted in her death.

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