If the consequence would have occurred anyway there is no liability this happened in White where the defendant put cyanide ion his mothers drink intending to kill her she died of a heart attack before drinking it. The defendant was not the factual cause of her death she was not guilty of murder but still guilty of attempted murder.
Legal causation is closely associated with moral responsibility it looks at blameworthiness (culpability) of the accused.
The case of Dalloway can be used to distinguish between factual and legal causation.
In Dalloway even though factual causation was established using the ‘but for’ test the child would not have died if D had not been on road, legal causation was no be t as the jury decided that even if the D had been holding his reins there was nothing he could have done to prevent death. The D was not culpable for the act.
Both factual and legal causation must be established for liability to follow.
The acceleration principle- In murder the accused’s act may be considered a cause of death if it has accelerated the victims death (Adams). However if a doctor gives a patient a pain relieving drug, which has side affects that accelerate death, this act will not be more than a minimal contribution to the death (Kimsey).
If a jury does not believe that death was a result of a culpable act then legal causation will not be established. If it is found that the act did not make more than a minimal contribution to the death it will be ignored under what is called the de minimis principle.
Contributory cases- the defendant’s acts need not be the sole cause or even the main cause of death, it being sufficient that it was a cause (Pagett).
The chain of causation can be broken by a novus actus interveniens this includes an act of a third party, the victims own act or a natural but unpredictable event.
In order to break the chain of causation so that the defendant is not responsible for the consequence, the intervening act must be sufficiently serious enough.
If the actions of a third party may have been predictable this leads to problems. In this type of case the reasonable foresee ability test; that is, were the actions of the third party a foreseeable response to the actions of the accused in the eyes of an ordinary reasonable person.
Issues of medical treatment have appeared in the following cases. The courts are very reluctant to allow medical treatment to break the chain of causation and will only do so in extreme cases.
In Smith the victim dies as a result of stab wounds compounded by medical treatment that was very poor, with proper treatment the victim had a 75% chance of recovery. The appellant’s conviction of murder was upheld on the basis that
“If at the time of death the original wound is still an operating and substantial cause, then the death can properly be said to be the result of the wound, albeit that some other cause of death is also operating. Only if the second cause is so overwhelming as to make the original wound merely part of history can it be said that the death does not flow from the wound.”
If the negligent treatment was the medical cause of death, the legal cause of death will still be with the accused if the original wound was still operating and substantial at the time of death. This leaves open the opportunity for the accused to escape liability if the victim dies as a result of negligent treatment so long as the original wound is healed at the time of death. If it was not for the accused actions the deceased would not have had to receive medical treatment at all. These problems led the courts to provide a new direction in Cheshire.
Cheshire would have been acquitted under the direction in Smith so the court changed the focus to the original act that led to the victim being in hospital in the first place. A man received a gunshot wound to the stomach he underwent surgery that was successful. Respiratory problems led to a string of negligent treatment by medical staff. Even though the gunshot wound had almost healed the victim died due to negligent treatment. The negligent treatment must be so independent of D’s acts, and in itself so potent in causing death, that they regard the contribution made by his acts as insignificant.’
The courts will use whichever direction will avoid breaking the chain of causation.
In Jordon the victim was taken to hospital with stab wounds he was given medical treatment that was described as ‘palpably wrong’ from which he later developed pneumonia and died. At time of death the wounds had almost healed. It isn’t clear how wrong negligent treatment needs to be ‘palpably wrong’. The case of Jordan has been described as ‘very exceptional’ in the later case of Malcharek and Steel and as ‘a case decided on its own special facts’ in the case of Blaue.
Actions of the victim this is when the victim brings about his own death. If the D causes the victim to act in a foreseeable way then any injury this may cause the D will be responsible. This happened in the case of Roberts where a girl jumped from a car to escape sexual advances and the D was held liable for her injuries.
If the victim’s reaction was unreasonable this may break the chain of causation. In Williams a hitchhiker jumped from a car and died from head injuries. The prosecution alleged there had been a attempt to steal v wallet and that was his reason for jumping. The court of appeal said to make D guilty v act had to be foreseeable and also had to be in proportion with the threat. The question asked was whether the victim’s conduct was: ‘within the ambit of reasonableness and not so daft as to make his own voluntary act one which was amounted to a novus actus interveniens and consequently broke the chain of causation.’
The accused must take the victim as he finds them they cannot complain if the victim is particularly susceptible to physical injuries e.g. has brittle bones.
It is commonly known as the ‘eggshell skull’ principle. In the case Mamote- Kulang the principle was again used with regard to an existing physiological condition.
The principle has been extended to religious beliefs (Blaue) in the case Blaue had stabbed a women for not having sex with him. She was admitted to hospital and told she needed a blood transfusion to save her life. Being a Jehovah’s Witness, she refused and died. Blaue was convicted as manslaughter he appealed saying her refusal was unreasonable and broke the chain of causation his argument was rejected under the principle of take your victim as you find them.
This is taken to the extreme in the case of Dear where the victim appeared to take the chance from the D actions to commit suicide when he for no clear reason did nothing to staunch the blood flow from his cut artery. The jury convicted of murder and D’s appeal was unsuccessful as the cause of V’s death was blood loss, which was caused by stab wounds inflicted by D.
There is an argument both for and against whether it is just to take liability so far.
No one could have possibly foreseen that another person would react in such a way.
On the other hand it was the D that inflicted the wound that led to the death so should therefore answer for that death.
The main rules of causation then are that if the D’s conduct was not the factual cause of the consequence they will be not guilty however if it was and the D’s conduct was more than a minimal cause of the consequence the next question will be asked (if it wasn’t they will be found not guilty) which is did an intervening act break the chain of causation if the answer is yes then the D will be not guilty if it is No then the D legally and factually caused the consequence and will be guilty if he has the required mens rea.
by
pmday2013 (student)
