In English law, there is no formal separation of public and private law, no constitutional court and before the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 there has been no catalogue of fundamental rights as it can be found in many continental European constitutional documents. The major source of fundamental rights in English law is now undoubtedly the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) which implements the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into English law, which came into force on 2 October 2000.

In accordance with the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, the HRA has no higher status than other Acts of Parliament. It is not possible for courts to override primary legislation that is incompatible with convention rights, or to declare it unconstitutional. This is portrayed in s 4 of the act which empowers the courts to declare that primary legislation is incompatible with the ECHR. This declaration, however, does not affect the validity, continuing operation and enforcement of the provision in question which remains even applicable to the case in question.

The primary responsibility for ensuring compliance with the Convention is placed on 'public authorities', s. 6 HRA 1998. Section 6 (1) of the Human Rights Act states that 'it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a convention right'. Section 6 (3) (b) further provides that 'public authority' includes 'any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature'. While it is clear which so-called 'pure' public are likely to be caught by the Act - for example, government, police, NHS trusts - it is extremely unclear which so-called 'functional' public authorities are caught, that is, those bodies that only sometimes exercise public functions.

It has become apparent that the courts are interpreting section 6 (3) (b) in a narrow fashion, leading to what has been called the 'protection gap'.1 what this refers to is the lack of protection for those persons in receipt of public services where a 'pure' public authority, such as a local authority, has contracted out the particular service (for example residential care) to a private sector body.

In Poplar Housing2 the Court of Appeal decided that a registered social landlord housing homeless persons on behalf of the London Borough Council of Tower Hamlets was a 'functional' public authority for the purposes of the Act. However, the Court of Appeal also held in the case of R v Leonard Cheshire Foundation, that a charitable trust providing residential care to people with disabilities on behalf of local authorities was not carrying out public functions and therefore not caught by section 6 (3) (b) of the Act. It could be argued that the courts have narrowed the definition of 'public authority' for the purposes of section 6 (3) (b) far beyond that which Parliament intended.

In times of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation, a contracting state may take measures derogating from its obligations under the Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law. The results of the immediate after-math of September/11th were 'draconian' anti terrorist legislation. The provisions of the anti-terrorist measures conflict with human right issues, for example, Article 6 - fair trial.
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A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department,3 is one of the most important constitutional cases in recent years and the most important test of the HRA 1998 to date. In Lord Hoffmann's words, the case "calls into question the very existence of an ancient liberty of which this country has until now been very proud : freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention". The Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001 empowers the Home secretary to detain indefinitely, without charge, a person believed to be a terrorist and a risk to national security.

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