Political Parties
In relation to the EP party political activity takes place at three main levels; the transnational, the political groups in the EP, and the national. Political activity in the EP is mainly channelled via political groups. Under the Rules of Procedure in order for MEPs to form a political group there must be 29 if they come from the same State and 23 if they come from two Member States, 18 if they come from three Member States, and 14 if they come from four or more Member States. There are a number of reason why groups have been formed and developed although the principle basis is ideological, funds are distributed for administrative and research purposes to groups on the basis of a fixed amount per group plus an additional sum for each member, no one is unsupported but the larger the group the more money it receives. There are also advantages in the conduct of Parliamentary business since much of what the EP does is centred around groups for example, distribution of committee chairmanships, or in the preparation of the agendas for plenary sessions. Political groups within the EP are generally weak and have limited ability to control or direct their members as all groups have significant internal divisions,usually both ideological and national. There is no government to sustain or attack, they have no structure as in national parties such as an organisational framework from which cooperation and united behaviour and generally recognised notions of responsibility and accountability would stem. Group leaders can invoke no effective sanctions against MEPs who do not fall into line. National political parties are also involved in the EP in three main ways firstly most candidates in the EP elections are chosen by their national parties. Secondly EP election campaigns are essentially national elections and the campaigns are conducted by their national parties and finally national parties exist in the EP and problems arise when national groups have to act in specific domestic instructions and each national group tends to have it own priorities and loyalties.
Organisation and operation.
The European Parliament is an autonomous body within the institutional framework of the European Union, it determines its internal organization and modus operandi governed by the Rules of Procedure In this respect the European Parliament successfully asserted its independence claiming that in the absence of Treaty provisions it was free to choose the place of its proceedings This was eventually settled by the protocol on the location of the seats of the institutions attached to the EP. The Amsterdam treaty confirmed the EP as a travelling circus since the EP has its seat in Strasbourg where the 12 periods of monthly plenary sessions including the budgetary session is held. The periods of additional sessions are to be held in Brussels and the general Secretariat of the EP and its departments remain in Luxembourg this is a costly and time consuming procedure.
Powers of the European Parliament:
There are major differences in the set up of the European Parliament as opposed to the national Parliaments of the Member States. There are three main ways in which the European Parliament can exercise its powers they are as follows;
- Through the legislative process
- Through the budgetary process
- Through control and supervision of the executive.
- Right to bring actions before the Court of Justice
The legislative process.
The Consultation procedure
Under this procedure the EP is asked for an opinion on Commission proposals for Council legislation. The opinion is prepared by the Rapporteur of one of the European Parliament’s specialist committees, however although the Council does not have to follow the opinion of the EP the consultation must be genuine. This is recognised as an essential procedural requirement by the Court of Justice. Further consultation is also required when a measure in which the EP has given an opinion is changed The Court of Justice has also held that the obligation to reconsult if the text that was finally adopted was substantially different from that which the EP had given its opinion on. However should Parliament fail to respond it cannot complain that its views have not been taken into account. The Council cannot come to a final decision without giving the EP an opportunity to respond it does not have to suspend discussion until it recieve their opinion. The EP is able to make use of this single referral in part at least, on its own subject competence and its tactical skills by taking advantage of Article 250 of the TEC because as long as the Council has not acted the Commission can alter its proposals. The EP will attempt to pressurise the Commission to alter its proposal to take into account the views of the EP, normally pressurising the Commission takes the form of voting on the amendments, but delaying voting on amendments that formally constitutes the opinion until after the Commission has stated whether or not it accepts the amendments. If the Commission does not accept the amendments then the EP may judge the position of the Commission unsatisfactory and as a result may seek to delay the progress of the proposal by referring it back to the appropriate Parliamentary Committee.
The cooperation procedure
After the Members of the European parliament were directly elected in 1979 the Community institutions were seen to be undemocratic as the only body that was accountable to the electorate played a very small part in the legislative process. The EP commissioned a report on the constitutional reform of the Community. That report the Spinelli Report was issued in 1984 and although many of its recommendations were not taken up an attempt was made in the SEA to address the issue of Parliamentary input into the legislative process This was known as the cooperation procedure. Under the consultation procedure the Council could take a final decision after the EP has issued its opinion, under this procedure there is a second reading. On the first reading the Council is confined to adopting a ‘common position’ it must then be referred back to the EP with an explanation of its common position including reasons for any EP amendments that have been rejected. The EP can exert further pressure at its second reading by amending or rejecting the common position by an absolute majority vote. Votes such as those do not amount to vetoes, but they can carry considerable political weight, and they can only be overcome in the Council by a unanimous vote, they put a great deal of pressure on both the Commission and the Council to take the views of the EP seriously.
The Co-decision procedure
This procedure is similar to the cooperation procedure until the EP issues its second reading except under a change made by the Treaty of Amsterdam if the EP and the Council reach agreement on the proposal at the first reading, the proposal can be adopted at that stage. Should the EP and the Council still disagree after the second reading, if the EP has rejected it by an absolute majority the proposal will fall and it is referred to a conciliation committee. This Committee is made up of an equal number of representatives of both the EP and the Council. If agreement is reached by this Committee then the text must be approved by the EP by a majority of the votes cast and the Council acting by a qualified majority. If no agreement is reached the proposals falls. This procedure provides the EP with the potential to veto legislative proposals. Legislation that is made under this procedure is made in the name of the EP and the Council, whereas legislation that is made under the consultation and cooperation procedures is made in the name of the Council only.
The assent procedure
Under this procedure the EP must consider proposals at a single reading and with no provisions for amendments. In some circumstances the assent requires an absolute majority of members of the EP and it also has powers of veto under this procedure. The assent of the EP is required with regard to the conclusion of agreements between the EU and other states , used most notably against Israel, when the EP delayed approval of certain agreements in protest at the conduct of Israel in the occupied territories. The other important power this procedure gives the EP is the final assent over admission of new members this has become more significant as more countries seek to join the EU . The EP is able to use this power to significantly increase its own power in return for allowing new countries to join.
Analysis of the legislative powers of the European Parliament
What powers the EP has in relation to a particular legislative proposal depends on which Treaty Article the proposal is based. It is in the interest of the EP that as much as possible is based on the co-decision procedure where it has the strongest powers and as little as possible on the consultation procedure where its powers are weakest. The EP benefited from the Amsterdam Treaty which upgraded some policy areas to the co-decision procedure with the cooperation procedure virtually eliminated and the policy areas within its remit moved to the co-decision procedure. It is difficult to estimate the precise effect of EP deliberations on the final form of legislative acts as a great deal of EP persuading and lobbying is carried out via informal contacts with Commission and Council contacts. Although it is not possible to be precise two things are clear firstly the EP is centrally involved in a process of legislative bargaining with the Commission and the Council both on an informal and in formal inter-institutional meetings and secondly figures show that a very significant percentage of EP amendments are accepted by both the Commission and the Council . Having established that the EP does have genuine legislative influence I will now out line the weaknesses to which it is subject. Unlike national Parliaments the EP does not have legislative powers, it does not have the final say over what is and what is not to become law. It does not have capacity to exercise a positive legislative role by initiating, developing and passing into law its own proposals. Its negative legislative role is also restricted for whilst the co-decision procedure and assent procedures give it the power of veto over most legislative proposals, under both the consultative and cooperation procedures the Council has the power to overturn EP amendments that have or have not been accepted by the Commission and to ignore the EP’s rejection of legislative proposals. Although Parliament has given an opinion the Council can choose not to act on any legislative proposal it does not like.The council does not have to wait for the opinion of the EP to take decisions or to adopt common positions in principle or pending the opinion of the EP this demonstrates that the opinion of the EP is likely to have a very limited effect. The EP is not consulted on all Council legislation. It has no right to be consulted on most of the external agreements the Council concludes with third countries on behalf of the EU. Importantly , trade agreements concluded under Article 133 of the TEC do not require EP approval. In only two sets of circumstances were EU law is being made with regard to external agreements is EP approval necessary in both cases by the assent of an absolute majority of MEPs: under Title VII Article 49 of the TEC for new accession to the EU and under Article 300 of the TEC for specific types of agreement , including association agreements, cooperation agreements, and agreements with important budgetary implications. The first one is used very occasionally the second however has been used to some effect in putting pressure on countries to improve their Human Rights records if they wish to receive financial aid. The EP has the right to be informed and consulted about various other forms of EU external relations under the CFSP pillar of the EU but these do not involve legislation and the powers of the EP are advisory. The EP does not have to be consulted on Commission legislation although it is informed. This is despite the fact that numerically Commission legislation makes up most of the EU legislation. There are different views on the significance of this pointing to the expenditure and political implications of some Commission legislation. MEPs argue that this is another example of executive power and legislative and democratic weakness, however the Council and the Commission argue that this type of legislation is highly technical and needs quick decisions and are similar to minor legislative acts that are commonly accepted as an inevitable aspect of decision – making in the modern world.
The budgetary procedure
The 1970 Treaty Amending Certain Budgetary Provisions of the Treaties and the 1975 Treaty Amending Certain Financial provisions of the Treaties have given the EP considerable powers in relation to the EU budget. These powers include:
- The right to propose ‘modifications’ to compulsory expenditure (principally agriculture) this comprises over two- fifths of the total budget. Modifications that include increases in total expenditure require qualified majority support in the Council to be accepted. Where increases are not involved , owing perhaps to a proposed increase being off set by a proposed decrease, a qualified majority vote is required for rejection this is called a negative majority.
- The EP has the right to propose amendments to non-compulsory expenditure (most things apart from agriculture) subject to the ceilings set by the financial perspective. Acting by a qualified majority the Council may modify these amendments, but the EP can reinsert and insist on themat its second reading of the budget
- Under Article 272(8) of the TEC parliament acting by a majority of its members and two thirds of the votes cast, may if there are important reasons reject the draft budget and ask for a new draft to be submitted to it. It can reject the whole budget if it does not like the Council’s final draft.
There has been major confrontations with the Council by the EP as it sought to assert itself, for most of the 1980’s this assertion was limited in effect, because although the EP formally enjoyed joint decision – making powers with the Council on the budget, the powers of the two bodies were not equally balanced. The Commission were the key actors in shaping the 2000-2006 financial perspective they set the debate and negotiations in their Agenda 2000 document. The EP exerted as much influence as it possibly could by producing reports and recommendations and questioning the Council and Commission, holding debates and votes. However the key decisions were taken by the Council of Ministers and by the Heads of Governments at the March 1999 Berlin summit. The EP managed to persuade the Council to make some modest adjustments to the Financial Perspective, but the endorsement that it gave to the Perspective in may 1999 was essentially an endorsement of a Commission sponsored and member State negotiated deal.
Supervisory powers of the European Parliament:
Articles 193 – 201 give the Parliament the following supervisory powers
- It can set up Committees of inquiry to investigate alleged maladministration (Article 193).
- It may receive petitions from EU citizens (Article 194).
- It mat appoint an ombudsman to investigate complaints by EU citizens (Article 195)
- It has the right to put questions to the Commission at Parliamentary debates and Committee meetings (Article 197)
- It may question the Council at Parliamentary debates (although the Council determines its own attendance at such debates) (Article 197) or in writing (Article 25 of the Councils Rules of Procedure as adopted by Council Decision 93/662/OJ 1993 L304/1)
- It has the right to debate the Commissions annual report (Article 200)
- It can by a two thirds majority, require the whole Commission to resign(Article 201)
The Parliament has two other supervisory powers they are as follows
- it must approve the incoming Commission
- It may initiate proceedings before the Court of Justice in respect of certain Act or omission by the other institutions (Articles 230 and 232)
Virtually all Parliaments experience difficulties in exercising supervisory powers over executives. They do not welcome the prospect of being investigated and seek to protect themselves behind whatever constitutional, institutional or party political defences are available
By Guy de Carmay, Fortune d’Europe (1953)
Under the ancient regime, Parlements were Courts subservient to the executive
Resolution of 20 March 1958 (OJ 1958, p6)
Resolution of 30 March 1962 (OJ 1962 p1045)
Single European Act (Article 3(1))
Case 230/81: Luxembourg v European parliament [1983] ECR 255
Roquette Freres v Council (Case 138/79)
European parliament v Council (Case C-65/90)
European Parliament v Council (Case C-388/92)
European parliament v Council (Case C-65/93
European Parliament v Council (Case C 417/93)