The negatives of having an unelected HL is that, without being directly elected, the House of Lords lacks democratic legitimacy. One of the basic principle of representative democracy is that voters choose representatives who govern them and that voters have the opportunity to remove these representatives through elections. So it takes little sense that one of the two Houses of Parliament at Westminster is appointed. Election of the upper house is essential for its democratic legitimacy. Election would give the House of Lords the confidence to fully carry out its work as a scrutineer of government and of proposed legislation. It would make the upper house more representative of public opinion and changes in the electorate's views over time than it is as an appointed chamber. Furthermore, ending the appointment of members would reduce the party leaders' power of patronage that exists under the current system, and reduce the possibility of corruption in choosing members of the Lords.
In addition, the membership of an elected upper house, if designed appropriately, would look different from that of the House of Commons and would not be dominated by party politics. A directly elected house could be chosen using a form of proportional representation (PR), therefore making it unlikely that one single party would dominate the composition and functioning of the house. Use of PR would ensure that the upper house would be more representative of voters’ support for parties than the Commons, where disproportionality in the translation of votes into seats is often high. Electing the upper house at a different time to the Commons, such as at the same time as European elections, would also help to ensure its composition differs from that of the lower house. Members of the upper house could be elected for long, non-renewable terms meaning they would be less influenced by short-term electoral considerations and so could take a longer-term view on legislation might be possible for many members of the Commons.
Furthermore, the expertise of an appointed House of Lords is often overstated for some areas of policy. One of the most frequently made arguments in favour of an elected House of Lords is that the chamber brings a wide array of expertise to bear on the legislative process While this is true for some areas of policy, particularly legal, constitutional and some scientific matters, research on peers’ understanding of social policy - the largest area of public spending — shows this to be patchy. MPs tend to have a greater knowledge of this area of policy, at least partly due to their contacts with constituents. More broadly, research facilities for members of the Lords are more limited than those in the lower house, leaving peers more likely to rely on materials from lobbyists. Moving to a fully elected upper house is the logical next step in reform of the Lords. The UK constitution has been altered in many ways since 1997, including devolution in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, the creation of a Supreme Court and the introduction of the Human Rights Act. Reform of the Lords has been only partial.
On the other hand the positives of having and unelected HL is that, direct election is not required for the upper house to have legitimacy. Direct election is essential to the legitimacy of the House of Commons. Elections to the Commons determine who forms the government, and only the Commons can dismiss the government through a confidence motion. The government and individual MPs, who represent the interests of their constituents, are held accountable at the ballot box. But the House of Lords has a different role: it is primarily a revising chamber that scrutinises proposed legislation. The distinction between 'input legitimacy’ and 'output legitimacy' is helpful here. The Commons has input legitimacy because of its composition (it is directly elected); the Lords has output legitimacy because of what it delivers (i.e. better quality legislation). Argument about the composition of the Lords obscures our view - the focus should be on how electively it carries out its core function.
Furthermore, an appointed upper house would retain the expertise of life peers. An elected upper house would be less effective because life peers would be removed. Many life peers, particularly crossbenchers who do not take a party whip, have specialist knowledge in areas such as the law, medicine, industry, agriculture, education and culture. This expertise is evident in the quality of debate in the Lords and the work of its committees. It is unlikely that they would stand for election, so their experience would be lost. An appointed upper house could complement the House of Commons by adding an element of functional representation (or descriptive representation) to Parliament. Key groups within civil society could have seats, as could groups underrepresented in the Commons. A strong. Independent appointments commission could deliver this, removing or greatly reducing the role of political parties in the nomination process
In addition, an elected upper house would produce competing claims of legitimacy, foster conflict between the Commons and Lords, and bring gridlock. If both Houses of Parliament were directly elected - and by different electoral systems at different times -- disputes about who represents the will of the people could arise. The constitutional conventions governing relations between the two houses would no longer be suitable. The Salisbury convention, which states that the Lords should not reject bills that enact a manifesto commitment of the governing party, has already come under strain with peers disputing the mandate of governments. New rules of the game would have to be agreed at a time of strained relations. The House of Commons would remain the dominant chamber and it would not be obliged to accept amendments made in the upper house. But if an upper house emboldened by direct election refused to back down, the choices facing the government would be unappealing. It could compromise and find itself unable to implement its manifesto pledges. Or it could resort to the Parliament Act 1949 and enact legislation without the consent of the lords after a gap of 1 year. In short, an elected upper house would flex its muscles, producing gridlock and doing little to improve the quality of legislation.
by
adnanx99yahoocom (student)
