Another effect of FPTP is that it restricts the chance of small extremist parties from gaining seats in Parliament. During the 2010 elections, the BNP gained 563,743 votes which made up 1.9% of the overall vote. If we have used the national list system they should have theoretically gained 12 seats in Westminster, but because of FPTP they have none today. The SNP however only had 491,386 votes yet they managed to gain 6 seats, this is because FPTP favours parties who’s support is concentrated in certain constituencies. The BNP may have many supporters nationally, but electors who vote for them may find their vote wasted in many cases because other parties the BNP are standing for win. This produces an unfair weighting of votes, where those in marginal seats determine the outcome of the results as a whole. It is therefore unfair and undemocratic thus questioning the legitimacy of government. However, PR seems to be producing the almost opposite effect in the Northern Ireland Assembly elections 2007. Due tot eh use of STV, the Progressive Unionist Party were able to gain one seat in the Assembly even though they only had 0.6% of first preference voting. There is likelihood therefore for smaller parties to gain the respective number of seats under PR.
Similarly, apart from wasted votes, FPTP also produces votes of unequal value for example in May 2010; the Liberal Democrats had an average of 120,000 votes to one seat whereas the Conservatives only needed 35,000 votes to gain one seat. This is disproportionately unfair because the number of seats given do not reflect the number of votes cast, one of the main drawbacks of FPTP, this therefore diminishes the chance of small parties obtaining power. The regional list system however, produces a very proportional allocation of seats, and when closed, it is beneficial to candidates of ethnic minorities and gender because the voter concentrates on the party manifesto instead of the personality of said candidate. Also, a threshold is usually placed so smaller parties cannot have a major influence on Parliament. If the UK had used this system with a threshold of 3%, Westminster would have found itself to only contain 4 parties: Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrats and UKIP. The list system therefore reduces the number of parties in Parliament which may or may not be beneficial to the electorate.
Also, with FPTP a strong relationship between MPs and constituents is in place, the electorate knows who to lobby if they want a specific issue raised in Parliament whether locally or nationally through their MP either during PMQ or as Private Member Bills. This is very important especially in the 21st Century where fewer and fewer eligible voters actually vote. Systems such as the national list system would mean the loss of this important relationship and even if the link is retained, with the use of PR electoral systems the relationship would be watered down into a weaker form of what it is today. This would mean that people may become more disillusioned with politics and hindered from raising their views to representatives.
With all these factors into consideration between FPTP and PR, the question of the government’s mandate to govern can also be raised. Under FPTP, no government has gained a majority of over 50% of votes. This means that their mandate to govern can be called into question; if they do not have even over half of the support in the UK then they should surely not be allowed to govern on behalf of the whole adult population. In 1997, Labour’s landslide victory, they had 43% of the vote but 63.4% of the seats in the Commons. This is highly undemocratic and produces a Commons that does not accurately represent the political views of society in the UK. If other electoral systems like AMS or the list system were implemented, at least some minority parties like UKIP would have a chance of power and some seats rather than none, because in Parliament, one vote for or against could make a huge difference.