Liberal political theorists have sought to develop a theory of politics, which accepts the irreconcilable differences over what the ‘good’ life for human beings actually is, and what their nature is thought to be. Their concept of liberalism is thus concerned with ‘rules’ which will provide the individual will the greatest amount of freedom to pursue their own personal good in their own way so long as it does not interfere with another individuals freedom or act unjustly. This idea is supported by Joseph Raz when he quotes, “[liberalism is] committed to moral pluralism, that is to the view that there are many worthwhile and valuable relationships, commitments and plans of life which a re mutually incompatible” (Plant, 1999, p. 76). This argument clearly seems to support the case of both routes to success being open to individuals in order to allow them to ‘pursue their own personal good their own way’. This could be through means of education or by entering competitions such as that described in the question. The ethics of rules rather than goals is the main trait to this type of liberalism and that these rules can be justified by arguments which do not make particular assumptions about the good life.
Raymond Plant, when he postulates, “neutrality is a central value in liberalism and for its project to be coherent it has to show that the rules which define a liberal society can be derived from a position of neutrality in relation to differing conceptions of good.” (Plant, 1999, p. 77), adds weight to the argument that the government should not favour one route to success over another because people are individualistic and cannot all progress via the same means. This is further supported by Hayek with his view that “the laws of a free society should be framed independently of a particular view of human purposes and goals (Plant, 1999, p. 80).
Dworkin posits, “that political decisions must be as far as possible independent of conceptions of the good life. Since citizens of a society differ in these conceptions, the government does not treat them as equals if it prefers one conception to another”. Taking this theory into account it should therefore be considered fair that different types of people are able to attempt to gain rewarding careers in different fields.
The question of human nature and the ultimate attainment of goals by the individual is discussed further by Rawls in his book ‘A Theory of Justice’. His theory of primary goods and the original posititon became especially relevant. According to Rawls, it is possible to define a set of primary goods that are desired by everyone irrespective of whatever their own perception of good may be, and is independent of any particular assumptions about human nature. Rawls uses a device called the ‘thin’ theory of the good to explain these issues. Firstly, he assumes that all rational persons have ‘thick’ or developed theories of good. That is, they have a plan of life, an idea of what they would like to be or what they would like to achieve in life, and of their own personality and purposes. Such theories describes the conditions in which would allow us to flourish and meet our own ends. In a pluralistic society these plans of life will be different and incommensurable. However, this does not mean that an agreed account of some goods could not be arrived at even in a radically morally pluralist society. These goods are what he calls the ‘thin’ theory of good, and includes a range of goods that will be required by any rational person I order to be ale to carry out their life plan whatever it may turn out to be. Included amongst Rawls’ ‘thin’ goods are rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth and a sense of self-respect. With this in mind, it can therefore be seen that to deny individuals their rights to ‘thin’ goods such as opportunity and liberty, then they are unable to pursue their ‘thick’ good, i.e. their desired life plan. Relating this to the question then, in accordance with this theory if individuals were to be denied the liberty to make their own choices on their own future and the opportunity to achieve success in their desired field then they may not have a rewarding career regardless of education.
Hirsch supplies a valid argument when he suggests that education is a positional good in the sense that the value of education depends to a large degree on its scarcity value. Appling that to this essay, the government’s attempts at expansion of the university system and to exhort students into that system in order for them to achieve a rewarding career could not succeed on its own. This is because education cannot be distributed more equally without changing its value to those who consume it. Far from increasing equality and lessening tensions the more equal distribution of education has led to the growth of credentialism, with more and higher qualifications being demanded for jobs, which in previous generations may not have required a qualification at all. Wider spread availability of university education will not necessarily mean a greater opportunity for greater numbers to find rewarding careers but only that the same old jobs would now require more advanced qualifications. Therefore it is necessary for other routes to successful careers to exist, such as that described in the question so that a utilitarianist situation can arise, i.e. the greatest good for the greatest number.
Thus far we have examined a number of arguments that suggest that the availability of both routes suggests a fair and well-ordered society, however cases could be put forward to suggest otherwise. For example, do the two paths to success stated in the question involve the same level of difficulty? The answer to this question, most probably, is no because working towards a good degree involves at least three years of hard work, not to mention the years of work necessary to qualify for a place at university in the first place. Whereas, to win a competition such as ‘Pop Idol’ involves only a few, although intense, weeks of preparation. However it could be argued that for some, incredibly academically intelligent individuals, gaining a university degree does not pose as much difficulty for them as winning a competition such as ‘Pop Idol’ would pose for another.
In Political Liberalism John Rawls continues and revises the idea of justice as fairness he presented in A Theory of Justice, but changes its philosophical interpretation in a fundamental way. His earlier work assumed what Rawls calls a "well-ordered society," one that is stable, relatively homogenous in its basic moral beliefs, and in which there is broad agreement about what constitutes the good life. Yet in modern democratic society a plurality of incompatible and irreconcilable doctrines - religious, philosophical, and moral - coexist within the framework of democratic institutions. Indeed, free institutions themselves encourage this plurality of doctrines as the normal outgrowth of freedom over time. Recognizing this as a permanent condition of democracy, Rawls therefore asks, how can a stable and just society of free and equal citizens live in concord when deeply divided by these reasonable, but incompatible, doctrines? His answer is based on a redefinition of a "well-ordered society." It is no longer a society united in its basic moral beliefs but in its political conception of justice, and this justice is the focus of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Justice as fairness is now presented as an example of such a political conception; that it can be the focus of an overlapping consensus means that it can be endorsed by the main religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines that endure over time in a well-ordered society. Such a consensus, Rawls believes, represents the most likely basis of society unity available in a constitutional democratic regime. Were it achieved, it would extend and complete the movement of thought that began three centuries ago with the gradual if reluctant acceptance of the principle of toleration. This process would end with the full acceptance and understanding of modern liberties.
